Organized by Ruben Durante (ICREA, UPF, IPEG, and BSE), Ruben Enikolopov (New Economic School, ICREA, UPF, IPEG, and BSE), Gianmarco León-Ciliotta (UPF, IPEG, and BSE), Maria Petrova (ICREA, UPF, IPEG, BSE, and New Economic School), Giacomo Ponzetto (CREI, UPF, IPEG, and BSE), Marta Reynal-Querol (ICREA-UPF, BSE , and IPEG) and Sandro Shelegia (UPF and BSE).

This workshop is focused on the causes and effects of political institutions, and the behavior of voters and politicians facing different constraints, incentives and information. We encourage submissions of theoretical and empirical papers from economics and political science addressing questions including:
• How do political institutions promote or hinder economic development?
• Why do particular sets of political institutions emerge and persist?
• How do transparency and accountability affect politicians’ incentives?
• How do voters react to information, and to what effect?
• What is the impact of different electoral systems on policy choices?