

## Trade Liberalization, Exports, and Technology Upgrading: Evidence on the Impact of MERCOSUR on Argentinian Firms

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*This paper studies the impact of a regional free trade agreement, MERCOSUR, on technology upgrading by Argentinean firms. To guide empirical work, I introduce technology choice in a model of trade with heterogeneous firms. The joint treatment of the technology and exporting choices shows that the increase in revenues produced by trade integration can induce exporters to upgrade technology. An empirical test of the model reveals that firms in industries facing higher reductions in Brazil's tariffs increase investment in technology faster. The effect of tariffs is highest in the upper-middle range of the firm-size distribution, as predicted by the model. (JEL F13, F15, O19, O24, O33)*

Trade liberalization can increase productivity by inducing a better allocation of production factors or the adoption of more advanced technologies. The recent trade literature (Nina Pavcnik 2002; Marc Melitz 2003; Andrew B. Bernard et al. 2003; James R. Tybout 2003) has emphasized the first channel: trade integration reallocates market shares towards exporters, the most productive firms, increasing aggregate productivity. In this paper I show that, in addition, the resulting increase in revenues can induce exporters to invest in new technologies.

I study the impact of a regional free trade agreement on technology upgrading by Argentinian firms. To guide empirical work, I introduce technology choice in a model of trade with heterogeneous firms. In the model, more productive firms make higher revenues and therefore are the only ones that find paying the fixed costs to enter the export market profitable, as in Melitz (2003). In addition, only the most productive firms adopt the most advanced technology. This is because the benefit of adoption is proportional to revenues, while its cost is fixed. In this setup, a bilateral reduction in tariffs increases export revenues more than it decreases domestic revenues, inducing more firms to adopt the new technology.

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I test the model in the context of a regional trade liberalization episode: MERCOSUR. I directly estimate the impact of the reduction in Brazil's tariffs on entry in the export market and technology upgrading by Argentinian firms. Brazil's tariffs provide a good source of arguably exogenous variation, as they fell from an average of 29 percent in 1991 to zero in 1995, and varied extensively across industries. Indeed, a look at the aggregate data suggests that MERCOSUR had a strong impact on Argentina's exports: between 1992 and 1996 exports to Brazil quadrupled, while exports to the rest of the world increased only 60 percent.

The firm-level panel dataset I analyze is uncommon in that it contains direct measures of *spending* on several dimensions of technology, namely computers, software, technology transfers, patents, and innovation activities performed within the firm like research and development.<sup>1</sup> This allows me to build a direct and comprehensive measure of investment in technology instead of relying on the estimation of residuals from the production function as proxies for the level of technology.

In a first analysis of the data I check whether the sorting pattern predicted by the model is consistent with the observed differences between exporters and nonexporters operating in the same industry. In the model, underlying productivity differences produce a sorting of firms in three groups: the most productive firms both export and use the advanced technology, the intermediate group exports but still uses the old technology and the least productive firms use the old technology and serve only the domestic market. Indeed, in 1992 exporters had, on average, a higher level of spending on technology per worker than nonexporters in the same industry. The model also predicts that during the liberalization period both old and new exporters upgrade technology faster than nonexporters, which is confirmed by the data. In particular, new exporters were not more technology intensive than nonexporters before liberalization, but upgrade technology faster as they enter the export market during the liberalization period.

The patterns in the data described above show that there is a coincidence between entry in the export market and technology upgrading but do not provide an answer to the question of whether trade liberalization induced firms to adopt new technologies. Indeed, both entry in the export market and technology upgrading could be caused by other economic reforms undertaken in the same period if these had heterogeneous effects on firms with different characteristics.<sup>2</sup> Then, a second step in the empirical analysis attempts to establish causality by linking exporting and technology adoption directly to the reduction in Brazil's tariffs for imports from Argentina. Note that this is a direct test of the model where the decisions to enter the export market and to adopt a new technology are endogenous, and thus a function of tariffs.

The model predicts that in industries where tariffs fall more, the productivity cut-offs to enter the export market and to adopt the new technology fall more. Then, to assess the impact of falling tariffs on the export decision I estimate the change in the probability that a firm enters the export market as a function of the change in Brazil's tariffs at the industry level. I find that firms in sectors with a higher

<sup>1</sup> In addition, the survey contains a series of questions asking whether the firm performed a certain category of innovation or improvement in products or production process during the period 1992–1996 that I use to perform robustness checks.

<sup>2</sup> For example, capital account liberalization could have made credit available for middle-size firms, allowing them to enter the export market and upgrade technology.

reduction in tariffs are more likely to enter the export market. The average reduction in tariffs (24 percentage points) increases the probability of entering the export market by 10 to 12 percentage points.

Next, to assess the impact of falling tariffs on the technology adoption decision I estimate the change in spending on technology<sup>3</sup> as a function of the change in tariffs. I find that firms increase their spending on technology faster in industries where tariffs fall more. The average reduction in Brazil's tariffs increases spending on technology by 0.20 to 0.28 log points. I find that the reduction in tariffs has a positive effect of similar magnitude on old and new exporters, as suggested by the within industry patterns in the data reported above.

Finally, I test the model's prediction that the reduction in tariffs induces firms in the middle range of the productivity distribution to enter the export market and upgrade technology but should not affect firms in the lower and upper ranges of the distribution. I find that the reduction in Brazil's tariffs had a stronger effect on both entry in the export market and technology upgrading in the third quartile of the firm size distribution.<sup>4</sup> The estimated effects on the third quartile are around double the size of the average effects for all firms reported above.

The empirical identification of the effect of falling export costs on entry in the export market and technology upgrading is based on a generalized differences-in-differences estimation, where the sources of variation are the changes in Brazil's tariffs for imports from Argentina across time (1996–1992) and across four-digit ISIC industries. Note that, as MERCOSUR mandates that tariffs fall to zero in all industries, I relate *changes* in technology spending to the initial *level* of Brazil's tariffs. The focus on changes in technology differences out time-invariant industry characteristics that might be correlated with Brazil's tariffs. The use of the initial level of Brazil's tariffs minimizes reverse causality concerns. Still, a main potential problem is that other reforms carried out in the same period could have had heterogeneous effects on industries with different characteristics.<sup>5</sup> I address this concern by showing that results are robust to controls for industry trends at the two-digit ISIC disaggregation level and the likely determinants of Brazilian trade policy: skill, capital intensity, and the elasticity of demand of the industry at the four-digit ISIC disaggregation level.

The model developed in this paper builds on an extensive theoretical literature analyzing the effects of trade on technological change.<sup>6</sup> In particular, it was inspired by the insight in Stephen R. Yeaple (2005) that a reduction in trade costs increases the share of firms that export and use the most advanced technology. The model

<sup>3</sup> As measures of technology I use spending in technology, spending on technology per worker, and spending on technology over sales; all produce similar results.

<sup>4</sup> I use initial firm size measured as employment relative to the four-digit industry mean in 1992 as a proxy for productivity, as the survey does not provide for measures of value added nor a long enough series of investment that would permit calculation of productivity as a residual of an estimated production function.

<sup>5</sup> For example, capital account liberalization could have benefited capital-intensive industries disproportionately. If Brazil's trade policy was also targeting these industry characteristics, the estimates of the effects of tariffs might pick up the impact of this other policy.

<sup>6</sup> Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1991) provide a comprehensive analysis of the effects of economic integration on innovation and growth; Jonathan Eaton and Samuel Kortum (2001) discuss the effect of lower barriers to trade on innovation, in particular; in their baseline model the effect of a bigger market size is counteracted by the increased competition with technologies embedded in imports, so that there is no effect of lower barriers to trade on innovation.

I present differs from Yeaple's in that heterogeneity in exporting and technology choice is the result of *ex ante* heterogeneity in productivity.<sup>7</sup> To my knowledge, the model presented in this paper is the first to show that when firms are heterogeneous the presence of fixed technology adoption costs implies that the trade-induced reallocations of market shares towards exporters can induce them to upgrade technology. This differential feature of the model is important to interpret the empirical findings reported above: the reduction in tariffs induced technology adoption mostly in the third quartile of the firm size distribution, and not only new exporters but also firms that were already exporting upgrade technology when variable trade costs fall.

The empirical work presented in this paper is related to the literature that analyzes the question of whether export market participation has a positive impact on productivity. The first studies by Sofronis K. Clerides, Saul Lach, and Tybout (1998) for Colombia, Mexico, and Morocco, and Bernard and Jensen (1999) for the United States find that exporters have higher productivity than nonexporters, but this is because *ex ante* more productive firms become exporters, while there are no effects of exporting on productivity. Instead, recent papers in this literature like Johannes Van Biesebroeck (2005) and Jan De Loecker (2007) find increases in productivity after firms enter the export market in Ivory Coast and Slovenia, respectively. This paper differs from this literature in that the outcome of interest is technology instead of productivity, and in that it analyzes the effect of bilateral trade liberalization on technology adoption, not the effect of exporting.

The first departure from previous literature, namely the focus on investment in technology as the outcome of interest, has the advantage of isolating a particular mechanism through which firm productivity can improve.<sup>8</sup> Earlier studies have often estimated productivity as a residual in the production function. These residuals capture not only differences in technical efficiency across firms but also differences in market power, factor market distortions, or changes in the product mix, as suggested by the recent work by Lucia Foster, John Haltiwanger, and Chad Syverson (2008), Chang-Tai Hsieh and Peter Klenow (2009), and Bernard, Stephen Redding, and Peter Schott (2010), respectively. More importantly, changes in technology not only affect productivity but can have implications for factor markets if new technologies use skilled labor more intensively. Indeed, several studies have documented increases in the relative demand for skill in developing countries during the trade liberalization period,<sup>9</sup> leaving the open question of whether skill-biased technological change might have been an endogenous response to trade liberalization. This paper provides evidence for a particular channel through which increased trade can induce firms to upgrade technology, namely increased export revenues.

<sup>7</sup> In Yeaple (2005) firms are *ex ante* homogeneous, but in equilibrium all firms are indifferent between entering the export market and adopting the new technology or serving only the domestic market and using the old technology.

<sup>8</sup> A similar approach was followed by Eric A. Verhoogen (2008) who develops a model where increased trade with more developed countries increases production of high quality goods and tests it in the context of Mexico's 1994 devaluation. The mechanism generating quality upgrading in his model is the higher valuation for high quality goods of consumers in developed countries, the United States in this case. Instead, in this paper the analysis focuses on trade liberalization between two countries of a similar level of development, Argentina and Brazil; thus the mechanism generating technology upgrading is of a different nature: increased revenues for exporters to a country with identical homothetic preferences. Still, in the model technology upgrading can be interpreted alternatively as reducing marginal production costs or increasing quality.

<sup>9</sup> Pinelopi K. Goldberg and Nina Pavcnik (2007) review and discuss these studies.

The second departure from existing literature, namely the estimation of the impact of a reduction in a trading partner's tariffs on investment in technology instead of the effect of export market participation, parallels the comparative static exercise that naturally emerges from a model where the decision to both export and adopt technology are endogenous, thus each variable is a direct function of tariffs. This exercise is aimed to address the policy question of what is the effect of a reduction in a trading partner's tariffs on technology investment, for which comparison of exporters and nonexporters across time can offer only indirect evidence. Indeed, the finding that entry in the export market is not associated with increases in productivity in the absence of trade reforms can be explained by entry responding to temporary opportunities to sell in a foreign market. The opposite finding, even in the context of a trade reform, can't be fully attributed to it, especially in the context of simultaneous implementation of other market-oriented reforms that might have made it possible for some firms to invest in productivity improvements and thus enter the export market.

The empirical methodology implemented in this paper follows the literature measuring the effects of trade liberalization on economic outcomes through changes in tariffs.<sup>10</sup> The focus of most studies has been unilateral trade liberalizations, while the analysis of regional or bilateral trade liberalizations is rare. The first study of the impact of a trading partner's reduction in tariffs using plant-level data was Daniel Trefler's (2004) analysis of the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement. To my knowledge, this paper's analysis of MERCOSUR is the first study of the impact of a trading partner's reduction in tariffs for a developing country. Not surprisingly, the effects of trade on technology adoption seem to be different in this context. This can be seen by comparing the results presented here with those in a contemporaneous study of the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement by Alla Lileeva and Trefler (2010). Their finding that the reduction in US tariffs induced productivity increases in only the least productive new entrants in the export market for the case of Canada contrasts with the findings for Argentina where the reduction in Brazil's tariffs induced technology upgrading mostly in the third quartile of the firm-size distribution and not only in new but also in old exporters. As I discuss in the theoretical section of the paper, the result that old exporters upgrade technology when trade costs fall obtains only when the costs of technology adoption are high (relative to fixed exporting costs), which is more likely to be the case in developing countries.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the theoretical model and derives the empirical predictions on the effects of trade liberalization on entry in the export market and technology upgrading. Section II describes the trade liberalization episode and the dataset. Section III presents the empirical strategy and tests the predictions of the model. Section IV concludes.

<sup>10</sup> This literature includes studies of the impact of trade liberalization on inequality like Orazio Attanasio, Goldberg, and Pavcnik (2004) for Colombia, Petia Topalova (2005) for India, and the study of the impact of trade liberalization on productivity in Colombia by Ana Fernandes (2007).

## I. Theory

This section develops a simple model of the decision to enter the export market and upgrade technology by heterogeneous firms. I consider the case of two symmetric countries engaging in bilateral trade liberalization. Each economy consists of a single monopolistically competitive industry where firms produce differentiated products under increasing returns to scale, and using a single factor of production, labor, as in Paul Krugman (1979). Firms are heterogeneous in productivity, face fixed exporting costs as in Melitz (2003), and can choose to increase their productivity by paying a fixed technology adoption cost, as in Yeaple (2005).

### A. Setup of the Model

Each country is endowed with  $L$  units of labor used to produce differentiated products in a single industry. The symmetry assumption ensures that wages, which are the numeraire, and all aggregate variables are the same for both countries. I present the discussion from the point of view of the home country.

*Entry.*—The supply side is characterized by monopolistic competition. Each variety is produced by a single firm, and there is free entry into the industry. Firms are heterogeneous in their productivity in the sense that marginal labor costs vary across firms using the same technology.<sup>11</sup> This idiosyncratic component of labor productivity is indexed by  $\varphi$ , which also indexes firms and varieties. To enter the industry in a given country, firms pay a fixed entry cost consisting of  $f_e$  units of labor. Entrants then draw their productivity from a known Pareto cumulative distribution function  $G(\varphi) = 1 - \varphi^{-k}$  with  $k > 1$ .

*Technology.*—After observing their productivity firms decide whether to exit the market or stay and produce. Firms produce varieties using a technology that features a constant marginal cost ( $1/\varphi$ ) and a fixed cost ( $f$ ), both in terms of labor. Firms can choose to upgrade their technology in the following sense: by paying an additional fixed cost they can reduce their marginal cost of production. This can be represented as a choice between two different technologies  $l$  and  $h$ , where  $h$  features a higher fixed cost ( $\eta f$ ) and a lower marginal cost [ $1/(\gamma\varphi)$ ]. The resulting total cost functions under each technology are

$$TC_l(q, \varphi) = \left( f + \frac{q}{\varphi} \right),$$

$$TC_h(q, \varphi) = \left( \eta f + \frac{q}{\gamma\varphi} \right),$$

where  $\eta > 1$  and  $\gamma > 1$ . Then, in this setup, there is a part of firm productivity that is the result of luck, but firms can also take actions to increase their productivity.

<sup>11</sup> Alternatively, heterogeneity in productivity can be interpreted as quality: more productive firms produce a good of higher quality, in the sense that consumers are willing to pay more for the same amount of the good.



A simple interpretation would be that before entering an industry firms engage in product development, but the value of that product/its marginal production cost is revealed only after it has been developed, and thus the cost of product development is sunk. At the production stage, firms can take actions to increase the quality of the product or further reduce its marginal cost, by paying a higher fixed production cost every period. Finally, in every period there is an exogenous probability of exit ( $\delta$ ).

*Serving the Foreign Market.*—After entry, a firm can choose to export, in which case it must incur an additional fixed cost  $f_x$ . In addition, exported goods are subject to per-unit iceberg trade costs, so that  $\tau$  units need to be shipped for one unit to make it to the foreign country.

*Demand.*—Preferences across varieties have the standard CES form, with an elasticity of substitution  $\sigma = 1/(1 - \rho) > 1$ . These preferences generate a demand function  $q(\omega) = EP^{\sigma-1}[p(\omega)]^{-\sigma}$  for every variety  $\omega$ , where  $p(\omega)$  is the price of each variety,  $P = [\int_0^M p(\omega)^{1-\sigma} d\omega]^{1-\sigma}$  is the price index of the industry,  $M$  is the number (measure) of existing varieties, and  $E$  is the aggregate level of spending in the country.

### B. Firm Behavior

*Profit Maximization.*—Under CES preferences the profit maximizing price is a constant markup over marginal costs. Then, a firm with productivity  $\varphi$  using technology  $l$  charges the price  $p_l^d(\varphi) = 1/(\rho\varphi)$  in the domestic market and a higher price in the export market  $p_l^x(\varphi) = \tau/(\rho\varphi)$ . If instead the firm uses technology  $h$ , it charges lower prices in both markets:  $p_h^d(\varphi) = 1/(\rho\varphi\gamma)$  and  $p_h^x(\varphi) = \tau/(\rho\varphi\gamma)$ .

To make the decisions of whether to enter the export market and whether to adopt technology  $h$ , firms compare the total profit of each of the four possible choices, which are described below.

Profits if only serving the domestic market and using technology  $l$ :

$$\pi_l^d(\varphi) = \frac{1}{\sigma} E(P\rho)^{\sigma-1} \varphi^{\sigma-1} - f;$$

profits if only serving the domestic market and using technology  $h$ :

$$\pi_h^d(\varphi) = \frac{1}{\sigma} E(P\rho)^{\sigma-1} \varphi^{\sigma-1} \gamma^{\sigma-1} - f\eta;$$

profits if exporting and using technology  $l$ :

$$\pi_l^x(\varphi) = (1 + \tau^{1-\sigma}) \frac{1}{\sigma} E(P\rho)^{\sigma-1} \varphi^{\sigma-1} - f - f_x;$$

profits if exporting and using technology  $h$ :

$$\pi_h^x(\varphi) = (1 + \tau^{1-\sigma}) \frac{1}{\sigma} E(P\rho)^{\sigma-1} \varphi^{\sigma-1} \gamma^{\sigma-1} - f\eta - f_x.$$




FIGURE 1. EXPORTING AND TECHNOLOGY CHOICES

Note that the assumption that both countries are identical and trade costs are symmetric implies that the price index ( $P$ ) and the expenditure level ( $E$ ) in foreign markets are the same as at home. Exporting and technology choices are represented in Figure 1, where the four possible profits are depicted as a function of firm productivity.<sup>12</sup> The equilibrium depicted is obtained when  $\varphi^x < \varphi^h$ , where  $\varphi^x$  is defined as the level of productivity above which a firm using technology  $l$  finds exporting profitable [ $\pi_l^d(\varphi^x) = \pi_l^x(\varphi^x)$ ] and  $\varphi^h$  is defined as the level of productivity above which an exporter finds adoption of technology  $h$  profitable [ $\pi_h^x(\varphi^h) = \pi_l^x(\varphi^h)$ ]. In online Appendix A, I show that in this equilibrium firms sort into four different groups: the least productive firms ( $\varphi < \varphi^*$ ) exit, the low productivity firms ( $\varphi^* < \varphi < \varphi^x$ ) serve only the domestic market and use technology  $l$ , the medium productivity firms ( $\varphi^x < \varphi < \varphi^h$ ) still use technology  $l$  but also export, and the most productive firms ( $\varphi^h < \varphi$ ) both export and use technology  $h$ .<sup>13</sup>

Note that in Figure 1 using technology  $h$  and serving only the domestic market is always dominated by some other choice. Note also that there is a range of productivity levels where exporting is profitable but adopting technology  $h$  is not, so that the marginal exporter uses technology  $l$ . I focus in this case ( $\varphi^x < \varphi^h$ ) in what follows and provide the necessary parameter restrictions for this ordering of cutoffs to apply. The opposite case ( $\varphi^x > \varphi^h$ ) is one where the equilibrium features no exporters using the low technology, which is inconsistent with the empirical findings I report in the next section.

To solve for the industry equilibrium it is useful to state the conditions for exit, entry in the export market, and technology adoption as a function of the exit cutoff, which I do next.

<sup>12</sup> More precisely a transformation of firm productivity:  $\varphi^{\sigma-1}$ .

<sup>13</sup> Available from <http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.101.1.XX>.



*Exit.*—For the least productive firms profits are highest when using technology  $l$  and serving only the domestic market. Then the exit cutoff  $\varphi^*$  is defined by:

$$(1) \quad \pi_l^d(\varphi^*) = 0 \Leftrightarrow \frac{1}{\sigma} E(P\rho)^{\sigma-1} (\varphi^*)^{\sigma-1} - f = 0.$$

*Exporting.*—The marginal exporter uses technology  $l$ . Then  $\varphi^x$  can be expressed as a function of  $\varphi^*$  using  $\pi_l^d(\varphi^x) = \pi_l^x(\varphi^x)$  and the zero profit condition for the marginal firm (equation (1)):

$$(2) \quad \varphi^x = \varphi^* \tau \left( \frac{f_x}{f} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}};$$

note that as long as  $\tau(f_x/f)^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}} > 1$ ,  $\varphi^x > \varphi^*$ . Thus, only the most productive firms export.

*Technology Choice.*—The marginal firm adopting technology  $h$  is an exporter. Then the adoption cutoff ( $\varphi^h$ ) is defined by

$$\pi_h^x(\varphi^h) - \pi_l^x(\varphi^h) = 0 \Leftrightarrow (\gamma^{\sigma-1} - 1)(1 + \tau^{1-\sigma}) \frac{1}{\sigma} E(P\rho)^{\sigma-1} (\varphi^h)^{\sigma-1} = f(\eta - 1).$$

The benefit of using technology  $h$  (the left-hand side of the equation above) is that the firm makes higher revenues, as demand is elastic ( $\sigma > 1$ ). The cost of using technology  $h$  (the right-hand side of the equation above) is its higher fixed cost. Note that this cost is the same for all firms while the benefit is increasing in productivity. This is why technology choice is characterized by a cutoff productivity level  $\varphi^h$  above which all firms use technology  $h$ . Next,  $\varphi^h$  can be expressed as a function of  $\varphi^*$  by substituting the zero profit condition for the marginal firm (equation (1)) in the equation above:

$$(3) \quad \varphi^h = \varphi^* \frac{1}{\left(1 + \tau^{1-\sigma}\right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}} \left( \frac{\eta - 1}{\gamma^{\sigma-1} - 1} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}.$$

Note that the share of active firms adopting technology  $h$  [ $(\varphi^h/\varphi^*)^{-k}$ ] is higher the lower are variable trade costs. This is because a reduction in trade costs increases the total revenues of exporters relative to those of the marginal firm, which only serves the domestic market.<sup>14</sup> By comparing equations (2) and (3) we can see that the parameter restriction required for  $\varphi^h > \varphi^x$  is that technology adoption costs are high enough relative to fixed exporting costs:

$$\frac{\varphi^h}{\varphi^x} = \left( \frac{\tau^{1-\sigma}}{(1 + \tau^{1-\sigma})} \frac{\frac{\eta - 1}{\gamma^{\sigma-1} - 1}}{\frac{f_x}{f}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}} > 1.$$

<sup>14</sup> Indeed, in online Appendix C I show that this result requires that the marginal firm is a nonexporter, that is,  $\tau(f_x/f)^{1/(\sigma-1)} > 1$ . This is implicitly assumed in the zero profit condition for the marginal firm (equation (1)) used to derive equation (3).

### C. Industry Equilibrium

The equilibrium price ( $P$ ), number of firms ( $M$ ) and the distribution of active firms' productivities in the economy are determined by the free entry condition. Free entry requires that the sunk entry cost equals the present value of expected profits:

$$(4) \quad f_e = [1 - G(\varphi^*)] \frac{1}{\delta} \bar{\pi},$$

where  $1 - G(\varphi^*)$  is the probability of survival and  $\bar{\pi}$  are per-period expected profits of surviving firms.  $\bar{\pi} = \bar{\pi}_d + p_x \bar{\pi}_x$  where  $\bar{\pi}_d$  are expected profits from domestic sales,  $p_x = [1 - G(\varphi^x)]/[1 - G(\varphi^*)]$  is the probability of exporting conditional on surviving and  $\bar{\pi}_x$  are expected exporting profits. Then, to solve for the free entry condition (equation (4)) we need to solve for expected profits  $\bar{\pi}$ . The derivations are detailed in online Appendix A:

$$(5) \quad \bar{\pi} = \frac{\sigma - 1}{k - \sigma + 1} f \Delta$$

$$\Delta = 1 + \left( \tau^{\sigma-1} \frac{f_x}{f} \right)^{\frac{-k}{\sigma-1}} \frac{f_x}{f} + \left( \frac{\eta - 1}{(1 + \tau^{1-\sigma})(\gamma^{\sigma-1} - 1)} \right)^{-\frac{k}{\sigma-1}} (\eta - 1).$$

By substituting the solution for expected profits (equation (5))<sup>15</sup> in the free entry condition (equation (4)) we can solve for the exit cutoff:

$$(6) \quad \varphi^* = \left( \frac{\sigma - 1}{k - \sigma + 1} \frac{f}{\delta f_e} \Delta \right)^{\frac{1}{k}}.$$

By substituting the solution for the exit cutoff (equation (6)) in equations (2) and (3) a solution for the exporting and technology adoption cutoffs can be obtained:

$$(7) \quad \varphi^x = \left( \frac{\sigma - 1}{k - \sigma + 1} \frac{f}{\delta f_e} \Delta \right)^{\frac{1}{k}} \tau \left( \frac{f_x}{f} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}$$

$$(8) \quad \varphi^h = \left( \frac{\sigma - 1}{k - \sigma + 1} \frac{f}{\delta f_e} \Delta \right)^{\frac{1}{k}} \frac{1}{(1 + \tau^{1-\sigma})^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}} \left( \frac{\eta - 1}{\gamma^{\sigma-1} - 1} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}.$$

Finally, welfare is determined by the inverse of the price index, which can be obtained by substituting the exit cutoff (equation (6)) in the zero-profit condition for the marginal firm (equation (1)):

$$(9) \quad P = \left( \frac{\sigma - 1}{k - \sigma + 1} \frac{f}{\delta f_e} \Delta \right)^{\frac{1}{k}} \frac{1}{\rho} \left( \frac{\sigma f}{L} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}.$$

<sup>15</sup> Note that for expected profits to be positive we need to impose the parameter restriction:  $k > \sigma - 1$ .

*Discussion.*—To interpret the solution for expected profits in equation (5) note that  $f\Delta$  can be written as

$$f\Delta = f + p_x f_x + p_h (f_h - f),$$

where  $p_x = (\varphi^x/\varphi^*)^{-k}$  and  $p_h = (\varphi^h/\varphi^*)^{-k}$  are the fraction of surviving firms that export and adopt the high technology, respectively. Then, expected profits are proportional to expected fixed costs ( $f\Delta$ ). It is straightforward to show that in the simple case of a closed economy with only one technology the solution for expected profits is the same as in equation (5) but with  $\Delta = 1$ . Then, expected profits are proportional to the variable profits of the marginal surviving firm, which must be equal to  $f$ . In the open economy, with probability  $p_x$  the firm becomes an exporter, and in that case expected profits are augmented in proportion to  $f_x$ , the variable exporting profits of the marginal exporter. Finally, with probability  $p_h$  the firm adopts the high technology, in which case expected profits are augmented in proportion to the variable adoption profits of the marginal adopters which are  $(f_h - f)$ . Note that as a reduction in variable trade costs increases the fraction of firms that export  $p_x$  and the fraction of firms adopting the high technology  $p_h$ , expected profits increase.

#### D. Bilateral Trade Liberalization

In this section I analyze the impact of bilateral trade liberalization on entry in the export market and technology upgrading. I show that a reduction in trade costs increases export revenues, inducing more firms to enter the export market and upgrade technology. This increases expected profits, inducing more entry into the industry. Increased entry reduces the price index, and thus firms serving only the domestic market lose revenues. As a result, the least productive firms make negative profits and exit.

More formally, I show in online Appendix B that when variable trade costs ( $\tau$ ) fall, and not all firms export ( $\tau^{\sigma-1}f_x > f$ ):

- (i) *The fraction of surviving firms that export,  $p_x = (\varphi^x/\varphi^*)^{-k}$ , and the fraction of surviving of firms that use technology  $h$ ,  $p_h = (\varphi^h/\varphi^*)^{-k}$ , increase.<sup>16</sup>*
- (ii) *Expected profits increase, that is,  $\partial\bar{\pi}/\partial\tau < 0$ .*
- (iii) *The price index falls, that is,  $\partial P/\partial\tau > 0$ .*
- (iv) *The exit productivity cutoff increases, that is,  $\partial\varphi^*/\partial\tau < 0$ .*
- (v) *The productivity cutoff for exporting decreases, that is,  $\partial\varphi_x/\partial\tau > 0$ .*
- (vi) *The productivity cutoff for adopting technology  $h$  decreases, that is,  $\partial\varphi_h/\partial\tau > 0$ .*

<sup>16</sup> This can be directly seen in equations (2) and (3).

*Discussion.*—The new result in the model is that the reduction in variable trade costs induces more firms to upgrade technology (result 6). What makes adoption of the new technology profitable for the most productive exporters is the increase in total revenues.<sup>17</sup> Still, it is important to note that this is not a market size effect: an increase in market size as represented by an increase in  $L$  does not affect revenues nor the technology adoption cutoff. Instead, the result is due to the asymmetric effect of trade liberalization in models of heterogeneous firms with fixed exporting costs: while firms serving only the domestic market lose revenues, exporters see their revenues increase.

Indeed, this result requires that domestic revenues fall less than export revenues increase. I show in online Appendix C that this can never be the case when the marginal firm is an exporter. In that case, as  $\tau$  falls free entry induces the price index to fall enough to make the profits of the marginal firm equal to zero. If this firm is an exporter, the price index must fall enough to make the reduction in domestic profits completely offset the increase in export profits.

An alternative intuition for this result is that as countries engage in bilateral trade liberalization, firms lose domestic revenues, because there are more foreign firms and increased foreign sales, but gain export revenues. The second effect dominates as long as exporters can serve the foreign market but face the entry of only a fraction of foreign firms.

## II. Context and Data

### A. Trade Liberalization

In this section I describe the regional and unilateral trade liberalization policies undertaken in Argentina at the beginning of the 1990s. Although these policies had started to be discussed in the late 1980s, the depth and pace of the reforms implemented in 1991 were largely unexpected. The newly elected president had promised populist policies during the campaign, namely a widespread increase in wages, but his government implemented a set of market oriented reforms. Many observers believed that the newly built consensus for the reforms was mostly due to the 1989 and 1990 hyperinflations, and the crisis in the socialist bloc. In particular, political arguments favoring MERCOSUR in Argentina and Brazil were based on the view that after the fall of the Berlin Wall the world would be organized in regional blocs, as the recent emergence of NAFTA and creation of the EU suggested.<sup>18</sup>

Argentina started reducing import tariffs with respect to the rest of the world before MERCOSUR was launched, in the context of debt-related negotiations with the World Bank and the IMF. Between October 1988 and October 1991 there were 11 major revisions of trade policy, often related to changes in macroeconomic policy aimed at controlling hyperinflation. By October 1991, the average nominal tariff was 12 percent, ranging from 0 percent to 35 percent, where rates were increasing in the value added of production of each good. Manufactures were concentrated in the

<sup>17</sup> The benefit of technology adoption is proportional to revenues while its cost is fixed.

<sup>18</sup> For a discussion of the policy debates in Argentina and Brazil during the period of launching of MERCOSUR see Jorge Campbell, Ricardo Rozemberg, and Gustavo Svarzman (1999).

range of 5 percent to 22 percent. Almost all import licenses were eliminated, with the exception of the automobile industry. Finally, in October 1993 imports of new capital goods were exempted of tariffs.

MERCOSUR was established by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay in March 1991. The agreement established *generalized, linear, and automatic* reductions in tariffs, and the adoption of a common tariff with third countries. The tariff reductions were generalized in the sense that the same reduction relative to the most-favored nation (m.f.n.) tariff rates was to be applied to all goods. They were to be implemented gradually according to a semiannual timetable starting with a 54 percent reduction in December 1991 and finishing at 100 percent in December 1994.<sup>19</sup> This new agreement was in sharp contrast with the regional integration treaty signed in 1988, where reductions in tariffs were gradually negotiated sector by sector and free trade was to be achieved in ten years.

The Customs Union was established in 1995 with the adoption of a Common External Tariff (CET), with an average level of 12 percent. Tariffs varied between 0 and 20 percent across industries. Inputs and materials had the lowest tariffs, followed by semifinished industrial goods, capital and IT goods,<sup>20</sup> and final goods. There were exceptions to internal free trade for a limited number of products, special regimes for sugar and automobiles, and some products faced tariff rates different from the CET.

MERCOSUR seems to have had a big impact on Argentinian exports. Between 1992 and 1996, exports to Brazil quadrupled, while exports to the rest of the world increased only 60 percent. As a result, growth in exports to Brazil explains 50 percent of the growth in total exports during this period. This might be related to the deep reduction in Brazil's tariffs during this period. Table 1 reports summary statistics for m.f.n. tariffs at the four-digit ISIC industry level of aggregation in the period under study.<sup>21</sup> The first row reports the level of Brazil's m.f.n. tariffs in 1991, which are the baseline for the MERCOSUR tariff reductions that started in December 1991. The average reduction in Brazil's tariffs faced by Argentinian firms between December 1991 and December 1994 was 29 percentage points. Tariff reductions varied extensively across industries, as initial m.f.n. tariffs varied between 84 percentage points and 0 percentage points. As the panel of firms I analyze covers the period 1992–1996, I use the level of Brazil's m.f.n. tariffs in 1992 as the baseline for the calculation of tariff reductions in the period 1992–1996. These are on average 24 percentage points, slightly lower than 1991 tariffs, but reflect a similar variation across industries, as their correlation is 0.97.

<sup>19</sup> The timetable of reductions relative to m.f.n. rates was: 54 percent by December 1991, 61 percent by June 1992, 68 percent by December 1992, 75 percent by December 1993, 82 percent by December 1993, 89 percent by June 2004, and finally 100 percent by December 1994.

<sup>20</sup> According to Julio Berlinski et al. (2006) the common external tariffs for capital goods (14 percent) and information technology and telecommunication (16 percent) were the most difficult to agree upon. Argentina favored low tariffs, while Brazil wanted higher protection. Thus, national tariffs were to converge to the CET by 2001 for capital goods and 2006 for IT goods, from above in the case of Brazil and from below in the case of Argentina.

<sup>21</sup> The source of the tariff data is UNCTAD-TRAINS. Tariffs for each four-digit ISIC industry are obtained as a weighted average of tariffs of the nine-digit HS products within each four-digit ISIC industry, where the weights are given by imports of each product. Thus, when computing Brazil's m.f.n. tariffs in 1992 weights for each product within a four-digit industry are based on Argentina's exports to Brazil of that product in each year. An alternative is to obtain four-digit ISIC industry as simple averages of m.f.n. tariffs for nine-digit HS products within each industry, but these give similar results, as their correlation is 0.975.

TABLE 1—BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA'S M.F.N. TARIFFS

	Average	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum	Industries
Brazil's m.f.n. tariffs in 1991	0.29	0.17	0.00	0.84	101
Brazil's m.f.n. tariffs in 1992	0.24	0.13	0.00	0.63	104
Argentina's m.f.n. tariffs in 1992					
Outputs	0.13	0.06	0.00	0.22	102
Inputs	0.11	0.03	0.01	0.17	101
Change in Argentina's tariffs w.r.t. the world 1992–1996					
Outputs	0.01	0.05	–0.10	0.14	104
Inputs	0.01	0.02	–0.03	0.06	101

*Note:* Industries refer to 4-digit ISIC industries with available tariff data.

As m.f.n. tariffs in Argentina were already low before MERCOSUR was launched, the baseline for the reduction in Argentina's tariffs for imports from Brazil was only 13 percentage points on average (Table 1). Still, there was significant variation in tariffs across four-digit ISIC industries, from 0 to 22 percentage points. Surprisingly, imports from Brazil grew exactly at the same rate as imports from the rest of the world during this period (60 percent).

As Argentina's unilateral trade liberalization occurred before the period under study, between 1992 and 1996 Argentina's average import tariffs with respect to the rest of the world increased slightly (1 percentage point). Still, there were changes in tariffs in both directions, from –10 percentage points to 14 percentage points across four-digit ISIC industries. The modifications on import tariffs during this period are related to the convergence to the CET that partly reflected the structure of protection in Brazil.<sup>22</sup>

In addition, Table 1 reports average m.f.n. input tariffs for Argentina as these are used for robustness checks in the empirical analysis of the impact of Brazil's tariffs on entry in the export market and technology upgrading. The input tariff for each industry is computed as a weighted average of the tariffs of all inputs used, where the weights are based on the cost share of each input obtained from the input-output matrix of Argentina, as described in online Appendix D. The baseline m.f.n. rates for Argentina's input tariff reductions with respect to Brazil were smaller than the output tariffs reported above, with an average level of 11 percentage points in 1992. Similarly, the changes in Argentina's input tariffs with respect to the world were smaller than the output tariffs, ranging from –3 to 6 percentage points.

Finally, an important point to note is that the start of MERCOSUR tariff reductions with respect to m.f.n. rates, December 1991, just precedes the period under study, 1992–1996. Still, exports seem to have reacted to tariff declines with a lag. The data on aggregate Argentinian industrial exports to Brazil show that these started growing in 1993. Thus, it is likely that the relevant overall tariff reductions in the period 1992–1996 are the full 100 percent reduction over m.f.n. rates between December 1991 and 1994 and not the 32 percent remaining reduction that occurred

<sup>22</sup> Berlinski et al. (2006) and Won Chang and L. Alan Winters (2002) provide a more detailed discussion of Argentina and Brazil's trade policy measures in the 1990s.



between December 1992 and 1994. Thus, in the empirical analysis I set the change in Brazil's tariffs with respect to Argentina between 1992 and 1996 to minus the level of Brazil's m.f.n. tariffs in 1992. Similarly, I set the change in Argentina's tariffs with respect to Brazil between 1992 and 1996 to minus the level of Argentina's m.f.n. tariffs in 1992. Note that the application of a 100 percent or 32 percent tariff reduction with respect to m.f.n. tariffs in 1992 does not affect the estimation of the average impact of tariffs on entry in the export market or technology upgrading, as in the first case the estimated coefficient is 0.32 times smaller, but the average change in tariffs is  $1/0.32$  times bigger.<sup>23</sup> It does affect the interpretation of the results, though, as the implied responses of entry in the export market and spending on technology to a given tariff change are 0.32 times smaller when considering the full 100 percent reduction. Then, the reported estimates can be considered as a lower bound.

*Brazil's Trade Policy.*—As the source of identification of the effect of tariff reductions on entry in the export market and technology upgrading are the differences across industries in the level of m.f.n. tariffs in Brazil in 1992, it is important to discuss Brazil's trade policy in more detail.

Like Argentina, Brazil implemented a program of unilateral trade liberalization between 1988 and 1994. Berlinski et al. (2006) note that the tariff structure in 1988 was based on the tariffs implemented in 1957 under the import substitution policy. They argue that the first reforms implemented in 1988–89 did not have significant effects on the degree of protection of the domestic industry, as NTBs, which were the main instrument of protection, were not modified. Instead, after a new government took power in March 1990 NTBs were eliminated and tariffs were reduced gradually according to a timetable ending in January 1994. The new tariffs would vary between 0 and 20 percent, except for a few goods facing 30–35 percent tariff rates.<sup>24</sup>

Brazil's m.f.n. tariff rates in 1992 reflect a transition between the old and new tariff structure. As a result, they display tariff rates above 30 percentage points for some unskilled, labor-intensive industries protected under the import substitution policy like toys, textiles, and rubber and also for skill-intensive industries that were protected under the new policy like domestic appliances, office accounting and computing, and the car industry. Possibly as a result, the correlation between Brazil's tariffs in 1992 and an exogenous measure of skill intensity of the industry<sup>25</sup> is very low ( $-0.002$ ). Instead, tariffs are negatively correlated with a measure of capital intensity ( $-0.21$ ), suggesting that Brazil protected labor-intensive industries. As the omission of industry characteristics that are correlated with Brazil's trade policy might induce biases in the estimation of the impact of the reduction in Brazil's tariffs

<sup>23</sup> For example, if the change in Brazil's tariffs is set to minus the level of m.f.n. tariffs in 1992 multiplied by 0.32, estimated coefficients are  $1/0.32$  times bigger, but then the average reduction in Brazil's tariffs in the period is 0.32 times smaller; thus the estimated effect of the average reduction of tariffs is the same.

<sup>24</sup> According to Berlinski et al. (2006) the 0 percent tariffs corresponded to commodities and "exportables," 10 percent for agricultural products and their derivatives, 10, 15 and 20 percent for products using basic inputs with 0 percent tariffs, and 20 percent for the rest of the products. The main exceptions to the general rule were IT goods (35 percent tariff), domestic appliances (30 percent tariff), and the car industry (35 percent tariff).

<sup>25</sup> I use measures of average capital and skill intensity in the industry in the United States in the 1980s obtained from the NBER productivity database (see online Appendix D for details).

on entry in the export market and technology upgrading, I include in the regressions two-digit ISIC industry dummies that absorb part of the correlation between changes in tariffs and industry characteristics. With the inclusion of two-digit ISIC industry dummies the correlation between capital intensity and tariffs falls to  $-0.06$ , although the correlation between tariffs and skill intensity increases to  $0.06$ . Thus, in addition to including two-digit ISIC industry dummies I control for measures of capital, skill intensity, and the elasticity of demand.<sup>26</sup>

### B. Firm-Level Data

The data I analyze comes from the *Encuesta Nacional de Innovación y Conducta Tecnológica de las Empresas Argentinas (ENIT)* (National Survey on Innovation and Technological Behavior of Industrial Argentinian Firms) conducted by the *Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos (INDEC)*, the Argentinian government statistical agency. The survey covers the period 1992–1996 and was conducted in 1997 over a sample of 1,639 industrial firms.

The sample is representative of firms owning establishments with more than ten employees and is based on 1993 census data. Although according to the census only 15 percent of establishments had more than ten employees, they represented 90.7 percent of the value of output, 90.9 percent of industrial value added, 87.9 percent of employment and 94.1 percent of the wage bill.<sup>27</sup>

As the survey was conducted in 1997, it does not contain information on firms that were active in 1992 and exited afterwards. I focus my analysis on a balanced panel of 1,380 firms present both in 1992 and 1996 for which there is information on sales and employment and that belong to four-digit ISIC industries with information on Brazil's tariffs.

The survey contains information on several dimensions of spending on technology upgrading. Firms upgrade technology by performing various innovation activities like internal R&D, paying for technology transfers, and buying capital goods that embody new technologies; and with different purposes like changing production processes, products, organizational forms, or commercialization. I constructed a measure of spending on technology (ST) that includes the following: spending on computers and software; payments for technology transfers and patents; and spending on equipment, materials, and labor related to innovation activities performed within the firm.<sup>28</sup>

The survey contains information on ST for all years in the period 1992–1996, while information on all the rest of the variables (sales, exports, imports, employment by education, investment) is available only for the years 1992 and 1996.

The survey also contains some binary measures of technology adoption: a list of nine yes/no questions asking whether the firm performed a certain category of

<sup>26</sup> I use the elasticity of substitution in the industry as estimated by Christian Broda and David E. Weinstein (2006). The correlation of the elasticity of demand with tariffs is low: 0.05 and 0.06 with controls for two-digit ISIC industry dummies.

<sup>27</sup> The sample is the same as the one used for the *Encuesta Industrial Anual*, the standard yearly industry survey used to compute Industrial GDP. A description of the sampling methodology of *Encuesta Industrial Anual* is available at INDEC's Web site: [www.indec.mecon.ar](http://www.indec.mecon.ar).

<sup>28</sup> Like R&D, adaptation of new products or production processes, technical assistance for production, engineering and industrial design, organization, and commercialization.

innovation or improvement in products or production process during the period 1992–1996. As an example, one of these categories is “product differentiation” and another “machinery and equipment associated to new production process.” I use this information to construct an innovation index equal to the fraction of categories for which the firm gave positive answers. A detailed description of the questions is contained in online Appendix D.

The main measure of technology I use in the empirical analysis is technology spending, while the binary measures of technology are used to perform robustness checks. I think technology spending is a better measure of technology for two reasons. First, the information has a panel structure that can be used to control for unobserved firm and industry characteristics. Second, it is a more objective measure in the sense that it does not depend on the interpretation of what an improvement or innovation is.

Finally, another unusual feature of the survey is that it contains information on employment by education. I use this information to construct measures of employment in primary school equivalents, skill intensity, and sales per worker as described in online Appendix D.

Table D.1 in online Appendix D contains summary statistics by export status for the main variables of interest for the initial year in the data, 1992.

### *C. Industry-Level Data*

In the empirical section I use controls for four-digit ISIC industry characteristics that might be correlated with changes in tariffs. First, average capital and skill intensity in the industry in the United States in the 1980s obtained from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) productivity database (see online Appendix D for details). I also use the elasticity of substitution in the industry as estimated by Broda and Weinstein (2006). Finally, data on exports from Argentina to Brazil in the years 1992 and 1996 were obtained from the UN COMTRADE database. This information is aggregated at the four-digit ISIC industry level.

## **III. Empirics**

In this section I test the predictions of the theoretical model developed in Section I. First, I check whether the sorting pattern of firms into exporting and technology use predicted by the model is consistent with the observed characteristics of exporters and nonexporters operating in the same four-digit ISIC industry. Second, I test the main predictions of the model: that a reduction in variable trade costs causes entry in the export market and technology upgrading. To establish causality, I use the differential changes in Brazilian tariffs across four-digit ISIC industries to show that firms are more likely to enter the export market and upgrade technology in industries where tariffs fall more.

### *A. Within-Industry Patterns in the Data*

In the model, underlying productivity differences produce a sorting of firms into three groups: the low productivity firms serve only the domestic market and use the low technology, the medium productivity firms still use the low technology but also




FIGURE 2. EFFECT OF FALLING VARIABLE TRADE COSTS

export, and the most productive firms both export and use the high technology. In this setting a reduction in variable trade costs increases exporting revenues, inducing firms in the middle range of the productivity distribution to enter the export market and upgrade technology.

Figure 2 illustrates the effects of trade liberalization for firms in each part of the productivity distribution. The upper line represents productivity cutoffs to adopt the high technology and to enter the export market before liberalization ( $\varphi_0^x, \varphi_0^h$ ), while the lower line represents the cutoffs after liberalization ( $\varphi_1^x, \varphi_1^h$ ). Within the group of firms that were already exporting before liberalization ( $\varphi_0^x < \varphi$ ), those in the upper range of productivity ( $\varphi_0^h < \varphi$ ) were already using technology  $h$ , while firms in the range  $\varphi_0^x < \varphi < \varphi_0^h$  adopt it only afterwards. Within the group of firms that enter the export market after liberalization ( $\varphi_1^x < \varphi < \varphi_0^x$ ), those in the upper range ( $\varphi_1^h < \varphi < \varphi_0^x$ ) enter the export market and adopt the new technology, while those in the lower range ( $\varphi_1^x < \varphi < \varphi_1^h$ ) enter the export market but keep the old technology.

To check whether the sorting pattern depicted in Figure 2 and the parameter restrictions required to obtain it are consistent with the data, I divide firms into three groups: continuing exporters,<sup>29</sup> new exporters,<sup>30</sup> and never exporters,<sup>31</sup> and compute differences in characteristics for firms operating within the same four-digit ISIC industry.

Table 2 reports that, on average, continuing exporters have a 0.33 log points higher level of spending on technology per worker than never exporters in 1992. This is consistent with at least a fraction of them already using the high technology before liberalization. Interestingly, they increase spending on technology 0.28 log points faster than never exporters during the liberalization period (1992–1996), which is consistent with a fraction of them adopting the high technology after liberalization.

<sup>29</sup> Firms that were already exporting in 1992.

<sup>30</sup> Firms that export in 1996 but were not exporting in 1992.

<sup>31</sup> Firms that do not export in 1992 nor 1996.

TABLE 2—DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EXPORTERS AND NONEXPORTERS

	Levels in 1992		Changes 1992–1996		Number of firms
	Continuing exporters	New exporters	Continuing exporters	New exporters	
Firm characteristic					
Sales	1.770 [0.089]***	1.032 [0.103]***	0.180 [0.040]***	0.254 [0.049]***	1,380
Employment	1.509 [0.074]***	0.870 [0.089]***	0.021 [0.026]	0.183 [0.035]***	1,380
Spending on technology per worker	0.335 [0.149]**	0.193 [0.175]	0.277 [0.106]***	0.375 [0.117]***	894
Skill intensity	5.147 [1.034]***	1.471 [1.104]	1.238 [0.377]***	1.252 [0.471]***	1,380

Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. Exporter premia are estimated from a regression of the form:  $\ln Y_{ij} = \alpha_1 NE_{ij} + \alpha_2 EE_{ij} + \alpha_3 EN_{ij} + I_j + \varepsilon_{ij}$  where  $i$  indexes firms,  $j$  indexes four-digit ISIC industries;  $NE$  are new exporters (231 firms),  $EE$  are continuing exporters (556 firms),  $EN$  are firms that exported in 1992 but didn't in 1996 (27 firms) and the reference category relative to which differences are estimated is nonexporters (566 firms);  $I$  are industry dummies, and  $Y$  is the firm characteristic for which the differences are estimated.

\*\*\*Significant at the 1 percent level.

\*\*Significant at the 5 percent level.

\*Significant at the 10 percent level.

Firms that would enter the export market after liberalization were not significantly more technology intensive than never exporters in 1992 (Table 2). In contrast, after liberalization these new exporters become more technology intensive than firms that do not export, increasing their spending on technology per worker 0.37 log points faster between 1992 and 1996.

The patterns in the data described above show that there is a coincidence between entry in the export market and technology upgrading but can't establish whether it is expanded export opportunities that cause technology adoption, vice versa, or whether both are caused by a third factor. Some alternative explanations for the results in Table 2 can be ruled out: as these are based on comparisons of exporters and nonexporters within industries, they are robust to macroeconomic shocks that affect all firms equally (an example could be exchange rate appreciation) and to shocks that affect all firms within an industry (an example could be fast technological change in a particular industry). Still, the fact that within each sector exporters and new exporters are upgrading technology faster than other firms could reflect other shocks that affect middle and high productivity firms differentially. This is particularly plausible in a context where several reforms were implemented at the same time. For example, capital account liberalization, which could facilitate access to credit to finance technology upgrading and entry in foreign markets to medium and big firms but not to small firms in the presence of credit constraints. Then, the next step in the empirical analysis attempts to establish causality by linking exporting and technology adoption directly to the reduction in Brazil's tariffs for imports from Argentina.

### B. The Impact of the Reduction in Brazil's Tariffs: Identification Strategy

The empirical identification of the effect of the fall in variable export costs on entry in the export market and technology upgrading by Argentinian firms is based

on the differential reductions in Brazilian tariffs for imports from Argentina across four-digit ISIC industries.

This source of identification has two features that make it likely to be exogenous with respect to the outcomes analyzed, *changes* in export status and *changes* in spending on technology between 1992 and 1996. First, the tariff reductions were programmed in 1991 and reach a level of zero for all industries<sup>32</sup> in 1995. Thus *changes* in tariffs are predetermined by the 1991 m.f.n. tariff *levels* in Brazil. Second, the 1991 m.f.n. import tariffs of Brazil are the same for Argentina and the rest of the world and are therefore unlikely to be targeted to industry characteristics particular to Argentina, whose share of Brazil's trade was only 7.7 percent.<sup>33</sup> As changes in tariffs are predetermined, they are unlikely to be driven by political pressures arising from the effects of liberalization in Brazil or Argentina, or by contemporaneous shocks to industrial performance. As they respond to Brazil's worldwide trade policy, it is also unlikely that results are driven by Brazilian tariffs being initially high in industries where Argentina has a comparative advantage.

Although the points above address the reverse causality problem, Brazil's initial tariff structure is certainly not random. As discussed above, Brazil's trade policy is correlated with some industry characteristics, and omitting them could be an important source of bias. Thus, I estimate all the equations in first differences, so that constant industry characteristics are differenced out. Still, if industries with different initial characteristics are on different trends, Brazil's tariffs could be capturing some omitted industry-level time-varying variable. I address this problem in two ways. First, I include in the differenced equations two-digit ISIC industry dummies that account for unobserved industry trends at broad sector levels like "Manufacture of food products and beverages" (ISIC 15) or "Manufacture of chemicals" (ISIC 24). As tariffs vary at the four-digit level this means that I am comparing manufacturers of dairy products (ISIC 1520) to macaroni producers (ISIC 1544), but not to manufacturers of pharmaceuticals (ISIC 2423) that are instead compared to producers of fertilizers (ISIC 2412). Second, as there can still be important differences between producers of pharmaceuticals and of fertilizers, I include four-digit ISIC level controls for the industry characteristics that are likely to determine tariffs: the elasticity of demand, capital and skill intensity. These industry characteristics are measured with US data to avoid endogeneity problems.

An additional issue concerning the use of Brazil's tariffs to measure the effect of expanded export opportunities on entry in the export market and technology upgrading is that they might be correlated with changes in Argentina's tariffs during this period, as long as the structure of protection was similar between the two countries in 1992. To address this concern I control for the change in Argentina's tariffs with respect to the world in the period 1992–1996 and alternatively for the change in Argentina's tariffs with respect to Brazil.<sup>34</sup> I control both for final goods tariffs and intermediate inputs tariffs.

<sup>32</sup> Except for the automobile and sugar industries. In the results presented in this section, 1996 tariffs are still set to zero for these two industries, to avoid endogeneity problems in using the actual 1996 tariffs. As a robustness check, all the results presented in this section have been replicated for the sample of firms excluding these sectors.

<sup>33</sup> Argentina's share of Brazil's imports rose to 11.2 percent in 1995 when all tariffs were eliminated.

<sup>34</sup> An important point to note is that as Argentina's m.f.n. tariffs with the rest of the world in 1992 were the basis for MERCOSUR tariff reductions, it is hard to distinguish the effect of the reduction of tariffs with respect to Brazil



*Heterogeneous Effects.*—The sorting pattern of firms described in Figure 2 implies that the reduction in Brazil’s tariffs should induce entry in the export market and technology upgrading for firms in the middle range of the productivity distribution. In particular, the model predicts that the reduction in tariffs would induce firms in the middle range of the productivity distribution to enter the export market but should not affect firms in the lower and upper ranges of the distribution. Similarly, the reduction in tariffs should induce only firms in the middle range of the productivity distribution to upgrade technology. To study these heterogeneous effects, I use firm size relative to the four-digit ISIC industry mean in 1992 as a proxy for initial productivity and divide firms into quartiles. Then, I analyze the effects of the reduction in Brazil’s tariffs on each quartile of the firm size distribution.

Next I present the estimation of the effect tariff changes on entry in the export market and later the estimation for technology upgrading.

### C. Entry in the Export Market

I estimate a linearized version of the entry in the export market choice described by equation (7). This linearization does not respect functional form, thus estimation attempts only to recover the signs of the partial derivative of interest and to assess the economic significance of the estimated coefficients. To simplify the exposition, I first describe estimation of the average effect of a reduction in Brazil’s tariffs on entry in the export market for all firms, and later analyze how this effect varies for firms in different quartiles of the size distribution.

I empirically analyze the entry in the export market decision using an index model:

$$(10) \quad EXP_{ijst} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \beta_{\tau^x} \tau_{jt}^x + \alpha_{st} + \mu_i + \varepsilon_{ijst} > 0 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases},$$

where  $j$  indexes four-digit ISIC industries;  $s$  indexes two-digit ISIC industries;  $t$  indexes time, that is the years 1992 and 1996;  $i$  indexes firms;  $EXP_{ijst}$  is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm exported in year  $t$ ;  $\tau_{jt}^x$  are Brazil’s tariffs that vary across four-digit ISIC industries and time;  $\mu_i$  are plant fixed effects that capture unobserved constant plant heterogeneity ( $\varphi$ ), constant sector characteristics that affect the sector exporting cutoffs in the model ( $\sigma, k, f_x, f, f_e$ ), and also some other sector characteristics that although not included in the model might affect the exporting cutoffs (like factor intensity);<sup>35</sup>  $\alpha_{st}$  are two-digit ISIC industry dummies that capture variation across time in sector characteristics.

Equation (10) with plant fixed effects can’t be consistently estimated by probit (incidental parameters problem). Thus, I estimate it using the linear probability model:

$$EXP_{ijst} = \beta_{\tau^x} \tau_{jt}^x + \alpha_{st} + \mu_i + \varepsilon_{ijst}.$$

from changes of tariffs with respect to the rest of the world.

<sup>35</sup> Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2007) develop a two-factor, two-sector and two-country model of trade with heterogeneous firms and show that the cutoff for entry in the export market is closer to the exit cutoff in comparative advantage industries.

TABLE 3—ENTRY IN THE EXPORT MARKET

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: Full sample. Dependent variable: change in export status 1996–1992</i>								
Δ Brazil’s tariffs	−0.421 [0.084]***	−0.416 [0.080]***	−0.407 [0.081]***	−0.340 [0.106]***	−0.466 [0.097]***	−0.325 [0.091]***	−0.362 [0.093]***	−0.533 [0.141]***
Δ Argentina’s tariffs w.r.t. world								
Outputs			0.207 [0.423]	0.176 [0.409]	−0.003 [0.340]			
Inputs				1.126 [0.886]	1.543 [0.693]**			
Δ Arg.’s tariffs w.r.t. Brazil								
Outputs						−0.507 [0.331]	−0.780 [0.300]**	−0.269 [0.344]
Inputs							1.215 [0.599]**	0.702 [0.524]
Industry-level controls					yes			yes
Firm-level controls		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
2-digit ISIC industry dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	1,380	1,380	1,380	1,348	1,348	1,374	1,342	1,342
R <sup>2</sup>	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.05
<i>Panel B: Full sample. Dependent variable: export status in 1996</i>								
Δ Brazil’s tariffs	−0.291 [0.071]***	−0.285 [0.077]***	−0.278 [0.074]***	−0.203 [0.084]**	−0.323 [0.101]***	−0.262 [0.101]**	−0.281 [0.111]**	−0.490 [0.144]***
Export status in 1992	0.642 [0.023]***	0.543 [0.028]***	0.543 [0.028]***	0.544 [0.028]***	0.546 [0.028]***	0.542 [0.028]***	0.545 [0.029]***	0.544 [0.028]***
R <sup>2</sup>	0.46	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50
<i>Panel C: Sample of nonexporters in 1992. Dependent variable: export status in 1996</i>								
Δ Brazil’s tariffs	−0.411 [0.108]***	−0.446 [0.124]***	−0.457 [0.122]***	−0.294 [0.123]**	−0.447 [0.138]***	−0.330 [0.150]**	−0.357 [0.175]**	−0.604 [0.202]***
Observations	797	797	797	781	781	797	781	781
R <sup>2</sup>	0.04	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.17	0.16	0.16	0.17

Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the 4-digit ISIC industry level. Δ denotes a change in a variable during the period 1992–1996. Firm-level controls include employment measured in efficiency units, sales per worker, and skill intensity, all measured in the initial year (1992). Industry-level controls include demand elasticity, skill intensity, and capital intensity of the 4-digit ISIC industry in the United States. In panel B remaining controls and number of observations are the same as in the corresponding column in panel A. In panel C controls are the same as in the corresponding column in panel A.

- \*\*\* Significant at the 1 percent level.
- \*\* Significant at the 5 percent level.
- \* Significant at the 10 percent level.

In this case, first differencing eliminates time-invariant plant and sector heterogeneity:

$$(11) \quad \Delta EXP_{ijs} = \beta_{\tau^x} \Delta \tau_j^x + \Delta \alpha_s + \Delta \varepsilon_{ijs}.$$

Estimation of equation (11) by OLS is reported in the first column of panel A of Table 3, where the reported standard errors are clustered at the four-digit ISIC industry level. The coefficient in the change in Brazil’s tariffs ( $\beta_{\tau^x}$ ) is negative (−0.421) and significant ( $t = -5.01$ ). The estimated coefficient implies that the average reduction in Brazil’s tariffs (24 percentage points) increases the probability of entry in the export market by 10 percentage points. Columns 2 to 8 assess the robustness of the baseline results to inclusion of controls, as described by the following equation:

$$(12) \quad \Delta EXP_{ijs} = \beta_{\tau^x} \Delta \tau_j^x + \beta_{\tau^m} \Delta \tau_j^m + \beta_z z_{ij1992} + \beta_c c_j + \Delta \alpha_s + \Delta \varepsilon_{ijs}$$

where  $\Delta\tau_j^m$  denotes changes in Argentina's import tariffs for outputs and inputs with respect to the world and Brazil;  $z_{ij1992}$  are firm characteristics in the initial year (1992) like size measured by the number of workers, sales per worker, and skill intensity; and  $c_j$  are four-digit ISIC industry characteristics like the elasticity of demand, skill and capital intensity in the United States. Estimation of equation (12) is reported in columns 2 to 8 of Table 3, and although some of the firm and industry characteristics are highly significant, the coefficient on Brazil's tariffs is not significantly affected by their inclusion. The coefficients in the regressions including all controls (columns 5 and 8) are  $-0.466$  ( $t = -4.80$ ) and  $-0.533$  ( $t = -3.78$ ) and imply that the average reduction in Brazil's tariffs (24 percentage points) increases the probability of entry in the export market by 11 to 12 percentage points.

A potential problem of the specification in equation (12) is that if there are sunk exporting costs, current export status might depend on lagged export status,<sup>36</sup> which in turn is likely to be negatively correlated with the initial level of Brazil's tariffs. This problem can't be solved by including lagged export status in the specification in first differences, as in that case export status in 1992 would be both part of the dependent variable and a regressor, thus necessarily correlated with the error term.<sup>37</sup> Still, it is possible to estimate the equation in levels, including lagged export status as a regressor, as specified in the following equation:

$$(13) \quad EXP_{ijs1996} = \beta_{\tau^x} \Delta\tau_j^x + \delta EXP_{ij1992} + \alpha_s + \varepsilon_{ijs1996}.$$

Unlike the first-differenced specification, equation (13) does not control for unobserved constant heterogeneity. Still, estimation of equation (13) is useful because first-difference and lagged-dependent variable estimates have a bracketing property: if the first-difference specification in (12) is correct, then (13) will tend to underestimate the absolute value of  $\beta_{\tau^x}$ , while if the lagged-dependent variable specification in (13) is correct, then (12) will tend to overestimate the absolute value  $\beta_{\tau^x}$ . This is because the initial level of Brazil's tariffs is negatively correlated with export status in 1992.<sup>38</sup> Panel B of Table 3 reports estimation of equation (13) where the estimated coefficient goes from  $-0.291$  ( $t = 4.09$ ) in the baseline specification in column 1 to  $-0.490$  ( $t = 3.40$ ) in column 9 where all controls are included. These estimates are 31 percent to 8 percent lower than the estimates in the first-differences specification, as expected. They are also less stable, possibly due to the omission of unobserved time-invariant industry characteristics.

As a final check that the presence of sunk export costs is not creating a problem in the identification of the coefficient on Brazil's tariffs I estimate equation (13) restricted to firms that were not exporters in 1992. Panel C of Table 3 reports the estimation of equation (13) by OLS. The coefficient on the change in Brazil's

<sup>36</sup> Mark J. Roberts and Tybout (1997) and Bernard and Jensen (2004) find evidence of the existence of sunk exporting costs in Colombia and the United States, respectively.

<sup>37</sup> An alternative solution to this problem that permits controlling for both unobserved individual heterogeneity and lagged dependent variables is to run a specification in first differences and use further lags of the dependent variable as instruments, as proposed by Manuel Arellano and Stephen Bond (1991). I can't implement this solution because the panel I analyze contains data only for 1992 and 1996.

<sup>38</sup> For a discussion and a derivation of the biases in the first-difference and lagged-dependent variable estimators see pages 243–247 in Joshua D. Angrist and Jörn-Steffen Pischke (2009).

tariffs is very similar to the one estimated in the first-difference specification and significant ( $-0.447$  ( $t = -3.24$ ) and  $-0.604$  ( $t = -2.99$ ) in columns 5 and 8 where all controls are included), implying that the average reduction in tariffs increases the probability of entering the export market by 11 to 14.5 percentage points.<sup>39</sup>

A potential problem in the estimation of equation (13) restricted to nonexporters in 1992 is sample selection. The model predicts that in sectors where tariffs are higher the exporting cutoff is higher; thus it is likely that in sectors with high initial tariffs nonexporters are more productive than in sectors with low initial tariffs, creating a positive correlation between Brazil's tariffs in 1992 and unobserved productivity, thus biasing downwards the coefficient on the change in tariffs. A simple way to assess whether this is a problem is to look at the correlation of tariffs with firm characteristics that are correlated with unobserved productivity like size and sales per worker in the subsample of nonexporters in 1992, and both are very low ( $-0.033$  and  $0.013$ ). In addition, when these firm characteristics are included in the regressions the coefficient does not change (see panel C, columns 1 and 2); thus sample selection does not seem to play an important role.

*Entry in the Export Market by Quartile of the Firm Size Distribution.*—The model predicts that the reduction in Brazil's tariffs induces entry in the export market for firms in the middle range of the productivity distribution, but not for the least productive firms nor the most productive firms who would export even in the presence of high tariffs. More precisely, the prediction is that the reduction in tariffs induces entry for firms that were below the exporting threshold before liberalization but above it afterwards. That is, those firms with productivity in the range  $\varphi_1^x < \varphi < \varphi_0^x$  in Figure 2. To test this prediction, I estimate the effect of the change in Brazil's tariffs on each quartile of the initial firm size distribution<sup>40</sup> through the following equation:

$$(14) \quad \Delta EXP_{ijs} = \sum_{r=1}^4 \beta_{\tau^x}^r (\Delta \tau_j^x \times Q_{ij}^r) + \sum_{r=2}^4 \delta^r Q_{ij}^r + \Delta \alpha_s + \Delta \varepsilon_{ijs},$$

where  $r$  indexes each of the four quartiles of the size distribution and  $Q_{ij}^r$  are dummy variables taking the value of 1 when firm  $i$  belongs to quartile  $r$ . Estimation results are presented in column 1 of Table 4. The effect of the reduction in Brazil's tariffs on the probability to enter the export market is around two times larger in the third quartile of the firm size distribution, where the point estimate is  $-0.722$  ( $t = 4.35$ ). Column 4 presents estimation of the equation in levels including lagged export status as a control. The point estimates of  $\beta_{\tau^x}^r$  are smaller, but the same pattern is observed: the estimate of  $\beta_{\tau^x}^3$  is largest in the third quartile and precisely estimated ( $\beta_{\tau^x}^3 = -0.541$ ,  $t = -3.49$ ). Column 7 reports estimation of  $\beta_{\tau^x}^r$  in the sample of

<sup>39</sup> Equation (13) can also be estimated by probit as it does not contain firm fixed effects. Probit estimation for both the full sample and the sample of nonexporters in 1992 produces very similar results as OLS. Tables reporting these estimations are available upon request.

<sup>40</sup> As a proxy for initial productivity, I use initial firm size in terms of (log) employment in primary school equivalents relative to the four-digit industry average, as detailed in online Appendix D. Alternatively I used (log) domestic sales relative to the four-digit industry mean as a proxy for initial productivity, with similar but less precise results than the ones reported below. I prefer the employment measure because it reflects value added better than sales, as long as there are differences in the level of vertical integration across firms.

TABLE 4—ENTRY IN THE EXPORT MARKET BY QUARTILE OF THE FIRM SIZE DISTRIBUTION

Dependent variable indicated in columns	Full sample						Sample of nonexporters in 1992		
	Change in export status 1996–1992			Export status in 1996			Export status in 1996		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
$\Delta$ Brazil's tariffs									
× first size quartile	-0.331 [0.185]*	-0.388 [0.188]**	-0.442 [0.198]**	-0.125 [0.170]	-0.159 [0.179]	-0.293 [0.190]	-0.358 [0.182]*	-0.372 [0.202]*	-0.436 [0.226]*
× second size quartile	-0.327 [0.146]**	-0.367 [0.195]*	-0.412 [0.219]*	-0.146 [0.175]	-0.170 [0.212]	-0.306 [0.228]	-0.261 [0.230]	-0.258 [0.260]	-0.318 [0.278]
× third size quartile	-0.722 [0.166]**	-0.784 [0.151]**	-0.832 [0.203]**	-0.541 [0.155]**	-0.576 [0.152]**	-0.702 [0.199]**	-0.774 [0.242]**	-0.720 [0.239]**	-0.782 [0.287]**
× fourth size quartile	-0.356 [0.175]**	-0.429 [0.179]**	-0.483 [0.204]**	-0.286 [0.119]**	-0.339 [0.146]**	-0.474 [0.162]**	-0.276 [0.342]	-0.323 [0.390]	-0.377 [0.379]
Controls									
Export status in 1992				0.553 [0.027]**	0.558 [0.027]**	0.557 [0.028]**			
$\Delta$ Arg.'s tariffs									
w.r.t. world		yes			yes		yes		
w.r.t. Brazil			yes			yes		yes	yes
Industry-level controls		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Firm-level controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
2-digit ISIC industry dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	1,380	1,348	1,342	1,380	1,348	1,342	797	781	781
$R^2$	0.03	0.05	0.04	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.15	0.16	0.16

Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the 4-digit ISIC industry level.  $\Delta$  denotes a change in a variable during the period 1992–1996. Controls for changes in Argentina's tariffs with respect to the world and Brazil include both output and input tariffs. Industry-level controls include demand elasticity, skill intensity, and capital intensity of the 4-digit ISIC industry in the United States. Firm-level controls include dummies for the second, third, and fourth quartile of the firm-size distribution in the initial year (1992).

\*\*\*Significant at the 1 percent level.

\*\*Significant at the 5 percent level.

\*Significant at the 10 percent level.

firms that were not exporters in 1992, with similar results as in the full sample ( $\beta_{\tau^x}^3 = -0.774$ ,  $t = -3.20$ ).

The effect of the reduction in tariffs on the rest of the quartiles is less precisely estimated. The coefficients are negative but not always statistically significant. Taken altogether the results suggest that some firms in the first, second, and fourth quartiles were induced to enter the export market by the reduction in Brazil's tariffs. This is not inconsistent with the model, as size is not a perfect measure of productivity, and the exporting cutoffs might differ across industries.

The point estimates of  $\beta_{\tau^x}^3$  in the baseline specifications (columns 1, 4, and 7) imply that the 24 percentage point reduction in Brazil's tariffs increases the probability to enter the export market by 19 to 13 percentage points for firms in the third quartile of the size distribution. The finding that the reduction in Brazil's tariffs had a smaller impact on entry for firms in the top quartile of the size distribution suggests that most of them were above the threshold before (or regardless of) liberalization. Similarly, the lower induced entry for firms in the first and second quartiles suggests that most of them were still below the threshold after liberalization. Thus, trade liberalization induced more entry in the export market for firms in the upper-middle range of the size distribution.

To assess the robustness of the baseline estimates of  $\beta_{\tau^x}^3$  discussed above (columns 1, 4, and 7 of Table 4) I perform a similar series of checks as in the estimation of average industry-level effects of the reduction in Brazil's tariffs in Table 3. The

remaining columns in Table 4 show that results are robust to the inclusion of changes in Argentina's import tariffs (for both output and inputs and with respect to the world and Brazil) and industry characteristics (capital, skill intensity, and elasticity of demand).

#### D. Technology Adoption Decision

*Spending on Technology.*—The technology adoption decision described in the model (equation (8)) is binary. In the data, I observe a continuous measure of spending on technology and also some binary measures of product and process innovation. The technology spending measure has the advantage of having a panel structure that can be used to control for unobserved firm and industry characteristics but the disadvantage that only a subsample of firms has positive ST in 1992 and 1996. This sample is not representative for the smallest firms, while the binary measures of technology contained in the survey are available for a representative sample. I first analyze the ST measure, and later I also discuss the binary innovation measures.

I first describe estimation of the average effect of a reduction in Brazil's tariffs on spending on technology for all firms and later analyze how this effect varies for firms in different quartiles of the size distribution. In the model, a firm is more likely to adopt technology  $h$  the lower is the technology adoption threshold ( $\varphi^h$ ) in its sector (equation (8)), and the higher is its own productivity ( $\varphi$ ). Then the level of spending on technology can be described by

$$(15) \quad \log ST_{ijst} = \beta_{\tau^x} \tau_{jt}^x + \beta_{\tau^m} \tau_{jt}^m + \alpha_{st} + \mu_i + \varepsilon_{ijst},$$

where  $\tau^m$  denotes Argentina's import tariffs, as technology adoption depends on both export and domestic revenues. As the survey has information on ST for all the years in the period 1992–1996, equation (15) could be estimated in levels using the data for all the available years. The problem with this estimation strategy is that it would induce serial correlation in the error terms, as the variation across time in Brazil's tariffs is fully determined by their level in 1992. As a result, the standard error of the estimated coefficients would understate their standard deviation, as noted by Marianne Bertrand, Esther Duflo, and Sendhil Mullainathan (2004). Thus, instead of estimating equation (15) in levels for all the available years, I implement one of their proposed solutions. I collapse the data in two periods, one before (1992) and one after liberalization (1993–1996) and take first differences.<sup>41</sup> I thus estimate equation (15) in first differences:

$$(16) \quad \Delta \log ST_{ijs} = \beta_{\tau^x} \Delta \tau_j^x + \beta_{\tau^m} \Delta \tau_j^m + \Delta \alpha_s + \Delta \varepsilon_{ijs},$$

<sup>41</sup> An alternative would be to use only the information in 1992 and 1996. I chose the first option to exploit all the available information and to minimize the number of observations with zero ST. The first alternative gives very similar results, although standard errors are slightly bigger.



TABLE 5—TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION

Dependent variable: change in log (spending on technology)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Δ Brazil's tariffs	-1.079 [0.350]***	-1.077 [0.345]***	-1.051 [0.325]***	-1.079 [0.340]***	-0.939 [0.383]**	-1.437 [0.447]***	-1.435 [0.483]***	-1.449 [0.643]**
Δ Argentina's tariffs w.r.t. world								
Outputs			0.556 [1.116]	0.599 [1.147]	0.629 [1.186]			
Inputs				-0.762 [3.211]	-0.897 [3.040]			
Δ Argentina's tariffs w.r.t. Brazil								
Outputs						2.051 [1.322]	2.254 [1.367]	2.538 [1.881]
Inputs							-0.361 [2.785]	-0.739 [3.034]
Industry-level controls					yes			yes
Firm-level controls		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
2-digit ISIC industry dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	894	894	894	872	872	892	870	870
R <sup>2</sup>	0.03	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.06

Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the 4-digit ISIC industry level. Δ denotes a change in a variable during the period 1992–1996. Firm-level controls include employment measured in efficiency units, sales per worker, and skill intensity, all measured in the initial year (1992). Industry-level controls include demand elasticity, skill intensity, and capital intensity of the 4-digit ISIC industry in the United States.

\*\*\*Significant at the 1 percent level.

\*\*Significant at the 5 percent level.

\*Significant at the 10 percent level.

where the change in ST in the liberalization period is

$$\Delta \log ST_{ijs} = \frac{1}{4} \sum_{t=1993}^{1996} \log ST_{ijst} - \log ST_{ijs1992}.$$

Estimation of equation (16) by OLS is reported in Table 5. The coefficient on the change in Brazil's tariffs is negative and significant in all specifications. The estimated coefficient in the baseline specification in column 1, where only the change in Brazil's tariffs is included as a regressor, is  $-1.079$  ( $t = 3.08$ ) and implies that the average reduction in Brazil's tariffs (24 percentage points) induces an increase in technology spending of 0.24 log points. The estimated coefficient is not affected by the inclusion of firm-level controls (column 2) nor by the change in Argentina's output and input tariffs with respect to the world (columns 3 to 5). Instead, the inclusion of the change in Argentina's output tariffs with respect to Brazil (column 6) increases the coefficient to  $-1.437$  ( $t = -3.21$ ), possibly because these are correlated with Brazil's tariffs but had an effect of the opposite sign in technology adoption, although it is not statistically significant. Finally, the inclusion of the change in Argentina's input tariffs with respect to Brazil (column 7) does not affect the estimated coefficient.

A further question is whether the reduction in Brazil's tariffs also increases the technology intensity of production, in the sense of increasing the ratio of spending on technology to labor. This is stronger evidence that firms are actually changing their production technology, instead of just expanding production by increasing the

use of all factors proportionally. Table E.1 in online Appendix E reports estimates of equation (16), replacing the growth in spending on technology by the growth in spending on technology per worker as the dependent variable. The estimates of  $\beta_{\tau^x}$  are very similar to the ones reported in Table 5.<sup>42</sup>

An important caveat in the interpretation of the results presented in this section is that equation (16) can only be estimated on a subsample of firms that have positive ST in 1992 and 1993–1996, 894 out of the total of 1,380 firms in the panel. Firms reporting a positive level of spending on technology tend to be bigger: only 14 percent of them belong to the first size quartile, while 33 percent belong to the fourth, as reported in Table D.2 in online Appendix D. Thus, results might not be representative for the smallest firms. Instead, the binary measures of technology that I use to construct the innovation indexes are available for a larger subsample of firms (1,310 firms) that is representative in terms of size, as around 25 percent of firms in the subsample belong to each size quartile.

*Binary Measures of Technology.*—In this section I analyze alternative measures of technology. I use a set of questions on improvements in products and production process to construct indexes for the fraction of questions in each category and overall that were answered positively by the firm.

Table 6 reports OLS estimates of equation (16), replacing the change in spending on technology by indexes of innovation as a dependent variable. The coefficient on the change in Brazil's tariffs is negative and significant for all and each type of innovation. Consistent with the results presented in the previous section, the estimated coefficient is sensitive to the inclusion of the change in Argentina's tariffs with respect to Brazil as a control, changing from  $-0.30$  ( $t = 3.35$ ) to  $-0.40$  ( $t = 3.42$ ) (columns 2 and 3). It is possible that this is due to the reduction in Argentina's output tariffs having an effect on innovation of the opposite sign, although the estimate is only marginally significant (column 3). The estimated coefficient in column 2 implies that the average reduction in Brazil's tariffs induces an increase of 0.07 in the innovation index, which is 19 percent of the average innovation index (0.38). As the index is constructed as the fraction of yes/no questions about product and process innovation to which the firm gave a positive answer, the result can be interpreted as a 19 percent increase in the fraction of questions about innovation answered positively by the firm. The effect of a reduction in Brazil's tariffs is of similar magnitude when the innovation index is disaggregated in product and process innovations.

*Technology Adoption by Quartile of the Firm Size Distribution.*—The model predicts that the reduction in Brazil's tariffs induces technology adoption for firms in the middle range of the productivity distribution, but not for the least productive firms that do not export nor the most productive firms that already adopted the high technology. More precisely, the prediction is that the reduction in tariffs induces technology upgrading for firms that were below the technology adoption threshold before liberalization, but above afterwards. That is, those firms with productivity

<sup>42</sup> Similar results are also obtained when the outcome variable is the ratio of spending on technology to sales.

TABLE 6—PRODUCT AND PROCESS INNOVATION

Dependent variable indicated in columns	Product and process innovation			Product innovation			Production process innovation		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
$\Delta$ Brazil's tariffs	-0.236 [0.104]**	-0.299 [0.090]***	-0.400 [0.117]***	-0.293 [0.116]**	-0.346 [0.098]***	-0.438 [0.116]***	-0.183 [0.100]*	-0.261 [0.093]***	-0.357 [0.127]***
$\Delta$ Arg.'s tariffs w.r.t. world									
Outputs		-0.191 [0.271]			-0.184 [0.284]			-0.213 [0.295]	
Inputs		0.241 [0.618]			0.086 [0.740]			0.360 [0.574]	
$\Delta$ Arg.'s tariffs w.r.t. Brazil									
Outputs			0.530 [0.308]*			0.626 [0.335]*			0.341 [0.326]
Inputs			-0.263 [0.554]			-0.584 [0.578]			0.187 [0.586]
Industry-level controls		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
Firm-level controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
2-digit ISIC industry dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	1,301	1,269	1,263	1,312	1,280	1,274	1,319	1,287	1,281
$R^2$	0.24	0.25	0.26	0.22	0.24	0.24	0.22	0.23	0.23

Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the 4-digit ISIC industry level.  $\Delta$  denotes a change in a variable during the period 1992–1996. Firm-level controls include employment measured in efficiency units, sales per worker, and skill intensity, all measured in the initial year (1992). Industry-level controls include demand elasticity, skill intensity, and capital intensity of the 4-digit ISIC industry in the United States.

\*\*\* Significant at the 1 percent level.

\*\* Significant at the 5 percent level.

\* Significant at the 10 percent level.

in the range  $\varphi_1^h < \varphi < \varphi_0^h$  in Figure 2. To test this prediction, I estimate the effect of the change in Brazil's tariffs on each quartile of the initial firm size distribution<sup>43</sup> through the following equation:

$$(17) \Delta \log ST_{ijs} = \sum_{r=1}^4 \beta_{\tau^x}^r (\Delta \tau_j^x \times Q_{ij}^r) + \sum_{r=2}^4 \delta^r Q_{ij}^r + \beta_{\tau^m} \Delta \tau_j^m + \Delta \alpha_s + \Delta \varepsilon_{ij},$$

where  $r$  indexes each of the four quartiles of the size distribution, and  $Q_{ij}^r$  are dummy variables taking the value of 1 when firm  $i$  belongs to quartile  $r$ . Estimation results are presented in Table 7 for both spending on technology and the innovation index. The reduction in tariffs induces a statistically significant increase in spending on technology only in the third quartile of the size distribution, where the estimated coefficient is  $-2.106$  ( $t = 3.46$ ) (column 1). The point estimate is double the size of the estimated average effect for all firms reported in Table 5 and more than double the estimated coefficient for the other three quartiles of the size distribution. The results on the innovation index parallel the findings with the ST measure: the reduction in tariffs induces a statistically significant increase in innovation only in the third quartile of the size distribution, where the point estimate of  $\beta_{\tau^x}^r$  is  $-0.359$  ( $t = 2.70$ ), as reported in column 4.

<sup>43</sup> As noted above, I use initial firm size in terms of (log) employment in efficiency units relative to the four-digit industry average as a proxy for initial productivity. Alternatively I used (log) domestic sales relative to the four-digit industry mean as a proxy for initial productivity, with similar but less precise results than the ones reported below.

TABLE 7—TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION BY QUARTILE OF THE FIRM SIZE DISTRIBUTION

Dependent variable indicated in columns	Change in spending on technology			Product and process innovation		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$\Delta$ Brazil's tariffs						
× First size quartile	-0.872 [0.604]	-0.725 [0.570]	-1.235 [0.755]	-0.041 [0.116]	-0.076 [0.113]	-0.165 [0.143]
× Second size quartile	-0.846 [0.569]	-0.662 [0.629]	-1.171 [0.828]	-0.199 [0.149]	-0.227 [0.145]	-0.326 [0.163]**
× Third size quartile	-2.106 [0.609]***	-1.927 [0.627]***	-2.424 [0.886]***	-0.359 [0.133]***	-0.403 [0.146]***	-0.465 [0.171]***
× Fourth size quartile	-0.372 [0.534]	-0.146 [0.563]	-0.648 [0.773]	-0.190 [0.130]	-0.229 [0.132]*	-0.319 [0.154]**
Controls						
$\Delta$ Arg.'s tariffs w.r.t. world		yes			yes	
$\Delta$ Arg.'s tariffs w.r.t. Brazil			yes			yes
Industry-level controls		yes	yes		yes	yes
Firm-level controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
2-digit ISIC industry dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	894	872	870	1,301	1,269	1,263
$R^2$	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.20	0.20	0.20

Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the 4-digit ISIC industry level.  $\Delta$  denotes a change in a variable during the period 1992–1996. Controls for changes in Argentina's tariffs with respect to the world and Brazil include both output and input tariffs. Industry-level controls include demand elasticity, skill intensity, and capital intensity of the 4-digit ISIC industry in the United States. Firm-level controls include dummies for the second, third, and fourth quartile of the firm-size distribution in the initial year (1992).

\*\*\* Significant at the 1 percent level.

\*\* Significant at the 5 percent level.

\* Significant at the 10 percent level.

The effect of the reduction in tariffs on the rest of the quartiles is less precisely estimated. The coefficients are negative but not statistically significant; thus it is possible that some firms in the first, second, and fourth quartiles were induced to upgrade technology by the reduction in Brazil's tariffs. As mentioned above, this is not inconsistent with the model, as size is not a perfect measure of productivity, and the technology adoption cutoffs might differ across industries.

The point estimate of  $\beta_{\tau}^3$  implies that the 24 percentage point reduction in Brazil's tariffs induces firms in the third quartile of the size distribution to increase their spending on technology an average of 0.50 log points. The finding that firms in the top quartile of the size distribution did not increase ST in response to the reduction in tariffs suggests that they were above the threshold before, or regardless of, liberalization. Similarly, the lower and not statistically significant increase in spending on technology for firms in the second quartile suggests that they were still below the threshold after liberalization. Thus, trade liberalization induced technology upgrading for firms in the upper-middle range of the size distribution.

To assess the robustness of the baseline estimates of  $\beta_{\tau}^x$  discussed above (columns 1 and 4 of Table 7) I perform a similar series of checks as in the estimation of average industry-level effects of the reduction in Brazil's tariffs in tables 5 and 6. Columns 1–6 in Table 7 show that results are robust to the inclusion of changes in Argentina's import tariffs (for both output and inputs and with respect to the world and Brazil) and industry characteristics (capital, skill intensity, and elasticity of demand).<sup>44</sup>

<sup>44</sup> As a further robustness check, interactions between changes in Argentina's import tariffs and firm size quartiles were included as controls in the estimation of equation (17). Alternatively, a set of interactions between

To assess whether firms increased the technology intensity of production, I estimate equation (17) replacing the outcome of interest by spending on technology per worker. The results parallel the findings with the ST measure: the reduction in tariffs induces a statistically significant increase in spending on technology only in the third quartile of the size distribution, where the estimated coefficient is  $-2.061$  ( $t = 3.65$ ) (column 1, Table E.2 in online Appendix E).

Finally, to assess whether the reduction in Brazil's tariffs affected both product and process innovation, I estimate equation (17) separately for each type of innovation index. I obtain similar results to the ones reported above with the aggregate index, as reported in columns 4–9 of Table E.2 in online Appendix E.

### E. Mechanism

In this section I discuss how the evidence presented above relates to the mechanism emphasized in the theoretical model, namely that trade liberalization generates an increase in revenues for exporters making it profitable for them to adopt the high technology. Finally, I provide evidence that the reduction in Brazil's tariffs increased export sales to Brazil, and the reduction in Argentina's tariffs with respect to Brazil reduced domestic sales.

*Technology Upgrading by Export Status.*—The finding that the reduction in tariffs induces an increase in spending on technology in the third quartile of the firm size distribution is consistent with the theoretical prediction that only firms that are induced to cross a size threshold by the increase in export sales upgrade technology. To explore this issue further, I split the sample of firms in two on the basis of initial export status and show that the reduction in Brazil's tariffs induced technology upgrading in both subsamples. This implies that firms that were already exporting in 1992 are induced to upgrade technology by the reduction in Brazil's tariffs, which is consistent with technology upgrading being driven by the increase in revenues. If technology upgrading was driven by the mere act of exporting, Brazil's tariffs would impact technology spending only through their induced entry in the export market.

I estimate the effect of the reduction in Brazil's tariffs on ST and the innovation indexes for two subsamples of firms, the ones that did not export in 1992, and the ones that did. The model predicts that both groups upgrade technology if the ordering of cutoffs is  $\varphi_1^x < \varphi_1^h < \varphi_0^x < \varphi_0^h$ , as depicted in Figure 2. Estimation results when the outcome of interest is ST are reported in Table 8, where panel A reports the estimation for the subsample of firms that did not export in 1992 and panel B for the subsample of firms that exported in 1992. The coefficient is similar to the one estimated for the full sample and significant in almost all specifications. These findings are consistent with the within-industry patterns in the data presented in Table 2, namely that both continuing exporters and new entrants in the export market increase ST faster than nonexporters operating in the same four-digit industry. Finally, Table 9

industry characteristics and firm size quartile dummies were also included as controls. The estimated coefficient of the effect of Brazil's tariffs on ST and innovation in the third quartile of the firm size distribution is not affected by the inclusion of these controls and is always significant at the 1 percent confidence level. Tables reporting these estimations are available upon request.

TABLE 8—TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION BY INITIAL EXPORT STATUS

Dependent variable: change in log (spending on technology)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A. Sample of nonexporters in 1992</i>								
Δ Brazil's tariffs	-1.073 [0.520]**	-1.256 [0.513]**	-1.304 [0.498]**	-1.101 [0.435]**	-0.972 [0.459]**	-1.586 [0.682]**	-1.869 [0.763]**	-1.788 [0.947]*
<i>Panel B. Sample of exporters in 1992</i>								
Δ Brazil's tariffs	-1.116 [0.382]***	-1.043 [0.380]***	-0.979 [0.396]**	-1.191 [0.403]***	-1.052 [0.520]**	-1.348 [0.484]***	-1.015 [0.555]*	-1.153 [0.786]
Controls								
Δ Arg.'s tariffs w.r.t. world								
Outputs			yes	yes	yes			
Inputs				yes	yes			
Δ Arg.'s tariffs w.r.t. Brazil								
Outputs						yes	yes	yes
Inputs							yes	yes
Industry-level controls					yes			yes
Firm-level controls		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
2-digit ISIC industry dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the 4-digit ISIC industry level. Number of observations in panel A is 417, or 407 when input tariffs are included as controls. Number of observations in panel B is 477 in columns 1 to 3, 465 in columns 4 and 6, 475 in column 6, and 463 in columns 7 and 8. Δ denotes a change in a variable during the period 1992–1996. Firm-level controls include employment measured in efficiency units, sales per worker, and skill intensity, all measured in the initial year (1992). Industry-level controls include demand elasticity, skill intensity, and capital intensity of the 4-digit ISIC industry in the United States.

\*\*\* Significant at the 1 percent level.

\*\* Significant at the 5 percent level.

\* Significant at the 10 percent level.

reports the estimation of the impact of Brazil's tariffs when the outcomes of interest are the product and process innovation indexes, with similar results in both subsamples.

*Exports to Brazil.*—In this section I report evidence that the reduction in Brazil's tariffs increased export sales, using COMTRADE data on exports from Argentina to Brazil at the four-digit ISIC industry level of aggregation. The analysis of export sales at the firm level did not produce consistent results, possibly because the data combines all destinations.<sup>45</sup> The main differences between the industry-level and firm-level data on exports are that industry-level data are reported by destination, reflect the universe of exports instead of a sample, and changes in export sales at the industry level not only capture the changes in sales of continuing exporters but also of new exporters.

Table 10 reports estimation of the effect of the reduction in Brazil's tariffs on (log) exports to Brazil. As the number of observations is smaller than in the firm-level dataset, I try to assess the robustness of the estimates by reporting results with and

<sup>45</sup> The estimated coefficients for the impact of the reduction in Brazil's tariffs on the change in (log) export sales at the firm level are not significant nor robust, in the sense that the point estimates vary between 1.429 and 0.16 depending on the combination of controls. In addition, they have the wrong sign. To check whether this instability is due to the fact that the distribution of the dependent variable is very dispersed, I dropped the observations in the top and bottom deciles. The coefficients become all negative and stable between -0.471 and -0.252 but still not statistically significant.



TABLE 9—PRODUCT AND PROCESS INNOVATION BY INITIAL EXPORT STATUS

Dependent variable indicated in columns	Product and process innovation			Product innovation			Production process innovation		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
<i>Panel A. Sample of nonexporters in 1992</i>									
$\Delta$ Brazil's tariffs	-0.179 [0.117]	-0.279 [0.098]***	-0.368 [0.126]***	-0.220 [0.126]*	-0.315 [0.109]***	-0.403 [0.126]***	-0.145 [0.115]	-0.252 [0.097]**	-0.334 [0.138]**
<i>Panel B. Sample of exporters in 1992</i>									
$\Delta$ Brazil's tariffs	-0.324 [0.130]**	-0.331 [0.140]**	-0.413 [0.184]**	-0.403 [0.159]**	-0.393 [0.151]**	-0.455 [0.204]**	-0.247 [0.122]**	-0.277 [0.145]*	-0.363 [0.181]**
Controls									
$\Delta$ Arg.'s tariffs w.r.t. world		yes			yes			yes	
w.r.t. Brazil			yes			yes			yes
Firm-level controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Industry-level controls		yes	yes		yes	yes		yes	yes
2-digit ISIC industry dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the 4-digit ISIC industry level. Number of observations in panel A is 741, in column 1, 725 in columns 2 and 3, 747 in column 4, 731 in columns 5 and 6, 753 in column 7, and 737 in columns 8 and 9.  $\Delta$  denotes a change in a variable during the period 1992–1996. Controls for changes in Argentina's tariffs with respect to the world and Brazil include both output and input tariffs. Firm-level controls include employment measured in efficiency units, sales per worker, and skill intensity, all measured in the initial year (1992). Industry-level controls include demand elasticity, skill intensity, and capital intensity of the 4-digit ISIC industry in the United States.

\*\*\*Significant at the 1 percent level.

\*\*Significant at the 5 percent level.

\*Significant at the 10 percent level.

without two-digit ISIC industry dummies and report both OLS and IV estimates. The IV estimates use Brazil's tariffs in 1991 to instrument for Brazil's tariffs in 1992 in an attempt to correct for measurement error in Brazil's tariffs. As industry-level tariffs are computed as averages of product-level tariffs, zero or small trade in some products in a given year can produce inaccurate measures of industry-level tariffs. Panel A reports OLS estimates. The point estimate of the effect of Brazil's tariffs on exports is negative and statistically significant in all columns except in column 3 where controls for changes in Argentina's tariffs with respect to Brazil and two-digit ISIC industry dummies are included in the regression. Panel B reports IV estimates, where both the magnitude of the coefficient increases and standard errors fall, suggesting that measurement error in tariffs might produce attenuation bias in the OLS results. Finally, panel C reports the first stage of the IV estimates.

Overall, the industry-level data estimates suggest that the reduction in Brazil's tariffs had a sizable impact on export sales: the 24 percentage point reduction in tariffs increased export sales by 0.68 to 0.84 log points, according to the OLS and IV baseline estimates reported in column 1, where two-digit ISIC industry dummies are included.

*Domestic Sales.*—The model predicts that domestic sales decline with tariff declines. The mapping of this prediction to the data is not straightforward, as the model considers a fully symmetric case where changes in tariffs are the same for both countries.<sup>46</sup> Thus, the model does not differentiate between Brazil's and Argentina's

<sup>46</sup> The reason for considering the symmetric case is to obtain a closed-form solution for the model in general equilibrium, that is, allowing for the free entry of firms. This is important, as it highlights that trade liberalization

TABLE 10—EXPORT SALES TO BRAZIL

Dependent variable: change in (log) export sales 1992–1996	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A. OLS</i>						
Δ Brazil's tariffs	-2.836 [1.560]*	-3.598 [1.346]***	-2.402 [1.622]	-3.113 [1.325]**	-2.621 [1.221]**	-2.291 [1.325]*
R <sup>2</sup>	0.39	0.45	0.45	0.07	0.19	0.17
<i>Panel B. IV</i>						
Δ Brazil's tariffs	-3.513 [1.448]**	-4.226 [1.274]***	-3.129 [1.411]**	-3.911 [1.339]***	-3.326 [1.273]***	-3.242 [1.341]**
R <sup>2</sup>	0.39	0.45	0.45	0.07	0.19	0.16
<i>Panel C. First stage</i>						
Brazil's tariffs in 1991	-0.774 [0.035]***	-0.764 [0.040]***	-0.747 [0.038]***	-0.763 [0.026]***	-0.767 [0.029]***	-0.744 [0.032]***
R <sup>2</sup>	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.94	0.94	0.94
F-test on excluded instrument	480.12	366.19	378.54	867.08	685.09	548.69
Controls						
Δ Arg.'s tariffs						
with respect to world		yes			yes	
with respect to Brazil			yes			yes
Industry-level controls		yes	yes		yes	yes
2-digit ISIC industry dummies	yes	yes	yes			
Observations	100	97	96	100	97	96
R <sup>2</sup>	0.39	0.45	0.45	0.07	0.19	0.16

Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. Δ denotes a change in a variable during the period 1992–1996. Controls for changes in Argentina's tariffs with respect to the world and Brazil include both output and input tariffs. Industry-level controls include demand elasticity, skill intensity, and capital intensity of the 4-digit ISIC industry in the United States.

\*\*\*Significant at the 1 percent level.

\*\*Significant at the 5 percent level.

\*Significant at the 10 percent level.

tariffs. The empirical evidence suggests that the reduction in Argentina's tariffs with respect to Brazil reduced domestic sales, while the reduction in Brazil's tariffs did not have a significant effect.

Table 11 reports estimation of the impact of the reduction in Argentina's tariffs with respect to Brazil on domestic sales. The point estimate in the baseline specification in column 1 is 1.315 ( $t = 2.41$ ) and implies that the 13 percentage point reduction in Argentina's tariffs reduced domestic sales by 0.17 log points. The point estimate is robust to the inclusion of controls for changes in Argentina's input tariffs with respect to Brazil and industry characteristics (columns 2 and 4), falls to 1.022 ( $t = 1.89$ ) when changes in Brazil's tariffs are included in the regression (column 5), and becomes insignificant when in addition controls for industry or firm characteristics are included (columns 6 and 7). The evidence is thus not conclusive but suggestive that the reduction in Argentina's tariffs with respect to Brazil reduced domestic sales.

has an impact on technology adoption only when not all firms export; if all firms exported the increased revenues produced by tariff reductions would induce entry until revenues fall to their initial level, as indicated in the theory section.

TABLE 11—DOMESTIC SALES, EFFECT OF ARGENTINA'S OUTPUT TARIFF REDUCTIONS W.R.T BRAZIL

Dependent variable: change in log (domestic sales) 1996–1992	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
$\Delta$ Arg.'s tariffs w.r.t. Brazil							
Outputs	1.315 [0.545]**	1.465 [0.573]**	1.022 [0.541]*	1.278 [0.545]**	1.022 [0.538]*	0.662 [0.585]	0.619 [0.701]
Inputs		-1.010 [1.556]	-0.591 [1.417]	-0.579 [1.351]		-1.161 [1.285]	-1.047 [1.241]
$\Delta$ Brazil's tariffs					0.191 [0.256]	0.306 [0.211]	0.438 [0.271]
Firm-level controls			yes			yes	
Industry-level controls				yes			yes
2-digit ISIC industry dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	1,371	1,339	1,339	1,339	1,371	1,339	1,339
$R^2$	0.06	0.06	0.08	0.06	0.06	0.08	0.06

Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the 4-digit ISIC industry level.  $\Delta$  denotes a change in a variable during the period 1992–1996. Firm-level controls include employment measured in efficiency units and skill intensity, both measured in the initial year (1992). Industry-level controls include demand elasticity, skill intensity, and capital intensity of the 4-digit ISIC industry in the United States.

\*\*\*Significant at the 1 percent level.

\*\*Significant at the 5 percent level.

\*Significant at the 10 percent level.

TABLE 12—DOMESTIC SALES, EFFECT OF OTHER TARIFF REDUCTIONS

Dependent variable: change in log (domestic sales) 1996–1992	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
$\Delta$ Brazil's tariffs	0.368 [0.246]				
$\Delta$ Arg.'s tariffs w.r.t. Brazil					
Inputs		0.579 [1.442]			
$\Delta$ Arg.'s tariffs w.r.t. the world					
Outputs			-1.171 [0.786]		-1.425 [0.788]*
Inputs				2.358 [1.592]	2.551 [1.635]
2-digit ISIC industry dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	1,377	1,345	1,377	1,345	1,345
$R^2$	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.06

Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the 4-digit ISIC industry level.  $\Delta$  denotes a change in a variable during the period 1992–1996.

\*\*\*Significant at the 1 percent level.

\*\*Significant at the 5 percent level.

\*Significant at the 10 percent level.

Table 12 reports estimation of the effect of other changes in tariffs on domestic sales. Unlike the change in Argentina's tariffs with respect to Brazil, changes in Argentina's output and input tariffs with respect to the world did not have a statistically significant effect on domestic sales. This might be due to the fact that the changes in Argentina's tariffs with respect to the world were smaller, as unilateral trade liberalization took place before 1992. Finally, changes in Brazil's tariffs with respect to Argentina did not have a statistically significant effect on domestic sales.

#### IV. Concluding Remarks

The evidence reported in this paper suggests that expanded export opportunities can have a positive effect on firm performance. The evidence is consistent with falling trading partner's tariffs increasing revenues for exporters and making adoption of new technologies profitable for more firms. The finding that falling trading partner's tariffs induce firms to take actions that can increase their productivity suggests that the cross-sectional differences between exporters and nonexporters are not completely explained by selection of the most productive firms into the export market but are partly induced by participation in export markets. Therefore, trade policies oriented to facilitate access to foreign markets, like multilateral trade liberalizations, can have a positive effect on firm-level performance.

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