

1 HAS THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP
2 AFFECTED MEDITERRANEAN BUSINESS CYCLES? *

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5 **Abstract**

6 We date turning points of the reference cycle for 19 Mediterranean countries and
7 analyze their structure and interdependences. Fluctuations are volatile and not highly
8 correlated across countries; recessions are deep but asynchronous making average out-
9 put losses in the area limited. Heterogeneities across countries and regions are sub-
10 stantial. Mediterranean cycles are time varying but their evolution is not linked with
11 the Euro-Mediterranean partnership process. The concordance of cyclical fluctuations
12 is poorly related to trade and financial linkages and to their evolution over time.

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14 Keywords: Turning points, Reference cycles, Euro-Mediterranean partnership, trade and
15 financial interdependences.

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1 Introduction

One of the main objectives of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership is to enhance economic and financial cooperation between member countries and create an area of shared prosperity through sustained socioeconomic development, see <http://www.eeas.europa.eu/euromed>. To achieve this goal, the EU has established preferential relationships with non-EU Mediterranean partners, including bilateral association agreements and the European neighbourhood policy (ENP). The scope of bilateral association agreements is to establish a regional free trade area, both in terms of North-South and of South-South relationships, and create a common regulatory platform among the partners. The ENP instead seeks to create an area of stability, prosperity, democracy and peaceful solution of conflicts by offering to participating countries a stake in the EU internal market, and supports economic convergence toward EU standards with important financial packages (the so-called ENPI instruments).

These association agreements produced structural reform in a number of Mediterranean countries - trade was liberalized, entry barriers for foreign banks into domestic financial markets were lowered, and red tape for starting business reduced - changing the structure of the local economies. For example, the EU is now the first trading partner of Mediterranean countries and Mediterranean partners (excluding Turkey) account for more than 5 percent of overall EU trade in goods. In addition, in the last 5 years Mediterranean exports (imports) to the EU increased by 11 (8) percent a year, the fastest growing percentage of any commercial area with the EU in the world. Similarly, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from the EU to the area, while still small in volume, have grown at the rate of 10 percent a year.

Drawing from similar experiences elsewhere in the world, one can conjecture that the increased interconnection with the EU will have positive effects on the growth prospects of the Mediterranean in the years to come. However, increased interdependencies are likely to bring an important side effect: economies which in the past were insulated from EU cyclical fluctuations are now likely to be more affected by them. Thus, from a theoretical point of view, it is important to measure the impact of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership on Mediterranean business cycles and, from a welfare point of view, to consider the externalities that EU policies may have for business cycles non-EU countries in the region.

How should one expect cyclical fluctuations of a small economy to change when it becomes more interconnected with a large economy? Increased cross-border interdependences should

47 make cyclical fluctuations more similar. Greater openness to trade and increased financial
48 flows are likely to make the small economy more sensitive to external shocks and increase
49 the comovements of domestic and foreign variables by expanding or intensifying the channels
50 through which shocks spill across countries. However, increased economic integration could
51 lead to more asynchronous output fluctuations, as countries specialize in the production
52 of goods for which they have comparative advantage and freely trade them in the world
53 markets. Thus, production cycles could become idiosyncratic while consumption cycles are
54 perfectly correlated. While there is evidence in favour of the first type of effects (see e.g.
55 Canova and Dellas, 1993, Frankel and Rose, 1998), many Mediterranean countries possess
56 natural resources absent in the EU, thus making the second hypothesis relevant for the
57 region. In general, to evaluate the effects that the Euro-Mediterranean partnership will
58 have on the cyclical fluctuations and the welfare prospects of the area, one must know how
59 cyclical fluctuations in the Mediterranean basin look like and understand what contributes to
60 transmit fluctuations within the region and from the EU to non-EU countries. Canova and
61 Ciccarelli (2012) provide a first look at business cycles in the area and at their time variations
62 but do not study the structure of cyclical fluctuations nor the transmission mechanism across
63 countries. This paper fills this gap and contributes to the literature in two ways.

64 For students of business cycles, we provide a novel business cycle turning point classifica-
65 tion, which was unavailable for many countries in the region and absent for the Mediterranean
66 as a whole, and a set of stylized facts summarizing the features of fluctuations in the area.
67 Both are likely to be useful to test domestic and international models of the business cycle,
68 to understand the cyclical characteristics of developed, developing and frontier economies,
69 and to evaluate in which direction existing models need to be modified to capture realistic
70 aspects of Mediterranean fluctuations. For policymakers, we provide a characterization of
71 the cyclical fluctuations in different countries and regions of the basin, which may help them
72 to formulate policies better achieving their integration goals, and an interim evaluation of
73 the effects of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. Finally, because policy actions are pri-
74 marily directed to increase trade and financial interdependences in the region, and because
75 a large literature tries to explain the increased correlation of cyclical fluctuations between
76 developed and less developed countries via trade and financial links (see e.g. Imbs, 2010,
77 for a recent effort and references within), we measure what variations in trade and financial
78 interdependencies have done to cyclical fluctuations in the area.

79 We use up to five quarterly series (real GDP, unemployment, industrial production, real
80 income, and real sales) for 19 Mediterranean countries in our exercise. Since not all the
81 series are available and for the entire time span, and since starting dates are often irregularly
82 distributed, we use different weighting schemes to aggregate variables specific turning points
83 and choose turning point dates to minimize distortions and spurious patterns.

84 Mediterranean business cycles have some standard features but also important specificities,
85 which set them apart from those of other regions of the world. In particular, a vast
86 heterogeneity of patterns in terms of persistence, volatility and comovements emerges across
87 countries and regions. We find, for example, that cyclical upturns and downturns are not
88 generally well synchronized, and while comovements increased in the recent recession, its
89 absolute level is considerably below the one reported for countries in Asia or Latin America.
90 The number complete cycles in different countries (regions) is also different and amplitudes
91 and durations are very much country specific. Finally, the cross sectional distribution of
92 output losses in recessions is quite spread out and North African countries are decoupled
93 from the major EU countries in the region in this respect.

94 The structure of cyclical fluctuations changes over time. However, while persistence and
95 the volatility are affected, the concordance of turning points is not. Thus, it is difficult
96 to associate these variations with the political and institutional changes that the Euro-
97 Mediterranean partnership has brought about. Finally, while the correlation between bilateral
98 interdependences and the synchronicity of cyclical fluctuations has increased over time
99 on average, it does not appear to be generally true that Mediterranean countries who signed
100 trade agreements with EU saw this correlation increase more than the average. Hence, ei-
101 ther the effects of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership have not yet materialized, because
102 of institutional and political delays, or the heterogeneity of Mediterranean economies is so
103 large that current measures, while going in the correct direction, only have minimal impact
104 on the correlation structure of cyclical fluctuations. The recent political turmoil in the Arab
105 world suggests that both stories could to be true and that more needs to be done before the
106 Mediterranean becomes a meaningful economic entity.

107 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the methodology
108 used to date turning points of individual series and to aggregate individual turning points
109 into a reference cycle, and the statistics used to summarize the characteristics of reference
110 cycles. Section 3 presents the main results. Section 4 concludes.

2 The methodology

The literature concerned with the detection of turning points in economic activity has generally followed two approaches (see Hamilton, 2010, for a survey). The dominant approach, both in academics and in the real-time practice of dating committees, focuses attention on few aggregated time series and date turning points employing particular macroeconomic aggregates. For example, a turning in economic activity is typically calculated using real GDP or an index of coincident indicators. Press releases of the NBER and the CEPR Business Cycle Dating Committees indicate that a handful of aggregated macroeconomic time series are typically looked at but that certain variables (such as employment and GDP) receive a larger weight in the decision to call a turning point or not (see e.g. NBER, 2008, or CEPR, 2010). The existing practice is therefore consistent with the idea that one should try to aggregate macroeconomic information first and then detect turning points using highly aggregated series (we call this the "average then date" approach).

As Harding and Pagan (2002) and (2006) have suggested, the "average then date" approach is inconsistent with the methodology employed by pioneers of business cycle analysis, who instead considered a large number of disaggregated series, identified turning points in each of these series, and then determined reference cycle turning points using the distribution of the turning points of the disaggregated series; see Burns and Mitchell (1946, p. 13 and pp. 77-80) (we call this the "date then average" approach).

The two methods are likely to give different turning points classification and a different picture of various cyclical phases since the aggregation of non-linear functions (such as dating turning points) is not the same as the non-linear function of the aggregate. Nevertheless, there are theoretical and practical reasons to consider both methods useful. In general, little is known about the properties of the two approaches and apart a few motivated cases (see e.g. Stock and Watson, 2010), it is a matter of taste which procedure is selected.

In this study, we use the "date then average" approach and construct reference cycles for a country, a region, or an area. Our effort is constrained by strong data limitations. Data availability in fact forces us to concentrate attention on up to five quarterly real indicators (GDP, industrial production, unemployment rate, real income and sales) and for 19 Mediterranean countries only - Algeria, Croatia, Cyprus, Egypt, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Macedonia, Morocco, Portugal, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Tunisia and Turkey

¹. The series are chosen to maintain the closest match with the practices of the NBER and the CEPR dating committees. Because not all series are available for all countries and, in a country, the starting date of different series often differ, time varying weights are used to construct the reference cycle in individual countries. The weights are restricted so that at each point in time they sum to one. Thus, our approach can be thought as the discrete time counterpart of the weighting scheme for stratified data of Stock and Watson (2010).

We date turning points in the (log) level of individual series. Hence, the cycles we examine are "level" rather than "growth" cycles - the latter are computed after a trend is removed from each time series. Level cycles are preferable because it is difficult to specify the time series properties of the trend and its correlation with the cycle in small samples (see e.g. Canova, 2007). These difficulties lead to important specification and measurement errors that may distort our perception of the features of cyclical fluctuations

2.1 Dating turning points in individual series

To date turning points in individual series we adapt Bry and Boschan's (1971) methodology to quarterly data. Since the approach is relatively well known in the literature, we only briefly describe its features.

An observation y_t is considered a candidate peak of a variable y if $y_t \in \max\{y_{t-2}, y_{t-1}, y_t, y_{t+1}, y_{t+2}\}$, and a candidate trough if $y_t \in \min\{y_{t-2}, y_{t-1}, y_t, y_{t+1}, y_{t+2}\}$. This rule is weaker than a rule that imposes, for example, that a candidate peak satisfies $y_{t-2} < y_{t-1} < y_t > y_{t+1} > y_{t+2}$ and a candidate trough satisfies $y_{t-2} > y_{t-1} > y_t < y_{t+1} < y_{t+2}$. Therefore, we impose additional restrictions to reduce the set of potential turning point candidates. A candidate is accepted as a actual turning point if the following censoring rules are satisfied:

- Peaks and troughs must alternate. In case of a violation, e.g. a peak is followed by a peak, the lower of the two peaks is eliminated.
- A peak (though) must be higher than the previous trough (peak).
- The minimum length of a peak-peak and a trough-trough cycle is 5 quarters.
- The minimum length of a peak-trough and a trough-peak phase is 2 quarters.

¹When constructing a reference cycle, we date $-u_t$, so that a peak corresponds to a low level of unemployment and a trough to a high level of unemployment.

- 169 • Turning points occurring in the first 2 and in the last 2 quarters are eliminated.
- 170 • Peaks (troughs) at the beginning or end which are lower (higher) than the initial
- 171 (ending) values are eliminated.

172 The first two restrictions are obvious and require no comments. The third and the fourth
 173 are arbitrary but typical in the literature. For robustness, we have also produced a turning
 174 point classification requiring that a complete cycle must last, at least, 7 quarters and that
 175 expansion and recession phases must last, at least, 3 quarters (see appendix B). The last
 176 two constraints are employed to avoid that measurement errors and data revisions spuriously
 177 affect turning point dates. These rules were sufficient to uniquely date turning points in all
 178 the series and in all countries.

179 2.2 Constructing a reference cycle for each country

180 Consider a series $y_{it}^j, i = 1, \dots, 5$ in country $j = 1, \dots, 19$. Given the turning points dates
 181 we have computed for each individual series, we calculate at each t the distance in quarters
 182 to the nearest peak and create the new series $mp_t(i)^j$. Similarly, we calculate at each t
 183 the distance in quarters to the nearest trough and create the new series $mt_t(i)^j$. We then
 184 aggregate $mp_t(i)^j$ and $mt_t(i)^j$ over i and look for dates where the two aggregates reach their
 185 minimum. Intuitively, low values in mp_t^j (mt_t^j) indicate that several series are close to a peak
 186 (through) at time t . Thus, local minima of mp_t^j and mt_t^j are candidate peaks and troughs
 187 of the reference cycle. Once the candidates are identified, the same censoring rules used to
 188 date individual series turning points are applied to candidate reference turning points, and
 189 a unique set dates is selected for each country.

190 How one aggregates the individual $mp_t(i)^j$ and $mt_t(i)^j$ matters, especially because not
 191 all series start at the same date in each country. We have experimented with a number of
 192 approaches, including employing the simple mean, the weighted mean (with higher weights
 193 given to output and unemployment), and the median as an aggregate measure. In what
 194 follows, we primarily discuss results obtained when the weighted mean is used to aggregate
 195 single series information. For comparison, we also report country specific reference cycles
 196 dates obtained when the median is used to aggregate single series information.

2.3 Constructing a reference cycle for a region

With reference cycle for each country $j = 1, \dots, 19$, we apply the same techniques described in the previous subsections to construct a reference cycle for a region or an area. That is, for each j , we construct two new series rp_t^j and rt_t^j , measuring the distance in quarters to the nearest peak and the nearest trough. The two series are then aggregated over j belonging to a region or an area and we search for minima in the two aggregated series. Once candidate dates are identified, we apply the same censoring rules used for individual series and countries to identify a regional or an area reference cycle turning point.

We considered various regional grouping. Since there is some evidence that cycles tend to cluster around certain geographical poles (see Canova and Ciccarelli, 2012), we split the Mediterranean into four geographical regions - Major European countries (Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Greece), other European countries (Malta, Cyprus, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Slovenia), East Mediterranean countries (Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Israel) and the North African countries (Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco). We also aggregate country specific information using the monetary arrangement - in a group we have Euro-area countries and in the other non Euro-area countries - or the level of income-per-capita at the end of the sample - in one group we have the poor countries and in the other the rich countries.

The Mediterranean reference cycle is obtained aggregating the reference cycles of the 19 countries using the same censoring rules previously described.

2.4 The features of cyclical fluctuations

We summarize the features of the reference cycles with four statistics: the duration of expansions and recessions; the amplitude of expansions; the magnitude of the cumulative movements in recessions and the bilateral concordance of business cycle turning points.

The duration statistics measure the persistence and the amplitude statistics the volatility of cyclical fluctuations. Taken together they may suggest the presence of asymmetries in business cycle phases which, in turn, inform us about potentially non-linearities in the process generating cyclical fluctuations. We compute amplitudes and cumulative movements in recession using both real GDP and industrial production. While industrial production is a more imprecise proxy of the level of aggregate level economic activity, especially in countries where the service sector is large, it has the advantage of being available for all countries -

227 GDP in many cases it is not. Amplitude measures are reported in percentage terms, relative
228 to the previous turning point; that is, we report the level of GDP (IP) at the peak relative
229 to the level of GDP (IP) at the trough minus one. This facilitates the quantification of
230 size of the fluctuations. We compute the magnitude of cumulative movements in two ways:
231 using the actual decrease in GDP (IP) or using its triangular approximation. Letting D_i
232 be the duration of phase i and C_i the amplitude of phase i , the triangular approximation
233 to the cumulative movements in phase i is $C_i = 0.5(D_i C_i)$. This statistic gives us an idea
234 of the output loss incurred, say, in a recession - a measure which is typically of interest
235 among policymakers and approximates the welfare losses of business cycles that can be
236 computed in theoretical models. Finally, the concordance index is a pairwise measure of the
237 synchronization of the reference cycle turning points.

238 Since we are interested in assessing whether countries which have entered in preferential
239 agreements with the EU present important differences in their cyclical statistics relative to
240 countries which have either not entered in such agreements, we will compare amplitude,
241 duration and concordance measures over subsamples.

242 3 The results

243 The presentation of the results is organized in four parts. First, we describe the features of
244 the reference cycles of individual countries, of selected regions, and of the Mediterranean.
245 Second, we discuss summary statistics characterizing these reference cycles. Third, we study
246 how summary statistics change over time. Finally, we examine the importance of trade
247 and financial interdependencies for cyclical fluctuations in the area and zoom-in on the
248 relationship for a selected countries that have entered preferential agreements with the EU.

249 3.1 The turning points of the national reference cycles

250 Table 1 presents the chronology of turning points for each of the 19 countries. As far as we
251 know, it is the first time that such a compilation is presented for Mediterranean countries.
252 This information is useful for researchers analyzing cyclical fluctuations in developed and
253 developing countries and for policymakers interested in devising measures increasing their
254 synchronization. A chronology of the turning points for the individual series in each country
255 appears in appendix B, both when a five-quarters and a seven-quarters minimum duration

rule are employed to classify complete cycles.

In general, how we aggregate individual series turning points into a reference cycle does not matter much - compare the two columns of table 1 - and even less so when only some of the five aggregate macroeconomic series are available. Since for less developed countries of the area, sales, real income and GDP are not often available, the dates we obtain for these countries are quite robust. Classification differences appear for the main European countries and primarily occur when not all of the five variables are in phase. For example, there is a complete cycle in France between 1973:4 and 1974:4 when the reference is cycle is constructed using the weighted mean, which is absent when the median is employed. Similarly, the complete 1998:2-1999:4 cycle, which appears when the median is used to aggregate individual French series turning points, is absent when the weighted mean is employed. Overall, complete cycles tend to be slightly longer and less numerous when the median employed. Therefore, it is more difficult to pass the censoring rules for turning point classification when the median is used to aggregate individual information. However, when a turning point is found, it is more difficult to exit a cyclical phase if the median is used.

Reference cycles have quite heterogeneous features. They appear to be relatively short in some countries, see e.g. Greece, Italy and Portugal, but in others, long expansionary phases are present, see for example, Cyprus from 1995:3 to 2008:3; France from 1958:3 to 1974:3 and from 1993:3 to 2008:1, Jordan from 1995:3 to 2009:3, Slovenia from 1999:1 to 2008:3, and Spain from 1982:3 to 1991:4 and from 1993:2 to 2007:3. Recessionary phases are, on average, shorter than expansionary phases, but not uniformly so (see, for example, the case of Italy). Interestingly, the features of reference cycles of developed, less developed and frontier economies in the area are not very different. In fact, in each of these groups, there are countries which display cycles with short or long periodicity and these could be symmetric or asymmetric. Thus, reference cycles do not cluster along a development indicator. Similarly, being or not being a member of the EU is irrelevant for the structure of cyclical fluctuations: the only difference being that turning points are slightly more frequent in the non-EU members. A more detailed investigation of the effects of institutional and geographical factors on Mediterranean cyclical fluctuations is in the next subsection.

The most recent recessionary episode gives a useful snapshot of how heterogeneous reference cycles are nowadays and an independent check on the reasonableness of the procedure used to construct reference cycles. The Mediterranean seems to be split into three different

288 portions: the first portion includes countries which experienced a recession and by 2010 are
289 back into an expansionary phase; the second comprises countries which entered a recession
290 and have not yet displayed a cyclical through; and the third includes countries missing the
291 recession and displaying only an irregular and temporary slowdown in economic activity. In
292 the first group we have Croatia, Egypt, France, Italy, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Portugal,
293 Slovenia, Tunisia and Turkey; in the second group we have Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Jordan,
294 Macedonia, Serbia and Spain; Algeria is the only country without a recession. Note however
295 that there is considerable variation in the turning point dates in the first two groups: peak
296 dates are scattered over the 2007:3-2009:3 period but 2008:2 and 2008:3 have the highest
297 frequency; through dates instead are almost uniformly distributed between the 2008:2 and
298 2009:2. Therefore, while there appears to be a certain degree of synchronization in entering
299 the recession, there is a high degree of non-synchronization in exiting it. This observation
300 is consistent with what is known in the literature. For example, Canova et al. (2007) sug-
301 gested that G-7 cycles are more synchronized in recessions than in expansions and Imbs
302 (2010) termed the 2008-09 recession "the first global recession in decades", because of the
303 synchronicity in the timing and the generality of the pattern.

304 The presence of heterogeneities in the 2008-09 recessions is highlighted in Figure 1,
305 which presents the dynamics of output and of the unemployment rate since each country's
306 last cyclical peak. For comparison, the cyclical peak is normalized to 100 and scaled so
307 that it occurs in period 1 in each country. Clearly, the dynamics entering (and exiting) the
308 recession are quite different across countries. We have countries mild and relatively short
309 output recessions (France, Morocco, Italy, Portugal and Tunisia), countries with sharp and
310 short output recessions (Lebanon) and countries with relatively long and mild recessions (all
311 the others, including those which have not experiences a cyclical through). Some countries
312 display a sustained trend increase in unemployment since the last cyclical peak (e.g. France,
313 Italy and Spain), in others the unemployment rate is quite acyclical (e.g. Egypt, Morocco
314 and Tunisia) and in one the unemployment rate falls during the recession (Croatia). Note
315 that the unemployment rate lags the reference cycle in major European countries by one or
316 two quarters, but elsewhere real activity and the unemployment rate are quite coincident.
317 Hence, even during this "global" recession, cross country difference in the size of output and
318 unemployment losses, in the duration and the persistence of the episode are quite large.

3.2 A chronology for regions and for the Mediterranean basin

Given the large number of countries we examine and the considerable idiosyncratic component present in the national cyclical fluctuations, it is difficult to construct stylized business cycle facts for the Mediterranean using national reference cycles. For this reason, we collapse the individual country information into regions constructed using geographical characteristics, monetary arrangements, and the wealth per-capita at the end of the sample. When we use geographical characteristics, we split the countries into four groups. In the Major European countries group we have France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece; in the Other European countries group we have Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia, Macedonia, Malta, Cyprus; in the Eastern Mediterranean group we have Turkey, Israel, Lebanon, Jordan; and in the North Africa group we have Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria. When we split countries according to their institutional arrangements, we put countries which belong to the Euro area (France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Slovenia, Malta, Cyprus) in one group and the rest in the non-Euro area group. Finally, when we reorganize business cycle information using a wealth indicator, we choose 29.000US dollars for GDP per capita (PPP adjusted) in 2010 as cut off point. Thus, France, Italy, Spain, Israel are the rich countries, while the poor group includes all the others. Table 2 reports turning points dates clustering the 19 countries into these alternative regional groups.

When geographical proximity is used to group countries, regional heterogeneities are still overwhelming. For the common samples, turning points are hardly synchronized and certain regions experience many more (short) cycles than others. For example, consistent with the CEPR classification, the Major European countries group displays only 3 complete reference cycles with recessions starting in 1980:1, 1992:1 and 2008:1. On the contrary, the Other European countries group displays 5 full complete reference cycles over the last 30 years; and the North African countries group has 5 complete reference cycles but now for the shorter sample starting in 1990:1. Thus, not only the concordance of regional cycles is low; the persistence of regional cycles is also quite different.

The most recent recession in the Major European countries lasted roughly one year, twice as long as in the Other European countries group or in the North Africa group. For the Eastern Mediterranean group a trough can not yet be identified, because the four countries in the region are quite heterogeneous in both the timing of the upturn and the magnitude of the fall, making the recession appear quite long. For example, while Turkey roughly

351 follows the pattern of the Major European countries group, Israel and Jordan have not yet
352 displayed a through and in Lebanon a recession started about one year earlier than in the
353 other countries and terminated by 2008:2.

354 The other two classifications confirm the presence of profound differences in the nature
355 of cyclical fluctuations in the Mediterranean. The Euro area group displays seven complete
356 cycles, most of which are concentrated in the early part of the sample, with expansions being
357 generally longer than contractions while the non-Euro group displays six complete cycles, but
358 its time distribution is exactly the opposite of those in the Euro group (four cycles occurred
359 in the last 15 years), and cycles are more symmetric. Moreover, at least at the beginning of
360 the sample, expansions phases for the non-Euro group of countries are quite long, suggesting
361 a growth convergence pattern. On the other hand, complete cycles are more numerous in
362 the rich region; the frequency of complete cycles is larger in the earlier part of the sample in
363 the rich region and more equally divided for the poor region; recessions are generally shorter
364 than expansions in the rich region while recessions are quite long in the poor region.

365 Despite the heterogeneous nature of cyclical fluctuations in the region, the Mediterranean
366 reference cycle for the we construct is the first of its kind for the area and it is relevant for both
367 students of business cycles and for policymakers. For example, it can be used to compare
368 business cycles in the region with those of continental Europe and help us to understand
369 whether the region is getting more integrated into the world business cycle or not. Before
370 we describe its features, it is useful to remember that over the available sample, the number
371 of series employed to construct the reference indicator varied with time. In particular, at
372 beginning of the sample only data from the Major European and from some of the Eastern
373 Mediterranean countries is available; for the last decade, data for all countries is more or
374 less available. Hence, the Mediterranean reference cycle reflected the cyclical development
375 of Europe more than those of the Middle East or Africa at the beginning of the sample; but
376 it is more balanced in its regional coverage at the end of the sample.

377 The Mediterranean displayed 7 complete cycles over the last fifty years. The length of the
378 cycles is quite irregular, varying from a minimum of just above 2 years to a maximum of 13
379 years and with mean value of 6.7 years, and the persistence of business cycle phases varied
380 considerably over time. For example, the 1970s were a particularly turbulent period and
381 three recessions materialized in the eight years from 1974 to 1982; the remaining decades
382 have been more stable and one complete cycle, featuring long expansions and relatively

383 short recessions, took place in each. Interestingly, while the US and part of Europe were
384 booming between 1997 and 2001, the region experienced a long recessionary phase during
385 this period. Rather than being due to contagion effects of crises taking place elsewhere in the
386 world, the main reason for this long recession is that the majority of the countries displayed
387 unsynchronized troughs and very slow and uncertain recoveries.

388 Figure 2 zooms in on the last recession and shows the dynamics of real activity and of
389 unemployment around the Mediterranean peak (which occurred in 2008:2). Once again the
390 level of each series in each country is normalized to 100 at the cyclical peak. Consistent
391 with the expectation, real activity displays an inverted U-shaped pattern even though, in
392 some countries, this occurs with a lag relative to Mediterranean peak. There are also several
393 outliers to the pattern and, for example, during the recessionary phase (which lasted until
394 2009:2) Cyprus, Lebanon, Algeria and Morocco quickly surpass the activity level achieved
395 at the Mediterranean peak. The unemployment rate has a the typical U-shaped pattern
396 in many countries. Significant outliers here are Italy, Spain, Turkey and Croatia: in the
397 first three countries, the unemployment rate start increasing up to six quarters prior to the
398 Mediterranean peak: in Croatia, it is falling before and after the peak.

399 3.3 Durations, Amplitudes and Concordances

400 We summarize the cyclical information present in the reference cycles we have constructed in
401 table 3. We report the average duration in quarters of each phase and the average amplitude
402 of expansions computed using GDP growth or, when unavailable, using IP growth. Table 4
403 reports the average cumulative fall in GDP growth (or IP growth) in recessions.

404 Cyclical fluctuations are generally asymmetric: the average duration of expansions ex-
405 ceeds, and sometimes considerably, the average duration of recessions. The Mediterranean
406 spends about 75 per cent of the time in expansions, while the proportion varies between 62
407 and 90 percent when we consider a geographical classification, between 55 and 84 percent
408 when we use the monetary classification, and between 76 and 78 percent when we use a
409 wealth classification. Expansions last, on average, from 3 years to almost 8 years depending
410 on the grouping; recessions last, on average, from one to over 4 years depending on the
411 grouping. The largest asymmetries in the duration of business cycle phases occur in major
412 European countries; in the Eastern Mediterranean and non-European countries asymmetries
413 are moderate. Interestingly, the duration of cyclical phases is very marginally related to the

414 wealth of a country, while geography and the monetary regime matter quite a lot.

415 The volatility of cyclical fluctuations is significant. The average percentage change in
416 either GDP or IP growth for the Mediterranean is around 35-40 percent. Thus, the peak
417 is, on average, more than one third higher than the trough. However, there are important
418 regional differences. For example, in other European countries, GDP at the peak is over
419 70 percent higher than at the trough, while in the North African region the peak is only
420 10 percent higher. Similarly, in Euro area countries the peak is, on average, higher than
421 the trough by about 60 percent while for non-Euro countries the peak is only 10 percent
422 above the trough. Finally, as in the case of duration, the wealth classification seems to be
423 irrelevant for clustering amplitudes: both rich and poor countries have peaks that are about
424 35-40 percent higher than troughs.

425 There is a positive but moderate association between cyclical phases across countries: the
426 mean of the concordance index is 0.62 (the mode is 0.65), the cross sectional distribution of
427 the index is approximately normal, ranges from 0.3 to about 0.9, and the standard deviation
428 is 0.10. The concordance of cyclical phases is higher among Major European countries and
429 lower among the rest of the countries or between these and the Major European countries.
430 The concordance of turning points for other regional classifications is quite dispersed and
431 although the mean is slightly higher (about 0.70), the distribution is far from normal.

432 The cumulative loss in recession for the average Mediterranean country is small and
433 generally becomes larger when industrial production growth is used. The loss for the Ma-
434 jor European countries is also small, while losses for Euro area countries are marginally
435 larger. The average losses for the remaining classifications are positive. To understand this
436 somewhat surprising outcome it is important to remember that recession dates are chosen
437 using the reference cycle for the region (or the area) while losses are calculated averaging
438 the movements in domestic GDP (or IP) growth over those dates. Thus, if there is a large
439 heterogeneity in the timing of the recessions for the countries in the group or if real activity
440 in some countries is strongly asynchronous with the reference cycle, positive and possibly
441 large numbers could result. Hence, the entries of table 4 suggest that GDP (IP) growth
442 fluctuations in countries located in the Eastern part of the Mediterranean and do not adopt
443 the Euro not only have low synchronization with the reference cycle we construct, but often
444 show countercyclical movements.

445 To summarize, cycles phases are generally asymmetric in the Mediterranean, with expan-

446 sions lasting, on average, longer than recessions; fluctuations are not very highly correlated
447 and this is true even for countries sharing a border or having similar structural character-
448 istics; recessions can be deep but average output losses in the area are limited due to the
449 lack of synchronization of output growth turning points. Perhaps the most remarkable fea-
450 ture which distinguish the Mediterranean from other regions in the world is the considerable
451 heterogeneity in the structure of business cycle fluctuations. Cyclical upturns and down-
452 turns are generally not highly synchronized across countries or within regions, and while
453 synchronization increases in the most recent recessionary episode, its absolute level is far
454 below the one reported in other regions. Amplitude, durations and concordances measures
455 all have regional and country specific characteristics. Finally, the cross country distribution
456 of output losses in recessions is quite spread out and losses in North African countries are
457 different from those experienced, e.g., by the major European countries of the area.

458 While the snapshot is not very encouraging as far as regional integration and shared
459 prosperity are concerned, one should also recognize that time averaged statistics may mask
460 important convergence tendencies. After all, it is only since 1995 that policy measures have
461 been taken to foster integration in the area and to share the prosperity that this integration
462 will produce. For this reason, the next subsection examines the evolution of amplitude,
463 duration and concordance measures over two sample periods.

464 **3.4 Are there time variations in the cyclical fluctuations?**

465 While for many countries the sample is not very long, a subsample analysis is useful from at
466 least two perspectives. First, we would like to know whether the globalization trends, which
467 have led to a much higher synchronicity in the cyclical fluctuations between developed and
468 developing countries, are shared by the countries of the Mediterranean basin. Second, since
469 political and economic ties have been enhanced, we want to know whether this process has
470 also brought about changes in the cross country nature of cyclical fluctuations. We split the
471 sample at two different dates: at 1995, when the Barcelona process started, and at 2000.
472 This latter date does not have any special economic interest and it is selected to allow for
473 delays in the effects of the partnership agreements.

474 Table 5, which reports how durations and amplitudes have varied when countries are
475 grouped according to the same regional classifications previously used, suggests that duration
476 statistics are changing, but both the magnitude and the direction of the change is phase and

477 region specific. For example, when the Mediterranean reference cycle is used, recessions last
478 7.2 quarters in the first period and 9.5 quarters in the second, irrespective of the cut-off date,
479 while booms last roughly 20 quarters in the earlier period and 21.5- 26 quarters in the later
480 period, depending on the cut-off date. The length of booms increases in the second sample in
481 all European countries while it decreases in the Eastern Mediterranean and in North Africa.
482 Conversely, the length of recessions is roughly unchanged in the major European countries, it
483 decreases in the other European countries and in the Eastern Mediterranean, and it increases
484 in North Africa. A similar heterogeneity appears with the other two regional classifications.
485 In Euro area countries cyclical phases have become more asymmetric (the length of booms
486 increases and the length of recessions decreases on average), while in non-Euro area both
487 phases become less persistent (both the length of booms and recessions decreases on average).
488 In rich countries, asymmetries are exacerbated in the latter part of the sample, while they
489 are smoothed out in poor countries, primarily because expansions become less persistent.

490 Time heterogeneities are also evident in amplitude measures. For the Mediterranean as
491 a whole, expansions become longer in the second sample when we use 1995 as cut-off date
492 while the opposite is true when using 2000 as cut-off date. We also find that in European
493 countries expansion phases have become stronger while in the Middle East and North Africa
494 expansions have become weaker. In Euro area countries the amplitude of expansions is larger
495 (smaller) when we use the 1995 (2000) cut-off point while for non-Euro area countries no
496 major change is visible. Finally, the amplitude of expansions increases both in rich and poor
497 countries, regardless of the cut-off point used.

498 Interestingly, there are minor changes in the distribution of the concordance index across
499 subsamples. The mean value of the index is 0.62 for the whole sample, 0.60 for the sample
500 up to 2000, and 0.64 for the sample starting at 2001. Thus, while the mean value of the
501 concordance index increases, the increase is not as large as the one reported in, e.g., Imbs
502 (2010), who looked at a large cross section of developed and developing countries.

503 In conclusion, the features of cyclical fluctuations are changing over time with duration
504 and amplitude measures being more affected than the concordance index. However, depend-
505 ing on the regional classification used, cyclical asymmetries turns out to be exacerbated or
506 smoothed out, persistence increased or decreased, and volatility reduced or boosted. Hence,
507 not only cyclical fluctuations in the Mediterranean are heterogeneous; their time evolution
508 is also heterogeneous and there is little evidence that a convergence process is taking place.

509 In this sense, the Mediterranean stands quite apart from the globalization trends observed
510 elsewhere in the world. Furthermore, the time variations we detect are hard to link directly
511 or indirectly to the Euro-Mediterranean process and the political changes that have followed.

512 **3.5 What is the role of trade and financial links?**

513 To learn more about the nature of cyclical fluctuations in the Mediterranean, we next examine
514 how the distribution of the bilateral concordance index relates to the distribution of bilateral
515 trade and financial linkages. We construct bilateral trade (financial) measures summing up
516 imports and exports (capital inflows and outflows) of two particular countries and dividing
517 the result by the sum of total exports and imports (capital inflows and outflows) of the two
518 countries and averaging the result over time. We compute both simple and rank correlation
519 statistics. Since the results are similar, we focus the discussion on rank correlations only.

520 The correlation between concordance and trade indices is quite low - for the full sample
521 it is only 0.22. Thus, countries with a high concordance in the timing of cyclical fluctuations
522 are not necessarily those with high bilateral trade relationships. When we split the sample
523 at the end of 2000, the rank correlation is practically unchanged across subsamples (0.20 in
524 the first sample, 0.19 in the second), while there is a slight increase when simple correlations
525 are used (from 0.17 to 0.25). Overall, the relationship remains quite weak in the 2000s.

526 To look at the same issue from a different angle we compute the percentage of the cross
527 sectional dispersion of the concordance index explained by the cross section dispersion of
528 bilateral trade measures. Trade dispersion explains just 7 percent of the dispersion in the
529 concordance index and for the subsamples the percentage is even lower (1.5 percent in the
530 first, 6 percent in the second). Thus, trade seems to be only a minor determinant of the
531 synchronicity of cyclical fluctuations in the Mediterranean and the recent increase in trade
532 flows has not brought about larger cyclical synchronization.

533 Why is it that trade does not matter? One possibility could be that bilateral trade
534 relationships do capture the extent of trade interdependencies in the region because third
535 countries, outside of the Mediterranean, act as assemblers and exporters of domestically
536 produced products. While this could be an explanation, it is hard to identify who these
537 third countries could be. Alternatively, the generally low correlation between business cycle
538 synchronization and trade could be due to the fact that bilateral trade in the Mediterranean
539 is limited and that for many countries, the main trade partner is the EU. Thus, the results

540 may be spurious since many leakages we considered are not operative. To check for this
541 possibility we focus attention on the concordance of cyclical fluctuations of Morocco and
542 Tunisia, who signed trade agreements with the EU in the middle of the 1990s, with Major
543 European countries and examine the evolution of the trade-concordance correlation over
544 time. We want to see whether the concordance index is better correlated with bilateral
545 trade for this restricted group of countries and whether signing a trade agreement with the
546 EU has changed not only the extent of bilateral trade but also the synchronicity of cyclical
547 fluctuations. It turns out that for the full sample the rank correlation between the two
548 indices is 0.35, higher than what we obtained for all possible pairs in the Mediterranean.
549 However, the percentage of the cross sectional dispersion of concordances explained by the
550 dispersion of trade indices is low (4 percent) and trade explain less of the concordance of
551 cyclical fluctuations in the 2000s than in the earlier part of the sample (0.12 vs. 0.34).

552 Hence, not only the synchronicity of the cyclical fluctuations does not have much to do
553 with trade; there is also little evidence that changes in trade relationships are associated
554 with variations in concordance of cyclical fluctuations either in absolute terms or relative to
555 the average variations in the area. Since trade does not seem to matter, what else could
556 explain the dispersion of concordances in the Mediterranean? A few suspects comes to mind.
557 The first is financial interdependencies. Financial and banking interdependencies are quite
558 low in the area but have increased over the last 10 years. To examine their importance, we
559 have correlated concordance measures with bilateral capital movements for Cyprus, France,
560 Greece, Italy, Jordan, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia and Turkey, which are the only countries for
561 which flows are available. The rank correlation is similar to the one obtained with bilateral
562 trade (0.23) and the percentage of the dispersion of the concordance index explained is equally
563 small (11 percent). The rank correlation slightly increases if the concordance distribution
564 obtained after 2001 is used (0.29), but the percentage of the dispersion explained by financial
565 interdependencies decreases (0.03). Thus, financial interdependencies are unlikely to be "the
566 factor" in explaining the dispersion of concordances in the area.

567 Two other suspects are remittances and tourism flows. While remittances and tourism are
568 important components of GDP and employment in some of the countries of the region (e.g.
569 Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan), data on these two flows is scant and not very reliable,
570 and this renders a systematic investigation of their relationship with cyclical fluctuations
571 difficult to perform. Finally, it could be that institutions (such as the rule of law, the voice

572 and accountability of the political system, etc.) could be important to explain the nature
573 of business cycle fluctuations. Altug et al. (2011) have studied this relationship for a large
574 cross section of developed, developing and emerging markets and found some support for the
575 idea that institutions shape business cycle fluctuations more than standard macroeconomic
576 factors. Their analysis, however, includes only a few Mediterranean countries, and these
577 countries have similar institutions, making it difficult to extend the conclusions to the whole
578 of the basin, where institutional differences turn out to be quite large.

579 4 Conclusions

580 This paper contributes to the literature in two ways. For students of business cycles, we
581 provide a novel business cycle turning point classification constructed using a standardized
582 methodology and a set of stylized facts summarizing the features of the fluctuations in the
583 Mediterranean. Both could be useful to test domestic and international models of the busi-
584 ness cycle, to understand the cyclical characteristics of developed, developing and frontier
585 economies, and to evaluate in which direction existing models need to be modified to capture
586 realistic aspects of Mediterranean fluctuations. For policymakers, we provide a character-
587 ization of the cyclical fluctuations in different countries and regions of the Mediterranean,
588 which could help them to formulate policies which better achieve their integration goals, and
589 an interim evaluation of the effects of the Mediterranean partnership.

590 Overall, the Mediterranean basin is far from an integrated economic area and cyclical fluc-
591 tuations in the region are driven by considerable idiosyncratic elements. While some cyclical
592 convergence is taking place over time, the process appears to be at the very early stages and
593 not clearly connected with the policy measures that the EU has adopted to foster political
594 and economic integration. At the cost of oversimplifying, the Mediterranean appears to be a
595 colourful archipelago, where islands have its own regional life, are not well interconnected and
596 display heterogeneous cyclical dynamics. There are instances where regional commonalities
597 are important (such as in Mediterranean Europe) but also instances where idiosyncrasies
598 dominates even within regions (such as in the North Africa). Differences across countries
599 and regions appear to be due, in part, to national legislations and institutions and this paper
600 has little to say about those. However, part of the differences seem to be due to structural
601 factors, indicating that a process of homogenization is necessary prior to integration efforts.

602 The EU has invested a lot to enhance trade and financial interdependencies, hoping that the
603 homogenization of the economies and their integration would come through these channels.
604 So far the policies do not seem to have achieved their scope. This could be due to the fact
605 that, contrary to other regions of the world, trade and financial interdependencies are only a
606 minor channel of transmission in the region. It could also be the result of the uncertainties
607 about the political process or implementation delays. After all, even though the process
608 started in 1995, it is only since 2007 that the Euro-Mediterranean partnership has been fully
609 shaped. Thus, one may thus just want to wait and see, given that the main trust of the
610 policies is economically sound. Alternatively, one may want to design new measures to re-
611 duce national idiosyncrasies. The heterogeneities we have described do not necessarily have
612 an economic reason. Some countries possess natural resources while others do not, some
613 have better productive structures than others, but these difference matter little as cyclical
614 fluctuations are concerned. Institutional and cultural changes are needed, and more can be
615 done on this front.

616 The interpretative part of the paper has focused attention on how trade and financial
617 interdependencies affect the synchronicity of cyclical fluctuations, because the current lit-
618 erature has stressed their importance in other regions of the world. Trade and financial
619 interdependencies have increased in recent years but other channels could be as or more im-
620 portant to explain the patterns we have found. For example, in many countries migrations
621 are important and remittances are a large portion of GDP. The 2008–09 recession had an
622 important impact on the migrant remittances and on the ability of several non-EU Mediter-
623 ranean countries to sustain local demand and the current austerity measures are likely to
624 reduce external receipts of many non-EU countries. Similarly, tourism revenues are quite im-
625 portant for certain countries and local employment is heavily skewed toward tourism related
626 sectors. The Arab spring of 2011 has disrupted tourism flows in North Africa and increasing
627 them in Turkey and Spain, thus altering the transmission pattern of cyclical fluctuations in
628 the region. Data on these flows is scarce and reported figures do not necessarily provide the
629 information which is relevant from a cyclical point of view. A better understanding of the
630 interconnections within the Mediterranean could certainly be obtained if reliable data on mi-
631 gration and tourism flows would be available and effort devoted to analyze their international
632 macroeconomic implications.

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Table 1: National reference cycle turning points

Country	Weighted Mean		Median	
	Peaks	Troughs	Peaks	Troughs
Algeria		1992q3		1992q3
	1993q2	1997q3	1993q2	1997q3
	1998q4	1999q3	1998q4	1999q3
	2000q3	2001q2	2000q3	2001q2
	2003q3	2004q2	2003q3	2004q2
	2005q1	2005q4	2005q1	2005q4
Croatia		1991q4		1991q4
	1992q4	1994q2	1992q4	1994q2
	1994q4	1995q3	1994q4	1995q3
	1997q4	1999q2	1997q4	1999q1
	2005q3	2006q1	2002q4	2006q1
	2008q3	2009q1	2008q3	2009q1
Cyprus	1984q2	1985q3	1984q2	1985q3
	1990q2	1991q1	1990q2	1991q1
	1992q3	1993q2	1992q3	1993q2
	1994q4	1995q3	1994q4	2005q2
	2008q3		2008q3	
Egypt		2004q2		2004q2
	2005q1	2006q1	2005q1	2006q1
	2008q2	2009q2	2008q2	2009q2
France	1958q1	1958q3	1958q1	1958q3
	1974q3	1975q2	1977q1	1977q4
	1977q1	1977q3	1979q4	1980q4
	1979q3	1980q4	1992q1	1993q2
	1992q1	1993q3	1998q2	1999q4
	2008q1	2009q1	2008q1	2009q1
Greece	1961q3	1962q2	1961q3	1962q2
	1973q4	1974q3	1972q4	1974q3
	1976q4	1977q2	1976q4	1977q2
	1980q1	1981q2	1979q3	1981q2
	1981q4	1983q2	1984q3	1986q3
	1985q4	1987q2	1989q4	1993q1
	1990q1	1990q3	1994q2	1994q4
	1992q1	1993q1	2008q3	
	2000q2	2001q4		
	2008q2			

Country	Weighted Mean		Median	
	Peaks	Troughs	Peaks	Troughs
Israel	1958q2	1959q1	1958q2	1959q1
	1966q1	1967q2	1966q1	1967q2
	1975q3	1977q1	1975q3	1976q3
	1978q3	1983q3	1978q3	1982q2
	2001q1	2001q4	2000q4	2001q4
	2002q2	2007q3	2004q4	2005q3
	2008q2		2008q2	
Italy	1964q1	1964q4	1963q4	1964q3
	1967q3	1968q3	1968q1	1969q3
	1971q1	1972q3	1970q1	1971q4
	1974q2	1975q3	1974q1	1975q2
	1977q1	1977q3	1976q4	1977q2
	1978q3	1979q2	1978q2	1979q1
	1981q2	1982q4	1981q3	1982q3
	1992q1	1993q3	1991q4	1993q2
	1996q1	1996q4	1995q4	1996q3
	2001q1	2001q4	2000q4	2001q3
	2002q4	2003q2	2002q3	2003q1
2007q3	2009q2	2007q2	2009q1	
Jordan	1993q1	1993q4	1993q1	1993q4
	1995q1	1995q3	1995q1	1995q3
	2009q3		2009q3	
Lebanon	1994q1	1994q3	1994q1	1994q3
	1997q1	1997q3	1997q1	1997q3
	1999q4	2001q1	1999q4	2001q1
	2003q2	2004q1	2003q2	2004q1
	2004q4	2005q2	2004q4	2005q2
	2006q2	2006q4	2006q2	2006q4
	2007q3	2008q2	2007q3	2008q2
Macedonia		1992q3		1992q3
	1993q1	1995q3	1993q1	1995q3
	1997q4	2004q1	1997q4	2004q1
	2004q3	2006q1	2004q3	2006q1
	2008q3		2008q3	

Country	Weighted Mean		Median	
	Peaks	Troughs	Peaks	Troughs
Malta		1997q3		1997q3
	2000q4	2001q3	2000q3	2001q3
	2004q1	2005q1	2008q2	2009q2
	2007q2	2007q4		
	2008q3	2009q2		
Morocco	1991q4	1992q2	1991q4	1992q2
	1994q4	1995q2	1994q4	1995q2
	1996q4	1997q2	1996q4	1997q2
	2002q2	2003q4	2002q2	2003q3
	2004q3	2005q1		
	2008q2	2008q4	2008q2	2008q4
Portugal	1968q4	1969q2	1968q4	1969q2
	1974q1	1975q2	1974q1	1975q2
	1980q1	1980q3	1980q1	1980q3
	1983q1	1985q3	1983q1	1985q4
	1992q1	1994q1	1992q1	1994q1
	2002q2	2003q1	1999q2	2000q2
	2004q1	2004q4	2002q2	2002q4
	2008q2	2009q1	2004q2	2005q1
		2008q2	2009q1	
Serbia	1997q4	1999q2	1997q4	1999q2
	2000q2	2001q4	2000q2	2001q4
	2002q2	2003q4	2002q2	2003q4
	2004q2	2005q1	2004q2	2005q1
	2006q4	2007q4	2006q4	2007q4
	2008q2	2009q1	2008q2	2009q1
	2009q3		2009q3	
Slovenia		1992q3		1992q3
	1994q1	1994q3	1994q1	1997q2
	1998q1	1999q1	2008q3	2009q2
	2008q3	2009q2		
Spain	1974q4	1976q1	1974q4	1975q4
	1981q2	1982q3	1979q1	1979q4
	1991q4	1993q2	1991q4	1993q2
	2007q3		1996q4	2001q4
			2007q2	

Country	Weighted Mean		Median	
	Peaks	Troughs	Peaks	Troughs
Tunisia	1996q4	1997q2	1996q4	1997q2
	2001q1	2001q4	2001q1	2001q4
	2002q3	2003q4	2002q3	2003q4
	2005q2	2005q4	2005q2	2005q4
	2008q1	2009q1	2008q1	2009q1
Turkey	1978q3	1979q4	1987q4	1988q4
	1987q4	1989q1	1993q4	1994q2
	1993q4	1994q2	1998q1	1999q3
	1998q3	1999q3	2000q3	2001q3
	2000q3	2001q4	2004q3	2005q2
	2004q4	2005q4	2008q1	2009q1
	2008q1	2009q1		

When a weighted mean is used and all the series are available the weights used are 0.3 for GDP, 0.25 for unemployment, 0.2 for industrial production, 0.15 on income and 0.1 on sales. When one or more variables are not available weights are adjusted up proportionally such that they add up to one.

Table 2: Regional and Mediterranean reference cycle turning points

Major European Countries		Other European Countries		East Mediterranean Countries		North Africa Countries		Overall Mediterranean	
Peaks	Troughs	Peaks	Troughs	Peaks	Troughs	Peaks	Troughs	Peaks	Troughs
1964q1	1964q4	1984q2	1985q3	1958q2	1959q1	1991q4	1992q2		1959q1
1974q2	1975q2	1990q2	1992q3	1978q3	1994q3	1996q4	1997q2	1961q4	1965q2
1976q4	1977q2	1993q1	1995q3	2000q3	2001q4	2001q1	2003q4	1974q3	1975q3
1980q1	1980q4	1996q4	1998q2	2004q4	2005q2	2005q1	2005q4	1976q4	1977q2
1992q1	1993q3	2008q3	2009q1	2008q2		2008q2	2008q4	1979q3	1982q4
2008q1	2009q1							1992q4	1993q3
								1997q4	2001q4
								2008q2	2009q1

671

Euro Countries		Non-Euro Countries		Rich Countries		Poor Countries		
Peaks	Troughs	Peaks	Troughs	Peaks	Troughs	Peaks	Troughs	
1964q1	1964q4	1958q2	1959q1	1958q2	1959q1	1974q1	1975q2	
1974q2	1975q2	1978q3	1993q4	1964q1	1964q4	1976q4	1977q2	
1976q4	1977q2	1994q4	1998q4	1967q3	1968q3	1990q2	1993q4	
1979q4	1982q4	2000q2	2004q1	1974q3	1977q3	1997q4	2001q3	
1992q1	1993q3	2004q4	2005q4	1978q3	1982q4	2008q2	2009q1	
2000q4	2001q4	2008q2	2008q4	1992q1	1993q3			
2008q2	2009q1			2007q4	2009q1			

672

Notes: Reference cycles turning points are computed equally weighting the turning points of the countries belonging to the region or the area.

673

Table 3: Durations and amplitudes of the reference cycle

	Major European Countries		Other European Countries		East Mediterranean Countries		North Africa Countries		Overall Mediterranean	
	TP	PT	TP	PT	TP	PT	TP	PT	TP	PT
Duration	31.60	3.67	16.75	6.40	31.50	18.50	12.00	4.00	20.71	7.86
Using real GDP growth										
Amplitude	0.35		0.74		0.25		0.11		0.41	
Using IP growth										
Amplitude	0.36		0.14		0.78		0.01		0.26	

674

	Euro Countries		Non-Euro Countries		Rich Countries		Poor Countries		
	TP	PT	TP	PT	TP	PT	TP	PT	
Duration	24.33	4.86	20.20	16.83	25.50	7.14	25.25	7.80	
Using real GDP growth									
Amplitude	0.62		0.08		0.35		0.42		
Using real IP growth									
Amplitude	0.23		0.16		0.34		0.23		

675 Notes: Duration measures average length (in quarters) of cyclical phases; Amplitude the average
676 percentage change in GDP or Industrial production in each cyclical phase. TP indicates booms,
677 PT recessions.

Table 4: Cumulative Output losses in recessions

		Average	Major European	Other European	Eastern	North Africa	Overall Mediterranean	Euro	Non-Euro	Rich	Poor
		Using real GDP growth									
PT	Actual	-0.06	-0.02	0.52	4.38	0.04	0.60	-0.11	1.69	0.07	0.53
	TRA	-0.01	-0.02	0.48	5.27	0.06	0.57	-0.02	2.20	0.17	0.53
Using IP growth											
PT	Actual	-0.25	-0.14	-0.13	1.34	0.03	0.23	-0.17	0.78	0.09	0.17
	TRA	-0.20	-0.13	-0.09	2.06	0.03	0.15	-0.13	0.93	0.06	0.07

678

679 TRA refers to the average triangular approximation to cumulative movement. The first column
680 reports the average over time and over countries using the reference cycles of the 19 countries to
681 classify recession; the rest of the columns the average statistics computed over time and countries
682 using the regional reference cycles and for the overall reference cycle. Cumulative movements are
683 measured relative to the previous peak and are in percentages.


Table 5: Statistics of the reference cycle, subsamples

		Using 1995 as cut off date					Using 2000 as cut off date				
		Major European	Other European	Eastern Mediterranean	North Africa	Overall	Major European	Other European	Eastern Mediterranean	North Africa	Overall
Durations											
Before	TP	25.00	10.50	78.00		20.40	25.00	8.67	51.00	18.00	19.83
	PT	3.60	8.00	33.50	2.00	7.20	3.60	7.50	33.50	2.00	7.20
After	TP	58.00	23.00	16.00	12.00	21.50	58.00	41.00	12.00	10.00	26.00
	PT	4.00	4.00	3.50	4.50	9.50	4.00	2.00	3.50	5.33	9.50
Amplitude- GDP growth											
Before	TP	0.32	1.44			0.26	0.32	0.41	0.35	0.27	0.48
After	TP	0.47	0.72	0.25	0.11	0.38	0.47	1.21	0.19	0.09	0.36
Amplitude-IP growth											
Before	TP	0.38	0.04	5.01		0.46	0.38	0.08	1.59	-0.14	0.30
After	TP	0.26	0.18	0.39	0.09	0.20	0.26	0.25	0.17	0.11	0.20

		Euro Countries	Non-Euro Countries	Rich Countries	Poor Countries		Euro Countries	Non-Euro Countries	Rich Countries	Poor Countries	
Durations											
Before	TP	22.75	41.00	19.20	29.00		24.00	29.33	19.20	24.67	
	PT	5.40	32.00	7.50	7.00		5.40	26.67	7.50	7.00	
After	TP	27.50	6.33	57.00	21.50		26.00	6.50	57.00	27.00	
	PT	3.50	9.25	5.00	9.00		3.50	7.00	5.00	9.00	
Amplitude- GDP growth											
Before	TP	0.31	0.07	0.31	0.30		1.03	0.07	0.31	0.42	
After	TP	0.57	0.08	0.51	0.41		0.27	0.10	0.51	0.47	
Amplitude-IP growth											
Before	TP	0.39	0.37	0.33	0.49		0.32	0.21	0.33	0.21	
After	TP	0.14	0.06	0.38	0.21		0.09	0.08	0.38	0.22	

Notes: Duration measures average length (in quarters) of cyclical phases; Amplitude measures the average percentage change in GDP or Industrial production in each cyclical phase. TP indicates booms, PT recessions.


689



690

691

Figure 1: Dynamics since the last cyclical peak



692

693

Figure 2: Dynamics around the Mediterranean cyclical peak

694 **Appendix A: Data sources**

	Real GDP	Unemployment Rate	Industrial Production	Real Income	Sales
Algeria			1993q1-2009q4 (IFS)		
Croatia	1993q1-2009q4 (IFS)	2003q1-2010q1 (IFS)	1990q1-2010q1 (IFS)	2000q1-2009q3 (Eurostat)	
Cyprus	1995q1-2010q1 (IFS)	2004q1-2010q1 (IFS)	1980q1-2010q1 (IFS)	1995q1-2010q1 (Eurostat)	
Egypt	2002q1-2010q1 (IFS)	2003q1-2010q1 (IFS)			
France	1949q1-2009q4 (OECD)	1967q4-2010q1 (OECD)	1957q1-2010q1 (IFS)	1978q1-2010q1 (Eurostat)	1975q1-2010q1 (OECD)
Greece	1960q1-2009q4 (OECD)	1998q1-2009q4 (OECD)	1995q1-2010q1 (IFS)	2000q1-2009q4 (Eurostat)	1963q1-2009q4 (OECD)
Israel	1968q1-2009q4 (IFS)	1992q1-2009q4 (OECD)	1957q1-2010q1 (IFS)		
Italy	1960q1-2009q4 (OECD)	1959q1-2009q4 (OECD)	1957q1-2010q1 (IFS)	1981q1-2010q1 (Eurostat)	1990q1-2009q4 (OECD)
Jordan	1992q1-2010q1 (MCData)				
Lebanon			1993q1-2010q1 (CB)		
Macedonia			1992q1-2010q1 (IFS)		
Malta			1997q1-2010q1 (IFS)	2000q1-2009q4 (Eurostat)	
Morocco	1990q1-2009q4 (IFS)	1996q1-2010q1 (IFS)	1999q1-2009q3 (CB)		
Portugal	1960q1-2009q4 (OECD)	1983q2-2009q4 (OECD)	1957q1-2010q1 (IFS)	1995q1-2009q4 (Eurostat)	1990q1-2009q4 (OECD)
Serbia			1994q1-2010q1 (IFS)		
Slovenia	1992q1-2010q1 (IFS)	1997q2-2010q1 (IFS)	1992q1-2010q1 (IFS)	1995q1-2009q4 (Eurostat)	
Spain	1960q1-2009q4 (OECD)	1972q1-2009q4 (OECD)	1961q1-2010q1 (IFS)	1995q1-2010q4 (Eurostat)	1995q1-2009q4 (OECD)
Tunisia			1993q1-2010q4 (IFS)		
Turkey	1960q1-2009q4 (OECD)	2000q1-2009q4 (OECD)	1980q1-2010q1 (IFS)		

695

696 Notes: IFS stands for IMF International Financial Statistics; OECD stands for OECD
697 Quarterly National Accounts, except for the unemployment rates and sales, both of
698 which are from the OECD Main Economic Indicators (the Labor Force Statistics
699 and the Production & Sales Database, respectively); Eurostat stands for the Euro-
700 stat Quarterly National Accounts; CB stands for Central Bank data. For Lebanon
701 industrial production measures electricity production. Real GDP and real income are
702 measured in local currency; unemployment rates are calculated over the total labor
703 force. Bilateral trade data is from direction of trade (DOT) database at the IMF.
704 Bilateral capital flows are from the Country Portfolio Investment Survey database
705 at the IMF and refer to 2007 flows.

706 **Appendix B: Turning points individual series**

Table B.1: Individual series turning points.
 Minimum cycle length of 5 quarters, minimum phase length of 2 quarters.

	Real GDP		Unemployment		Ind. Prod		Real Income		Sales	
	Peaks	Troughs	Peaks	Troughs	Peaks	Troughs	Peaks	Troughs	Peaks	Troughs
Algeria					1992q3					
					1993q2	1997q3				
					1998q4	1999q3				
					2000q3	2001q2				
					2003q3	2004q2				
					2005q1	2005q4				
Croatia	1994q2	1994q2	2008q4		1991q4		2000q3			
	1994q4	1995q3			1992q4	1994q2	2008q3	2009q1		
	1997q4	1999q2			1995q1	1995q3				
	2002q3	2003q1			1997q4	1999q1				
	2005q3	2006q1			1999q4	2000q2				
	2008q3	2009q1			2003q3	2004q1				
					2005q2	2006q1				
					2007q3					
Cyprus	1995q3	1995q3	2005q3		1984q2	1985q3	2008q3			
	2008q4		2006q1	2006q4	1990q2	1991q1				
			2008q3		1992q3	1993q2				
					1995q1	1996q3				
					2000q1	2000q4				
					2004q1	2005q2				
					2007q4	2009q2				
Egypt			2004q2							
			2005q1	2006q1						
			2008q2	2009q2						
France	1958q1	1958q3	1968q2		1958q1	1959q1	1980q1	1980q4	1977q1	1977q4
	1974q3	1975q2	1969q2	1973q3	1966q3	1967q1	1992q1	1993q2	1979q3	1981q1
	1980q1	1980q4	1974q2	1977q3	1974q3	1975q3	2008q1	2009q1	1981q4	1984q4
	1992q1	1993q1	1978q1	1987q2	1977q1	1977q4			1993q4	1995q1
	2008q1	2009q1	1990q2	1994q2	1979q3	1980q4			1996q1	1996q3
			1995q2	1997q2	1981q4	1982q3			2008q1	2009q1
			1998q1	1998q4	1985q1	1985q3				
			2001q3	2006q1	1990q3	1991q2				
			2008q1		1992q1	1993q3				
					2000q4	2003q2				
					2004q4	2005q3				
					2008q1	2009q2				

	Real GDP	Unemployment	Ind. Prod	Real Income	Sales
	Peaks Troughs	Peaks Troughs	Peaks Troughs	Peaks Troughs	Peaks Troughs
Greece	1961q3 1962q2 1973q4 1974q3 1976q4 1977q2 1980q1 1981q2 1981q4 1983q2 1985q4 1987q2 1990q1 1990q3 1992q1 1993q1 1994q3 1995q2 2008q3	1999q4 2001q1 2001q4 2003q2 2004q1 2005q1 2005q3 2006q3 2007q1 2008q2	1995q4 1997q3 2000q2 2002q3 2004q2 2004q4 2007q1	2008q3	1963q3 1964q1 1966q3 1967q1 1970q3 1971q2 1972q4 1974q3 1977q3 1978q2 1979q3 1982q2 1984q3 1986q3 1988q3 1989q1 1989q4 1992q1 1992q3 1993q2 1994q2 1994q4 2006q3 2007q1 2008q1 2009q2
Israel	1975q3 1977q1 1978q3 1983q3 2008q3	1992q3 1996q2 2000q3 2001q1 2001q4 2007q1 2007q3 2008q2	1958q2 1959q1 1966q1 1967q2 1975q3 1976q3 1979q2 1980q1 1981q2 1982q2 1987q4 1989q2 1990q3 1991q1 2000q3 2001q4 2002q2 2003q3 2008q2 2009q2		
Italy	1964q1 1964q4 1974q3 1975q2 1977q1 1977q3 1981q4 1982q4 1992q1 1993q3 1996q1 1996q4 2001q1 2001q4 2002q4 2003q2 2004q3 2005q1 2007q3 2009q2	1963q4 1966q3 1967q3 1968q3 1971q1 1972q3 1974q2 1977q3 1978q3 1979q3 1981q1 1984q1 1984q3 1987q4 1988q3 1989q2 1991q3 1996q4 1997q3 1998q2 2002q1 2003q1 2007q2	1964q1 1964q3 1969q2 1971q2 1974q2 1975q3 1976q4 1978q1 1978q4 1979q2 1980q1 1980q3 1981q2 1983q2 1984q3 1985q1 1989q4 1991q2 1992q1 1993q3 1995q4 1996q4 1997q4 1999q2 2000q4 2001q4 2002q4 2005q1 2007q3 2009q2	1981q4 1982q4 1992q1 1993q3 1996q1 1996q4 2001q1 2001q4 2002q4 2003q2 2008q1 2009q2	1990q4 1992q4 1993q3 1994q2 1995q2 1996q3 1999q4 2004q3 2006q3 2008q4
Jordan	1993q1 1993q4 1995q1 1995q3 2009q3				

	Real GDP	Unemployment	Ind. Prod	Real Income	Sales
	Peaks Troughs	Peaks Troughs	Peaks Troughs	Peaks Troughs	Peaks Troughs
Lebanon			1994q1 1994q3 1997q1 1997q3 1999q4 2001q1 2003q2 2004q1 2004q4 2005q2 2006q2 2006q4 2007q3 2008q2		
Macedonia			1992q3 1993q1 1995q3 1997q4 2004q1 2004q3 2006q1 2008q3		
Malta			1997q3 2000q4 2001q3 2004q1 2005q1 2007q2 2007q4 2008q3 2009q2	2000q3 2003q1 2008q2 2009q2	
Morocco	1991q4 1992q2 1994q4 1995q2 1996q4 1997q2 2008q2 2008q4	1997q2 1998q1 2002q2 2003q4 2004q3 2005q1 2006q2 2006q4 2009q2	2002q3 2003q1 2008q2 2008q4		
Portugal	1968q4 1969q2 1974q1 1975q2 1980q1 1980q3 1983q1 1984q2 1992q1 1993q1 2002q2 2002q4 2004q2 2004q4 2008q2 2009q1	1986q1 1991q2 1996q2 1998q2 1999q2 2000q4 2003q2 2004q1 2005q4 2006q2 2007q2 2008q1	1964q4 1965q2 1966q2 1967q1 1970q2 1971q1 1974q1 1975q3 1980q1 1980q3 1983q1 1983q3 1984q3 1985q3 1990q4 1991q2 1992q1 1994q1 1999q4 2000q2 2001q3 2005q2 2007q1 2009q1	2002q2 2002q4 2004q2 2004q4 2008q2 2009q1	1993q3 1994q2 2000q2 2001q1 2002q3 2003q1 2008q3 2009q1
Serbia			1997q4 1999q2 2000q2 2001q4 2002q2 2003q4 2004q2 2005q1 2006q4 2007q4 2008q2 2009q1 2009q3		

	Real GDP		Unemployment		Ind. Prod		Real Income		Sales	
	Peaks	Troughs	Peaks	Troughs	Peaks	Troughs	Peaks	Troughs	Peaks	Troughs
Slovenia	1992q3	1994q1 1994q3	1999q1	2000q3 2001q1	1993q2	1995q1 1995q4	2008q3	2009q1		
	2008q3		2003q2 2004q1	2004q3 2006q1	1998q1 1999q2	2008q2 2009q2				
			2008q3 2009q3							
Spain	1974q4 1975q2	1978q2 1979q1	1985q3	1987q4 1988q2	1974q3 1976q1	1979q3 1980q3	2008q1		1996q2	
	1980q4 1981q2	1992q1 1993q2	2001q3 2003q1	2005q3 2006q1	1981q2 1982q3	1989q3 1991q1			2007q3	
	2008q1		2007q2		1991q4 1993q2	1995q2 1996q1				
					2000q4 2001q4	2007q2 2009q2				
Tunisia					1996q4 1997q2	2001q1 2001q4				
					2002q3 2003q4	2005q2 2005q4				
					2008q1 2009q1					
Turkey	1978q3 1980q2	1987q4 1989q1	2000q3 2003q2	2004q4 2005q4	1988q1 1988q4	1993q4 1994q2				
	1993q4 1994q2	1998q3 1999q3	2006q4 2009q2		1998q1 1999q3	2000q3 2001q2				
	2000q4 2001q4	2008q1 2009q1			2004q2 2005q1	2008q1 2009q1				

Table B.2: Individual series turning points.
 Minimum cycle length of 7 quarters, minimum phase length of 3 quarters.

	Real GDP		Unemployment		Ind. Prod		Real Income		Sales	
	Peaks	Troughs	Peaks	Troughs	Peaks	Troughs	Peaks	Troughs	Peaks	Troughs
Algeria					1993q2	1997q3				
					1998q4	1999q3				
					2000q3	2001q2				
					2002q3	2004q2				
Croatia	1994q4	1995q3	2008q4		1991q4					
	1997q4	1999q2			1992q4	1994q2				
	2008q3				1997q4	1999q1				
					2005q2	2006q1				
					2008q2					
Cyprus	2008q4		2006q4		1984q2	1985q3	2008q3			
			2008q3		1990q2	1991q1				
					1992q3	1993q2				
					1995q4	1997q3				
					2000q1	2000q4				
					2007q4	2009q2				
Egypt			2004q2							
			2005q1							
			2006q1							
			2008q2							
			2009q2							
France	1974q3	1975q2	1969q2	1973q3	1958q1	1959q1	1980q1	1980q4	1977q1	1977q4
	1980q1	1980q4	1974q2	1987q2	1974q3	1975q3	1992q1	1993q2	1979q3	1980q2
	1992q1	1993q1	1990q2	1994q2	1977q1	1977q4	2008q1	2009q1	1981q4	1984q4
	2008q1	2009q1	1995q2	1997q2	1979q3	1980q4			1990q2	1991q2
			1998q1	1999q1	1981q4	1982q3			2008q1	2009q1
			2001q3	2006q1	1992q1	1993q3				
			2008q1		1994q4	1995q4				
					2000q4	2003q2				
					2004q4	2005q3				
					2008q1	2009q2				
Greece	1961q3	1962q2	1999q4		1995q4	1997q3	2008q3		1970q3	1971q2
	1973q4	1974q3	2001q1	2001q4	2000q2	2001q4			1972q4	1974q3
	1979q1	1984q2	2003q2	2004q1	2006q2				1977q3	1982q2
	1985q4	1987q2	2008q2						1985q3	1986q3
	1992q1	1993q1							1989q4	1993q2
	1994q3	1995q2							2008q1	2009q2
	2008q3									

	Real GDP		Unemployment		Ind. Prod		Real Income		Sales	
	Peaks	Troughs	Peaks	Troughs	Peaks	Troughs	Peaks	Troughs	Peaks	Troughs
Israel	1976q3	1977q4	1997q2	1999q3	1958q2	1959q1				
	1978q3	1980q3	2001q1	2002q3	1966q1	1967q2				
	1981q4	1983q3	2008q2		1979q2	1980q1				
	2008q3				1987q4	1989q2				
					2000q3	2003q3				
					2008q2	2009q2				
Italy	1964q1	1964q4	1963q4	1966q3	1969q2	1971q2	1981q4	1982q4	1990q4	1994q2
	1974q3	1975q2	1967q3	1968q3	1974q2	1975q3	1992q1	1993q3	1999q2	2004q3
	1981q4	1982q4	1971q1	1973q2	1976q4	1978q1	1996q1	1996q4	2006q3	2008q4
	1992q1	1993q3	1974q2	1977q3	1981q2	1983q2	2001q1	2001q4		
	1996q1	1996q4	1978q3	1979q3	1989q4	1991q2	2007q3	2009q2		
	2001q1	2001q4	1981q1	1989q2	1992q1	1993q3				
	2007q3	2009q2	1992q2	1998q2	1995q4	1996q4				
			2007q2		1997q4	1999q2				
					2000q4	2001q4				
					2002q4	2005q1				
					2007q3	2009q2				
Jordan	1993q1	1993q4								
	2009q3									
Lebanon					1999q1	2000q3				
					2003q2	2004q1				
Macedonia					1995q3					
					1996q4	2004q1				
					2005q2	2006q1				
					2009q3					
Malta					2000q4	2001q3	2008q2	2009q2		
					2004q1	2005q1				
					2008q3	2009q2				
Morocco	1996q4	1999q1	1997q2	1998q4	2008q2					
			2009q2							
Portugal	1974q1	1975q2	1986q1		1966q2	1967q1	2008q2	2009q1	1993q3	1994q2
	1983q1	1984q2	1991q2	1996q2	1970q2	1971q1			2000q2	2001q1
	1992q1	1993q1	2000q4	2003q2	1974q1	1975q3			2008q3	
	2008q2	2009q1	2004q1	2007q2	1984q3	1985q3				
			2008q1		1992q1	1994q1				
					2001q3	2005q4				
					2007q1	2009q1				

	Real GDP	Unemployment	Ind. Prod	Real Income	Sales
	Peaks Troughs	Peaks Troughs	Peaks Troughs	Peaks Troughs	Peaks Troughs
Serbia		1997q4	1999q2 2002q2 2003q1 2004q2 2005q1 2008q2 2009q1		
Slovenia	2008q3	1999q1 2005q2 2006q3 2008q3 2009q3	1993q2 1995q1 1995q4 1998q1 1999q2 2008q2 2009q2	2008q3	
Spain	1978q2 1979q1 1992q1 1993q2 2008q1	1985q3 1991q1 1994q2 2001q3 2003q1 2007q2	1974q3 1975q2 1980q1 1982q3 1990q2 1993q2 1995q2 1996q1 2000q4 2001q4 2007q2 2009q2	2008q1	1996q2 2007q3
Tunisia			2001q1 2001q4 2004q1 2004q4 2008q1 2009q1		
Turkey	1978q3 1980q2 1987q4 1989q1 1998q3 1999q3 2000q4 2001q4 2008q1 2009q1	2000q4 2003q2 2004q4 2005q4 2006q4 2009q2	1988q1 1988q4 1998q1 1999q3 2000q3 2001q2 2004q2 2005q1 2008q1 2009q1		