

# **The Basic New Keynesian Model**

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
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## Motivation and Outline


*Evidence on Money, Output, and Prices:*

- Macro evidence on the effects of monetary policy shocks
  - (i) persistent effects on real variables
  - (ii) slow adjustment of aggregate price level
  - (iii) liquidity effect
- Micro evidence: significant price and wage rigidities


Figure 1. Estimated Dynamic Response to a Monetary Policy Shock




Federal funds rate



GDP






GDP deflator



M2

Source: Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999)

**Figure 1 - Examples of individual price trajectories (French and Italian CPI data)**



Note : Actual examples of trajectories, extracted from the French and Italian CPI databases. The databases are described in Baudry *et al.* (2004) and Veronese *et al.* (2005). Prices are in levels, denominated in French Francs and Italian Lira respectively. The dotted lines indicate events of price changes.

Source: Dhyne *et al.* (JEP, 2006)

TABLE 1. Measures of price stickiness in the euro area and the US (% per month unless otherwise stated).

	Statistics	Euro area	US
CPI*	Frequency	15.1	24.8
	Average duration ( <i>months</i> )	13.0	6.7
	Median duration ( <i>months</i> )	10.6	4.6
PPI†	Frequency	20.0	n.a
Surveys‡	Frequency	15.9	20.8
	Average duration ( <i>months</i> )	10.8	8.3
NKPC§	Average durations ( <i>months</i> )	13.5–19.2	7.2–8.4
Internet prices¶	Frequency	79.2	64.3

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- Micro evidence: significant price and wage rigidities

⇒ in conflict with the predictions of classical monetary models

*A Baseline Model with Nominal Rigidities*

- monopolistic competition
- sticky prices (staggered price setting)
- competitive labor markets, closed economy, no capital accumulation

## Households

Representative household solves

$$\max E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t U(C_t, N_t; Z_t)$$

where

$$C_t \equiv \left( \int_0^1 C_t(i)^{1-\frac{1}{\epsilon}} di \right)^{\frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon-1}}$$

subject to

$$\int_0^1 P_t(i) C_t(i) di + Q_t B_t \leq B_{t-1} + W_t N_t + D_t$$

for  $t = 0, 1, 2, \dots$  plus solvency constraint.

*Example:*

$$\lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} E_t \left\{ \frac{B_T}{P_T} \right\} \geq 0$$

## Optimality conditions

### 1. Optimal allocation of expenditures

$$C_t(i) = \left( \frac{P_t(i)}{P_t} \right)^{-\epsilon} C_t$$

implying

$$\int_0^1 P_t(i) C_t(i) di = P_t C_t$$

where

$$P_t \equiv \left( \int_0^1 P_t(i)^{1-\epsilon} di \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}}$$

### 2. Other optimality conditions

$$-\frac{U_{n,t}}{U_{c,t}} = \frac{W_t}{P_t}$$

$$Q_t = \beta E_t \left\{ \frac{U_{c,t+1}}{U_{c,t}} \frac{P_t}{P_{t+1}} \right\}$$

*Specification of utility:*

$$U(C_t, N_t; Z_t) = \begin{cases} \left( \frac{C_t^{1-\sigma} - 1}{1-\sigma} - \frac{N_t^{1+\varphi}}{1+\varphi} \right) Z_t & \text{for } \sigma \neq 1 \\ \left( \log C_t - \frac{N_t^{1+\varphi}}{1+\varphi} \right) Z_t & \text{for } \sigma = 1 \end{cases}$$

where

$$z_t = \rho_z z_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t^z$$

*Optimality conditions:*

$$\begin{aligned} w_t - p_t &= \sigma c_t + \varphi n_t \\ c_t &= E_t\{c_{t+1}\} - \frac{1}{\sigma}(i_t - E_t\{\pi_{t+1}\} - \rho) + \frac{1}{\sigma}(1 - \rho_z)z_t \end{aligned}$$

where  $i_t \equiv -\log Q_t$  and  $\rho \equiv -\log \beta$

*Ad-hoc money demand:*

$$m_t - p_t = c_t - \eta \dot{i}_t$$

## Firms

- Continuum of firms, indexed by  $i \in [0, 1]$
- Each firm produces a differentiated good
- Identical technology

$$Y_t(i) = A_t N_t(i)^{1-\alpha}$$

where

$$a_t = \rho_a a_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t^a$$

- Probability of resetting price in any given period:  $1 - \theta$ , independent across firms (Calvo (1983)).
- $\theta \in [0, 1]$  : index of price stickiness
- Implied average price duration  $\frac{1}{1-\theta}$

## Aggregate Price Dynamics

$$P_t = [\theta(P_{t-1})^{1-\epsilon} + (1-\theta)(P_t^*)^{1-\epsilon}]^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}}$$

Dividing by  $P_{t-1}$  :

$$\Pi_t^{1-\epsilon} = \theta + (1-\theta) \left( \frac{P_t^*}{P_{t-1}} \right)^{1-\epsilon}$$

Log-linearization around zero inflation steady state

$$\pi_t = (1-\theta)(p_t^* - p_{t-1}) \tag{1}$$

or, equivalently

$$p_t = \theta p_{t-1} + (1-\theta)p_t^*$$

## *Optimal Price Setting*

$$\max_{P_t^*} \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \theta^k E_t \left\{ \Lambda_{t,t+k} (1/P_{t+k}) (P_t^* Y_{t+k|t} - \mathcal{C}_{t+k} (Y_{t+k|t})) \right\}$$

subject to:

$$Y_{t+k|t} = \left( \frac{P_t^*}{P_{t+k}} \right)^{-\epsilon} C_{t+k} \quad (2)$$

for  $k = 0, 1, 2, \dots$  where  $\Lambda_{t,t+k} \equiv \beta^k U_{c,t+k}/U_{c,t}$

*Optimality condition:*

$$\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \theta^k E_t \left\{ \Lambda_{t,t+k} Y_{t+k|t} (1/P_{t+k}) (P_t^* - \mathcal{M} \Psi_{t+k|t}) \right\} = 0$$

where  $\Psi_{t+k|t} \equiv \mathcal{C}'_{t+k} (Y_{t+k|t})$  and  $\mathcal{M} \equiv \frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon-1}$ .

*Flexible price case ( $\theta = 0$ ):*

$$P_t^* = \mathcal{M} \Psi_{t|t}$$

*Zero inflation steady state*

$$\Lambda_{t,t+k} = \beta^k ; P_t^*/P_{t-1} = P_t/P_{t+k} = 1 \Rightarrow Y_{t+k|t} = Y ; \Psi_{t+k|t} = \Psi_t ; P_t = \mathcal{M}\Psi_t$$

*Linearized optimal price setting condition:*

$$p_t^* = \mu + (1 - \beta\theta) \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (\beta\theta)^k E_t\{\psi_{t+k|t}\}$$

where  $\psi_{t+k|t} \equiv \log \Psi_{t+k|t}$  and  $\mu \equiv \log \mathcal{M}$

*Particular Case:*  $\alpha = 0$  (constant returns)

$$\implies \psi_{t+k|t} = \psi_{t+k}$$

Recursive form:

$$p_t^* = \beta\theta E_t\{p_{t+1}^*\} + (1 - \beta\theta)p_t - (1 - \beta\theta)\hat{\mu}_t$$

where  $\mu_t \equiv p_t - \psi_t$  and  $\hat{\mu}_t \equiv \mu_t - \mu$

Combined with price dynamics equation yields:

$$\pi_t = \beta E_t\{\pi_{t+1}\} - \lambda\hat{\mu}_t$$

where

$$\lambda \equiv \frac{(1 - \theta)(1 - \beta\theta)}{\theta}$$

General case:  $\alpha \in [0, 1)$

$$\begin{aligned}\psi_{t+k|t} &= w_{t+k} - mpn_{t+k|t} \\ &= w_{t+k} - (a_{t+k} - \alpha n_{t+k|t} + \log(1 - \alpha))\end{aligned}$$

$$\psi_{t+k} \equiv w_{t+k} - (a_{t+k} - \alpha n_{t+k} + \log(1 - \alpha))$$

$$\begin{aligned}\psi_{t+k|t} &= \psi_{t+k} + \alpha(n_{t+k|t} - n_{t+k}) \\ &= \psi_{t+k} + \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha}(y_{t+k|t} - y_{t+k}) \\ &= \psi_{t+k} - \frac{\alpha\epsilon}{1 - \alpha}(p_t^* - p_{t+k})\end{aligned}$$

Optimal price setting equation:

$$p_t^* = (1 - \beta\theta) \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (\beta\theta)^k E_t \{p_{t+k} - \Theta \hat{\mu}_{t+k}\}$$

where  $\Theta \equiv \frac{1-\alpha}{1-\alpha+\alpha\epsilon} \in (0, 1]$ .

Recursive form:

$$p_t^* = \beta\theta E_t\{p_{t+1}^*\} + (1 - \beta\theta)p_t - (1 - \beta\theta)\Theta\hat{\mu}_t$$

Combined with price dynamics equation yields:

$$\pi_t = \beta E_t\{\pi_{t+1}\} - \lambda\hat{\mu}_t$$

where

$$\lambda \equiv \frac{(1 - \theta)(1 - \beta\theta)}{\theta} \Theta$$

## Equilibrium

*Goods markets clearing*

$$Y_t(i) = C_t(i)$$

for all  $i \in [0, 1]$  and all  $t$ .

Letting  $Y_t \equiv \left( \int_0^1 Y_t(i)^{1-\frac{1}{\epsilon}} di \right)^{\frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon-1}}$ :

$$Y_t = C_t$$

Combined with Euler equation:

$$y_t = E_t\{y_{t+1}\} - \frac{1}{\sigma}(i_t - E_t\{\pi_{t+1}\} - \rho) + \frac{1}{\sigma}(1 - \rho_z)z_t$$

*Labor market clearing:*

$$\begin{aligned} N_t &= \int_0^1 N_t(i) di \\ &= \int_0^1 \left( \frac{Y_t(i)}{A_t} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} di \\ &= \left( \frac{Y_t}{A_t} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \int_0^1 \left( \frac{P_t(i)}{P_t} \right)^{-\frac{\epsilon}{1-\alpha}} di \end{aligned}$$

Up to a first order approximation:

$$n_t = \frac{1}{1 - \alpha} (y_t - a_t)$$

*Average price markup and output*

$$\begin{aligned}
\mu_t &\equiv p_t - \psi_t \\
&= -(w_t - p_t) + (a_t - \alpha n_t + \log(1 - \alpha)) \\
&= -(\sigma y_t + \varphi n_t) + (a_t - \alpha n_t + \log(1 - \alpha)) \\
&= -\left(\sigma + \frac{\varphi + \alpha}{1 - \alpha}\right) y_t + \left(\frac{1 + \varphi}{1 - \alpha}\right) a_t + \log(1 - \alpha)
\end{aligned}$$

Under flexible prices:

$$\mu = -\left(\sigma + \frac{\varphi + \alpha}{1 - \alpha}\right) y_t^n + \left(\frac{1 + \varphi}{1 - \alpha}\right) a_t + \log(1 - \alpha)$$

implying

$$y_t^n = \psi_{ya} a_t + \psi_y$$

where  $\psi_y \equiv -\frac{(1-\alpha)(\mu-\log(1-\alpha))}{\sigma(1-\alpha)+\varphi+\alpha} > 0$  and  $\psi_{ya} \equiv \frac{1+\varphi}{\sigma(1-\alpha)+\varphi+\alpha}$ . Thus,

$$\widehat{\mu}_t = -\left(\sigma + \frac{\varphi + \alpha}{1 - \alpha}\right) (y_t - y_t^n)$$

*New Keynesian Phillips Curve*

$$\pi_t = \beta E_t\{\pi_{t+1}\} + \kappa \tilde{y}_t$$

where  $\tilde{y}_t \equiv y_t - y_t^n$  and  $\kappa \equiv \lambda (\sigma + \frac{\varphi + \alpha}{1 - \alpha})$ .

## The Non-Policy Block of the Basic New Keynesian Model

*New Keynesian Phillips Curve*

$$\pi_t = \beta E_t\{\pi_{t+1}\} + \kappa \tilde{y}_t$$

*Dynamic IS equation*

$$\tilde{y}_t = E_t\{\tilde{y}_{t+1}\} - \frac{1}{\sigma}(i_t - E_t\{\pi_{t+1}\} - r_t^n)$$

where  $r_t^n$  is the *natural rate of interest*, given by

$$r_t^n = \rho - \sigma(1 - \rho_a)\psi_{ya}a_t + (1 - \rho_z)z_t$$

*Missing block:* description of monetary policy (determination of  $i_t$ ).

## Equilibrium under a Simple Interest Rate Rule

$$i_t = \rho + \phi_\pi \pi_t + \phi_y \hat{y}_t + v_t$$

where  $\hat{y}_t \equiv y_t - y$  and

$$v_t = \rho_v v_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t^v$$

Equivalently:

$$i_t = \rho + \phi_\pi \pi_t + \phi_y \tilde{y}_t + \phi_y \hat{y}_t^n + v_t$$

where  $\hat{y}_t^n \equiv y_t^n - y$ .

*Equilibrium dynamics:*

$$\begin{bmatrix} \tilde{y}_t \\ \pi_t \end{bmatrix} = \mathbf{A}_T \begin{bmatrix} E_t\{\tilde{y}_{t+1}\} \\ E_t\{\pi_{t+1}\} \end{bmatrix} + \mathbf{B}_T u_t$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} u_t &\equiv \hat{r}_t^n - \phi_y \hat{y}_t^n - v_t \\ &= -\psi_{ya}(\phi_y + \sigma(1 - \rho_a))a_t + (1 - \rho_z)z_t - v_t \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\mathbf{A}_T \equiv \Omega \begin{bmatrix} \sigma & 1 - \beta\phi_\pi \\ \sigma\kappa & \kappa + \beta(\sigma + \phi_y) \end{bmatrix} \quad ; \quad \mathbf{B}_T \equiv \Omega \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ \kappa \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\text{with } \Omega \equiv \frac{1}{\sigma + \phi_y + \kappa\phi_\pi}.$$

Uniqueness condition (Bullard and Mitra):

$$\kappa(\phi_\pi - 1) + (1 - \beta)\phi_y > 0$$

*Exercise:* analytical solution (method of undetermined coefficients).

## Equilibrium under an Exogenous Money Growth Process

$$\Delta m_t = \rho_m \Delta m_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t^m$$

Money demand

$$l_t \equiv m_t - p_t = \tilde{y}_t - \eta i_t + y_t^n$$

Substituting into dynamic IS equation

$$(1 + \sigma\eta) \tilde{y}_t = \sigma\eta E_t\{\tilde{y}_{t+1}\} + \hat{l}_t + \eta E_t\{\pi_{t+1}\} + \eta \hat{r}_t^n - \hat{y}_t^n$$

Identity:

$$\hat{l}_{t-1} = \hat{l}_t + \pi_t - \Delta m_t$$

*Equilibrium dynamics:*

$$\mathbf{A}_{\mathbf{M},0} \begin{bmatrix} \tilde{y}_t \\ \pi_t \\ \hat{l}_{t-1} \end{bmatrix} = \mathbf{A}_{\mathbf{M},1} \begin{bmatrix} E_t\{\tilde{y}_{t+1}\} \\ E_t\{\pi_{t+1}\} \\ \hat{l}_t \end{bmatrix} + \mathbf{B}_{\mathbf{M}} \begin{bmatrix} \hat{r}_t^n \\ \hat{y}_t^n \\ \Delta m_t \end{bmatrix} \quad (3)$$

where

$$\mathbf{A}_{\mathbf{M},0} \equiv \begin{bmatrix} 1 + \sigma\eta & 0 & 0 \\ -\kappa & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & -1 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \quad ; \quad \mathbf{A}_{\mathbf{M},1} \equiv \begin{bmatrix} \sigma\eta & \eta & 1 \\ 0 & \beta & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \quad ; \quad \mathbf{B}_{\mathbf{M}} \equiv \begin{bmatrix} \eta & -1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & -1 \end{bmatrix}$$

*Uniqueness condition:*

$\mathbf{A}_{\mathbf{M}} \equiv \mathbf{A}_{\mathbf{M},0}^{-1} \mathbf{A}_{\mathbf{M},1}$  has two eigenvalues inside and one outside the unit circle.

## Calibration

Households:  $\sigma = 1$  ;  $\varphi = 5$  ;  $\beta = 0.99$  ;  $\epsilon = 9$  ;  $\eta = 4$  ;  $\rho_z = 0.5$











Firms:  $\alpha = 1/4$  ;  $\theta = 3/4$  ;  $\rho_a = 0.9$

Policy rules:  $\phi_\pi = 1.5$ ,  $\phi_y = 0.125$  ;  $\rho_v = \rho_m = 0.5$











## Dynamic Responses to Exogenous Shocks

- Monetary policy, discount rate, technology
- Interest rate rule vs. money growth rule











## Dynamic responses to a monetary policy shock: Interest rate rule



## Dynamic responses to a discount rate shock: Interest rate rule



## Dynamic responses to a technology shock: Interest rate rule



## Estimated Effects of Technology Shocks





FIGURE 4. ESTIMATED IMPULSE RESPONSES FROM A FIVE-VARIABLE MODEL: U.S. DATA, FIRST-DIFFERENCED HOURS  
(POINT ESTIMATES AND  $\pm 2$  STANDARD ERROR CONFIDENCE INTERVALS)


Source: Galí (1999)

## Estimated Effects of Technology Shocks




Source: Basu, Fernald and Kimball (2006)

## Dynamic responses to a monetary policy shock: Money growth rule



## Dynamic responses to a discount rate shock: Money growth rule



# Dynamic responses to a technology shock: Money growth rule

