

# Mismatch Cycles

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This paper studies the cyclical dynamics of skill mismatch and quantifies its impact on labor productivity. We build a tractable directed search model, in which workers differ in skills along multiple dimensions and sort into jobs with heterogeneous skill requirements. Skill mismatch arises because of information frictions and is prolonged by search frictions. Estimated to the United States, the model replicates salient business cycle properties of mismatch. Job transitions in and out of bottom job rungs, combined with career mobility, are key to account for the empirical fit. The model provides a novel narrative for the scarring effect of unemployment.

In a regime of ignorance, Enrico Fermi would have been a gardener, Von Neumann a checkout clerk at a drugstore. (Stigler 1962)

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## I. Introduction

Over the business cycle, labor markets face a large amount of reallocation: firms create and destroy vacancies, work relationships are formed and resolved, and workers change jobs and careers. In this paper, we investigate—theoretically and empirically—how business cycles affect the skill allocation of workers to jobs.

Our theoretical framework is a version of the directed search model of Menzio and Shi (2010, 2011), in which we incorporate two key features. First, workers differ along multiple skill dimensions and sort into jobs with heterogeneous skill requirements along those dimensions. The job search of workers encompasses a career choice, determining the *type of skill* that workers seek to employ, and a vertical choice of *task complexity*, which entails varying ability requirements on the employed skill. Second, workers and firms have incomplete information about worker skills, which generates skill mismatch in equilibrium. Workers and firms revise their beliefs about worker skills based on a noisy learning technology, with the important assumption that learning is more accurate regarding skills currently used in production. In equilibrium, workers reallocate both up and down job ladders within a given career path (utilizing the same skill at varying complexities) and across different career paths (utilizing different skills).

We estimate the framework using a combination of worker-level data from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79) and occupation-level descriptors of job requirements (O\*NET).<sup>1</sup> The estimation builds on a novel skill-based strategy to identify career switches in the data. We find that the business cyclicity of mismatch is determined by two opposing forces. On the one hand, we find that in recessions underqualified workers are fired, specifically those who are occupied at the bottom rungs of the job ladder. This *cleansing* effect reduces mismatch among ongoing work relations, raising the average labor productivity of workers who have been continuously employed for 2 years by 1.4%. On the other hand, we find that mismatch among new hires goes up in recessions, which is primarily caused by an increase in overqualification among workers hired for low-complexity jobs. This *sullying* effect reduces labor productivity of new hires by 0.9%. Both the cleansing effect and the sullying effect are consistent with direct evidence on the cyclicity of mismatch, which we document among workers in the NLSY79.

Our theoretical findings are explained by a nontrivial interaction between job mobility and mismatch: whereas transitions within a given career path (to jobs that employ similar skills) tend to reduce mismatch as

<sup>1</sup> See Yamaguchi (2012), Lindenlaub (2017), and Lise and Postel-Vinay (2020) for related calibration strategies using the same combination of NLSY79 and O\*NET.

workers re-sort across job rungs in response to belief revisions, transitions into new career paths (to jobs that employ previously untried skills) tend to increase mismatch because of increased uncertainty. Accordingly, the cyclicity of mismatch is closely entangled with the business cycle dynamics of career mobility. Specifically, our model predicts that career mobility is countercyclical (which we confirm in the data). This is because workers who are fired from the bottom rungs of a given career path will optimally seek to find jobs that utilize a different skill set rather than reapplying to jobs for which they are underqualified. In that sense, the two opposing forces shaping the cyclicity of mismatch are in fact both manifestations of the cleansing of underqualified workers, which increases career mobility in recessions and in turn heightens mismatch among new hires.

At the worker level, our framework gives rise to considerable inertia in mismatch and earnings, reflecting, on the one hand, the time needed to learn about any subsisting mismatch and, on the other hand, its slow dissolution due to search frictions. The inertia provides a novel narrative for the scarring effect of unemployment, which complements recent explanations by Krolikowski (2017), Jung and Kuhn (2019), Jarosch (2021), and Huckfeldt (2022).<sup>2</sup> In line with empirical evidence, workers who are displaced from their careers suffer large and persistent earnings losses, even after they have been reemployed. In the calibrated model, these earnings losses amount to 19% 5 years after displacement and to about 10% 10 years after displacement.

We conclude the paper with direct evidence for workers having imperfect information about their skills. Using workers' forecasts about their own future occupation, we document that the forecast errors entailed in these forecasts can be systematically predicted by a measure of worker ability that has been realized at the time the forecasts are formed. The evidence complements recent work by Conlon et al. (2018), who document substantial forecast errors in workers' expectations regarding future labor market outcomes using the Survey of Consumer Expectations of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.<sup>3</sup> In addition, we provide indirect evidence toward the model's mechanism. First, career mobility is predicted by the suitability of workers' skills for their current career. Second, mismatch among workers starting a new career is on average larger and more dispersed compared with workers switching jobs within careers.

<sup>2</sup> In the literature, the unemployment scar is explained by multiple channels. In all studies, part of the scar is attributed to a selection effect arising from the progression of employed workers to better jobs through on-the-job search. In Jung and Kuhn (2019), Jarosch (2021), and Huckfeldt (2022), an additional part of the scar is explained by human capital depreciating during unemployment. Finally, most related to our mechanism, Jarosch (2021) complements these channels with a high separation rate from bottom job rungs, which also adds inertia to workers' progression through the job ladder.

<sup>3</sup> Fredriksson, Hensvik, and Skans (2018) also provide indirect evidence pointing to information frictions using Swedish administrative data.

*Related literature.*—Our model combines ingredients from several strands of the literature. Our formulation of the labor market is based on the directed search models of Menzio and Shi (2010, 2011), Menzio, Telyukova, and Visschers (2016), and Schaal (2017), which provide us with the analytical framework to explore out of steady-state dynamics in a model with many degrees of heterogeneity.

The multidimensional modeling of skills is closely related to theoretical works by Lindenlaub and Postel-Vinay (2020) and Lise and Postel-Vinay (2020) that also emphasize the irreducibility of worker heterogeneity into a single unidimensional index.<sup>4</sup> There are two important differences with respect to our paper. First, both papers consider a random search model of the labor market, effectively accounting for skill mismatch by an exogenous friction that prevents workers from applying to the best-fitting jobs. In contrast, our approach abstracts from such frictions by allowing search to be directed and instead motivates skill mismatch using incomplete information.<sup>5</sup> Second, both papers focus on steady states, whereas our framework allows for aggregate shocks and is tractable enough to explore out of steady-state dynamics, which is at the core of our exploration.

Finally, our model incorporates learning à la Jovanovic (1979, 1984). Our paper particularly relates to more recent works in which learning is about worker skills rather than a match-specific productivity term (e.g., Groes, Kircher, and Manovskii 2013; Papageorgiou 2014; Wee 2016). In our model, this implies that the assessment of future match qualities varies with the prior work experience of workers and, in particular, leads to countercyclical fluctuations in uncertainty due to career mobility. Relatedly, Acharya and Wee (2020) explore a complementary mechanism that similarly gives rise to countercyclical uncertainty that reduces matching efficiency in recessions.

Our paper also contributes to an old debate on the cyclicity of worker-occupation mismatch.<sup>6</sup> On the one hand, matching models with endogenous separations suggest that mismatch is procyclical because of a cleansing of unproductive matches (e.g., Mortensen and Pissarides 1994; see also Lise and Robin 2017 for a variant with ex ante heterogeneous workers). On the other hand, others have argued that mismatch is countercyclical because of various sullyng forces (e.g., Moscarini 2001; Barlevy 2002; Barnichon and Zylberberg 2019). Our analysis provides a more nuanced

<sup>4</sup> Neal (1999) also studies an environment that distinguishes between career and firm matches.

<sup>5</sup> While labor market frictions by themselves do not cause mismatch to arise in our framework, they do contribute to its persistence, as they make reallocation costly. Related to the role of imperfect information in our model, Guvenen et al. (2020) use a similar narrative to motivate their empirical exploration of multidimensional skill mismatch.

<sup>6</sup> Şahin et al. (2014) explore an alternative notion of mismatch between vacancies and job seekers.

view, suggesting that in fact both forces are present among different sets of workers, although the cleansing effect unambiguously dominates at the aggregate. Our evidence complements Crane, Hyatt, and Murray (2021), who provide direct evidence that overall sorting is countercyclical; Bowlus (1995), who provides indirect evidence that match quality of new hires is procyclical; and Haltiwanger et al. (2021), who find evidence of both sulying and cleansing during recessions.

*Layout.*—The paper is organized as follows. In section II, we set up the model and characterize equilibrium. In section III, we describe the calibration strategy used to quantify the model. In section IV, we explore implications of mismatch at the worker level. In section V, we describe the predicted business cycle dynamics of mismatch and contrast them with the data. In section VI, we present suggestive evidence toward the learning friction at the core of the model and toward its implications for career mobility and mismatch. Section VII concludes.

## II. Model

We develop a directed search model of the labor market with endogenous sorting and aggregate fluctuations in productivity. There are two key features. First, workers are characterized by a high-dimensional vector of different *skill types*. Given their skills, workers sort into jobs that are characterized by the type of skill they employ and are further differentiated by how *intensely* they make use of this skill (task complexity). Second, information about worker skills is imperfect and needs to be inferred from noisy signals.

### A. Environment

#### 1. Population and Technology

Time is continuous and extends forever. There is a unit mass of workers, indexed by  $i \in [0, 1]$ , and an endogenous measure of one-vacancy firms with free entry. Firms and workers are risk neutral and share the same discount rate  $\rho$ . Each worker is characterized by a continuum of time-invariant abilities,  $\{a_{i,k}\}_{k \in [0,1]}$ , where  $a_{i,k}$  are normally distributed with mean  $a_0$  and variance  $S_0$  and are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) across skill types  $k$  and across workers  $i$ . Abilities are not observed (directly), but their distribution is public information.

Jobs are characterized by a unique skill type  $k \in [0, 1]$  utilized in production and a skill requirement (or task complexity)  $r \in \mathcal{R}$ , where  $\mathcal{R} \subset \mathbb{R}$  is compact. Henceforth, we label jobs sharing the same skill type  $k$  as *career*, and we refer to distinct levels of  $r$  within a given career as *job ladder*. The log output flow of worker  $i$  in job  $(k, r)$  is given by

$$\log y_{i,k,r}(t) = z(t) + \eta r - \max\{r - a_{i,k}, 0\}. \quad (1)$$

Here,  $z(t)$  is an aggregate productivity component, which follows a Poisson process that takes two values,  $z(t) \in \{z_L, z_H\}$ , with switching intensities  $\lambda_{z_L}$  and  $\lambda_{z_H}$ ; we normalize  $z_L \leq z_H$  and identify the first state with a recession. The second term in (1),  $\eta r$ , defines the gains in (potential) output associated with more complex tasks, whereas the third term captures losses due to underqualification. We assume  $\eta \in (0, 1)$ , so that the net return on raising the skill requirement is positive if and only if the worker is skilled enough to operate the more complex technology ( $a_{i,k} > r$ ).

Unemployed workers receive a constant utility flow  $b$  from home production.

## 2. Evolution of Beliefs

Agents learn about workers' skills while producing. Specifically, in each instant that a worker is employed, workers and firms update their beliefs about the utilized skill,  $a_{i,k}$ , on the basis of the noisy signal

$$ds_{i,k}(t) = a_{i,k}dt + \sigma dW_{i,k}(t),$$

where  $\sigma > 0$  parametrizes the noisiness of the signal and  $W_{i,k}$  follows a standard Brownian motion that is independent across all  $i$  and  $k$ . We assume that all learning is common knowledge and no direct inference is made from  $y_{i,k,r}$  (we view the signal  $s_{i,k}$  as an approximation to the information that could be inferred if agents were to observe a noisy version of output).<sup>7</sup>

The assumed process for  $s_{i,k}$  implies that for all  $i$  and  $k$ , the posterior distribution entertained about  $a_{i,k}$  is Gaussian at all times. Let  $\hat{a}_{i,k}(t)$  and  $\Sigma_{i,k}(t)$  denote the first two moments of this posterior. When a worker is employed in a job utilizing skill  $k$ , the posterior moments follow a diffusion given by the usual Kalman-Bucy filter,

$$\begin{aligned} d\hat{a}_{i,k}(t) &= \frac{\Sigma_{i,k}}{\sigma^2} (ds_{i,k}(t) - \hat{a}_{i,k}dt), \\ d\Sigma_{i,k}(t) &= -\left(\frac{\Sigma_{i,k}}{\sigma}\right)^2 dt. \end{aligned}$$

<sup>7</sup> In fact, this interpretation could be made exact with two slight changes to the environment: (1) time is discrete and (2) the penalty on underqualification is given by  $g(r - a_{i,k} - \sigma\epsilon_{i,t})$ , where  $\epsilon_{i,t} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, 1)$  is i.i.d. across  $i$  and  $t$ . Here  $g$  can be any monotonic approximation to  $\max\{r - a_{i,k}, 0\}$ , which sustains some arbitrary small return on skills when  $a_{i,k} > r$ . For example, one could set  $g(x) = \max\{x, 0\} + \beta x$ , with  $\beta > 0$  small. As long as  $g$  is strictly increasing in  $x$ , it holds that observing  $y_{i,k,r}$  is informationally equivalent to observing a noisy signal  $a_{i,k} + \sigma\epsilon_{i,t}$ , demonstrating our claim.

When the worker switches to a previously untried skill type  $k$ , the belief is initialized at the objective prior distribution,  $(\hat{a}_{i,k}, \Sigma_{i,k}) = (a_0, S_0)$ .

### 3. Labor Markets, Vacancy Creation, and Separations

The labor market is organized in a continuum of submarkets indexed by the job characteristics  $(k, r)$ , the relevant worker type  $(\hat{a}_{i,k}, \Sigma_{i,k})$ , and a lifetime utility  $x$  implicit in the employment contracts offered by firms to workers. Workers direct their search toward these submarkets. Specifically, unemployed workers have the opportunity to search the labor market at rate 1 and can search any submarket. For simplicity, we rule out recall of previously abandoned skill types but notice that the assumption imposes little restrictions on workers' search policies in practice.<sup>8</sup> Employed workers have the opportunity to search the labor market at rate  $\kappa \in [0, 1]$  and can search for jobs within their current career path (i.e., the skill type  $k$  of the aspired job must match their current job). Vacancies are created by an infinite supply of potential firms, which can open a vacancy in any submarket  $\omega \equiv (k, r, x, \hat{a}_k, \Sigma_k)$  at flow costs  $c$ .

Workers searching in a given submarket and vacancies posted in that submarket come together through a frictional matching process. In particular, a worker searching in submarket  $\omega$  meets a vacancy at rate  $p(\theta_i(\omega, z))$ , where  $\theta_i(\omega, z)$  denotes the vacancy-to-worker ratio of submarket  $\omega$ . Similarly, a vacancy posted in submarket  $\omega$  meets a worker at rate  $q(\theta_i(\omega, z)) = p(\theta_i(\omega, z))/\theta_i(\omega, z)$ . As usual, we assume that  $p$  is twice differentiable, strictly increasing, and concave, with  $p(0) = p(\infty) = 0$  and  $p'(0) = \infty$ .

When a firm and a worker meet in a submarket, the firm offers the worker a wage contract worth  $x$  in lifetime utility and hires the worker. Following Menzio and Shi (2010, 2011), we assume that the underlying contract space is complete, so that separations are bilaterally efficient. In particular, endogenous job separations as well as the search policies of employed workers are taken so as to maximize the joint value of the relationship.

In addition to an endogenous separation choice (further detailed below), worker-firm pairs separate at an exogenous rate  $\delta > 0$ . Moreover, independent of their current employment status, workers switch careers at an exogenous rate  $\epsilon > 0$ . If hit by such a career shock, workers are forever prevented from applying to any submarket involving the skill type  $k$  of their previous career.

<sup>8</sup> The exception is workers who are exogenously forced to switch careers (introduced below), who would otherwise prefer to reapply to their old career. The reason why the no-recall assumption does not pose much of a restriction otherwise is that  $k$  lies in a continuum. In particular, absent aggregate shocks, workers would never find it optimal to return to skill types that they have previously abandoned. The restriction therefore merely rules out recall after aggregate productivity shocks. For the calibration introduced in sec. III, workers indeed never find it optimal to do so if given the chance.

#### 4. Remark on Notion of Careers

In our terminology, the label *career* refers to a set of jobs that utilize similar skills. Our definition differs from previous approaches that have defined careers on the basis of occupation or industry codes. While related, such definitions would be misleading in our case, as distinct occupations may share very similar skill mixes, whereas others may bundle together jobs with distinct skills.<sup>9</sup> For a consistent interpretation of the model, one should therefore think of careers in terms of skill mixes when mapping the model to the data. Our calibration of the model in section III aims to do so by employing a skill-based definition of careers.

### B. Equilibrium Characterization

#### 1. Notation

To conserve on notation, we suppress  $i$  subscripts from all variables going forward. All value functions are indexed with a time subscript  $t$  to express their potential dependence on the aggregate state (except for their dependence on aggregate productivity  $z$ , which is kept as explicit argument).

#### 2. Vacancy Creation

By free entry, the value of creating a vacancy must be zero in every submarket. Let  $J_t(\hat{a}_k, \Sigma_k, r, z)$  denote the joint value of a worker-firm pair. The zero profit condition reads  $c = q(\theta_t(\omega, z))(J_t(\hat{a}_k, \Sigma_k, r, z) - x)$ . Rearranging, we find that this condition pins down the market tightness as a function of the firm's share of the surplus,  $\theta_t(\omega, z) = f_\theta(J_t(\hat{a}_k, \Sigma_k, r, z) - x)$ , where

$$f_\theta(V) \equiv \begin{cases} q^{-1}\left(\frac{c}{V}\right) & V \geq 0, \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad (2)$$

#### 3. Unemployed Worker Problem

Because there is no learning during unemployment, the belief about an unemployed worker's skills,  $\{\hat{a}_k, \Sigma_k\}_{k \in [0,1]}$ , remains at the same value at which they entered unemployment. The value of being unemployed *conditional* on searching for jobs of skill type  $k$ , denoted by  $U_i(\hat{a}_k, \Sigma_k, z)$ , is given by

<sup>9</sup> For instance, using the methodology described in sec. III, we find that the skill mix of an economist is very similar to the ones of actuaries, financial managers, and mathematicians and statisticians, which all constitute different occupations at the three-digit level (see app. G.1). Using two-digit occupation codes, on the other hand, bundles together many occupations with vastly different skill mixes.



$$\begin{aligned} \rho U_t(\hat{a}_k, \Sigma_k, z) &= b + \max_{x,r} \{p(\theta_t(\omega, z))(x - U_t(\hat{a}_k, \Sigma_k, z))\} \\ &+ \epsilon(U_t(a_0, S_0, z) - U_t(\hat{a}_k, \Sigma_k, z)) \\ &+ \lambda_z(U_t(\hat{a}_k, \Sigma_k, -z) - U_t(\hat{a}_k, \Sigma_k, z)). \end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

The flow value of being unemployed is comprised of four terms: (1) the utility flow of home production; (2) the product between the job finding rate and the excess utility,  $x - U$ , promised to the worker in the sub-market they are searching (maximized subject to the  $\theta$ - $x$  frontier defined by [2]); (3) the product between the exogenous career switching rate and the induced value change when starting a new career with  $(\hat{a}_{k'}, \Sigma_{k'}) = (a_0, S_0)$ ; and (4) the product between the arrival rate of aggregate productivity shocks and the corresponding change in value (here,  $-z$  denotes the complementary state of  $z$ ).

Intuitively,  $U_t(\hat{a}_k, \Sigma_k, z)$  measures an unemployed worker’s value of searching in career  $k$ . It remains to solve for the optimal career choice of unemployed workers. Fortunately, the problem is simplified by our assumption that  $k$  lies in a continuum, which implies that the choice of skill types is stationary, as workers never run out of new careers to explore. Accordingly, unemployed workers effectively face the choice between searching within their current career path, summarized by the belief  $(\hat{a}_k, \Sigma_k)$ , or starting a new career  $k'$ , with  $(\hat{a}_{k'}, \Sigma_{k'}) = (a_0, S_0)$ . The *unconditional* value of being unemployed is then given by

$$U_t(\hat{a}_k, \Sigma_k, z) = \max\{U_t(\hat{a}_k, \Sigma_k, z), U_t(a_0, S_0, z)\}. \tag{4}$$

#### 4. Joint Surplus Maximization

Next, consider a worker-firm pair’s joint continuation choice and the search policy of employed workers. As long as the relationship remains active, its flow value is given by

$$\begin{aligned} \rho J_t^{\text{act}}(\hat{a}_k, \Sigma_k, r, z) &= e^{z+\eta r} \mathbb{E}_t[e^{-\max\{r-a_t, 0\}}] + \Lambda_t(\hat{a}_k, \Sigma_k, r, z) \\ &+ \max_{x,r} \{\kappa p(\theta_t(\omega, z))(x - J_t(\hat{a}_k, \Sigma_k, r, z))\} \\ &+ \delta(U_t(\hat{a}_k, \Sigma_k, z) - J_t(\hat{a}_k, \Sigma_k, r, z)) \\ &+ \epsilon(U_t(a_0, S_0, z) - J_t(\hat{a}_k, \Sigma_k, r, z)) \\ &+ \lambda_z(J_t(\hat{a}_k, \Sigma_k, r, -z) - J_t(\hat{a}_k, \Sigma_k, r, z)). \end{aligned} \tag{5}$$

Here the first term corresponds to the expected output flow of the worker-firm pair. Using  $a_k \sim \mathcal{N}(\hat{a}_k, \Sigma_k)$ , we can explicitly compute the expected loss from underqualification as  $\mathbb{E}_t[e^{-\max\{r-a_t, 0\}}] = \psi(\hat{a}_k - r, \sqrt{\Sigma_k})$ , with

$$\psi(x, s) \equiv e^{x+s^2/2} \Phi\left(-\frac{x}{s} - s\right) + \Phi\left(\frac{x}{s}\right),$$

where  $\Phi(\cdot)$  is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. The second term in (5) captures how  $J$  changes as uncertainty declines over the course of the relationship (first term of  $\Lambda$ ) as well as how uncertainty affects the value itself (second term of  $\Lambda$ ):

$$\Lambda_t(\hat{a}_k, \Sigma_k, r, z) \equiv \left(\frac{\Sigma_k}{\sigma}\right)^2 \left(-\frac{\partial J_t(\hat{a}_k, \Sigma_k, r, z)}{\partial \Sigma_k} + \frac{1}{2} \frac{\partial^2 J_t(\hat{a}_k, \Sigma_k, r, z)}{\partial \hat{a}_k^2}\right).$$

The third term in (5) captures changes in the joint value due to the worker moving to a better-matched job (where the maximization is again subject to the  $\theta$ - $x$  frontier defined in [2]). The fourth and fifth terms capture the change in value induced by exogenous separation and exogenous career switching, in which cases the worker-firm pair obtains  $\mathcal{U}_t(\hat{a}_k, \Sigma_k, z)$  and  $\mathcal{U}_t(a_0, S_0, z)$ , respectively. Here we used that the postseparation value for the firm is zero given free entry. The last term captures the change in value induced by aggregate productivity shocks.

Finally, accounting for endogenous separations, we find that the joint value of the worker-firm pair is given by

$$J_t(\hat{a}_k, \Sigma_k, r, z) = \max\{J_t^{\text{act}}(\hat{a}_k, \Sigma_k, r, z), \mathcal{U}_t(\hat{a}_k, \Sigma_k, z)\}. \quad (6)$$

## 5. Job Ladder

We next explore workers' submarket choice as a function of the belief  $(\hat{a}_k, \Sigma_k)$ . When we substitute the  $\theta$ - $x$  frontier defined by (2) into (3) and (5), it is immediate that the choice of task complexity always maximizes the joint value,

$$r^*(\hat{a}_k, \Sigma_k, z) = \arg \max_{r \in \mathcal{R}} J_t(\hat{a}_k, \Sigma_k, r, z). \quad (7)$$

For employed workers, this follows from bilateral efficiency. For unemployed workers, it is similarly in their best interest to maximize the joint value because the firms' share is fixed by the free entry condition, making the worker effectively residual claimant on the value.

Figure 1 illustrates the resulting job ladder using the parametrization described in section III. The figure displays the choice of  $r$  as a function of  $\hat{a}_k$  and  $\Sigma_k$ . As the search policies are very similar for both realizations of aggregate productivity, we plot them only for the case where  $z = z_H$ . In the adopted parametrization, there is a seven-step job ladder corresponding to  $\mathcal{R} = \{0, 0.5, 1, \dots, 3\} \times S_0^{1/2}$ . Workers who are pursuing a new career search for jobs with the lowest complexity,  $r^*(a_0, S_0, z_H) = 0$  (indicated by the square in the plot). Workers who are more optimistic regarding their skills in their current career apply to more complex jobs




FIG. 1.—Job ladder. The graph shows the task complexity  $r^*$ , chosen as a function of expected ability  $\hat{a}_k$  and uncertainty  $\Sigma_k$ . The square marks the unconditional prior ( $a_0, S_0$ ) for untried skill types. Values for  $\hat{a}_k, \Sigma_k^{1/2}$ , and  $r$  are denominated in units of  $S_0^{1/2}$ . The graph is plotted for  $z = z_H$ , the case where  $z = z_L$  looks similar. See section III for a description of the parametrization.

(indicated by lighter shades of gray). There is no search toward job rungs below the one chosen by career switchers, as such jobs would be dominated by the option to pursue a new career.

The effect of uncertainty is more ambiguous: while high uncertainty leads workers at the bottom of the expected skill distribution to apply for jobs for which they expect to be overqualified, it leads workers with high expected skill to apply for jobs for which they are on average underqualified.<sup>10</sup> This is because for workers with high expected skill, the expected value of learning is nearly symmetric in good and bad news, making expected contemporaneous output the primary determinant of  $r^*$ , which for the calibrated value of  $\eta$  is maximized when workers are expected to be slightly underqualified (whenever  $\Sigma_k > 0$ ).<sup>11</sup> By contrast, for workers with low expected skill, being overqualified entails a positive option value because of the relative ease to adjust job rungs upward via on-the-job search, whereas being underqualified at the bottom job rung entails job loss and career switching.

<sup>10</sup> This prediction is consistent with our data on mismatch (introduced below), in which workers at the bottom job rungs are systematically overqualified, whereas workers in upper job rungs are systematically underqualified (see app. I.3).

<sup>11</sup> In general,  $\text{argmax}_y \mathbb{E}[y_i] > \hat{a}$  if and only if  $\eta > \bar{\eta}(\Sigma_k)$ , with  $\bar{\eta}(\Sigma_k) = 1 - (\sqrt{2/\pi} \cdot \Phi(-\Sigma_k^{1/2})/\phi(\Sigma_k^{1/2}) + 1)^{-1} < 0.5$  for all  $\Sigma_k > 0$ .

It remains to characterize the lifetime utility  $x$  chosen by workers who are actively searching for new jobs. From (2),  $x$  is decreasing in market tightness  $\theta$ , creating a trade-off for the worker to search in submarkets with higher job finding rates  $p$  versus searching in submarkets with higher utility  $x$ . When we maximize (3) subject to the  $\theta$ - $x$  frontier defined by (2), the market tightness chosen by unemployed workers is given by

$$\theta = p'^{-1} \left( \frac{c}{J_l(\hat{a}_k, \Sigma_k, r^*, z) - U_l(\hat{a}_k, \Sigma_k, z)} \right), \tag{8}$$

with  $r^*$  as in (7). Similarly, when we maximize (5) subject to (2), the market tightness chosen by employed workers is given by

$$\theta = p'^{-1} \left( \frac{c}{J_l(\hat{a}_k, \Sigma_k, r^*, z) - J_l(\hat{a}_k, \Sigma_k, r, z)} \right). \tag{9}$$

Note that by properties of  $p$ , the last expression evaluates to zero whenever  $r = r^*$ . That is, given bilateral efficiency, employed workers search only for jobs that are better matches (in expectation).

Figure 2 illustrates the search and separation policies of workers as a function of beliefs  $(\hat{a}_k, \Sigma_k)$  and current employment status (unemployed or employed in a job with complexity  $r \in \mathcal{R}$ ). Unemployed workers switch careers whenever  $\hat{a}_k$  is small (indicated by the dark gray area below the




FIG. 2.—Search and separation policies. The figure shows search policies as a function of expected ability  $\hat{a}_k$ , uncertainty  $\Sigma_k$ , and the employment state (unemployed/employed in job with complexity  $r$ ). Values for  $\hat{a}_k$ ,  $\Sigma_k^{1/2}$ , and  $r$  are denominated in units of  $S_0^{1/2}$ . The figure is plotted for  $z = z_H$ . See section III for a detailed description of the parametrization.

dotted threshold). Otherwise, they search for jobs in their current career (with a job finding rate that is increasing in  $\hat{a}_k$ ; not indicated in the plot). Employed workers are characterized by a separation threshold (black solid lines), below and above which they separate (with or without career switch).<sup>12</sup> Workers in continuing relationships actively search for better-matched jobs whenever  $r \neq r^*(\hat{a}_k, \Sigma_k, z)$ . Specifically, they aspire to *climb down* the job ladder if  $\hat{a}_k$  falls into the light gray shaded area bordered by the separation region below and the no-search region above. If  $\hat{a}_k$  falls into the upper light gray shaded area, they aspire to *climb up* the job ladder instead.

## 6. Distributional Dynamics

The aggregate state in this economy consists of the triplet  $(z, \Gamma, \Upsilon)$ , where  $\Gamma$  is the distribution over active worker-firm pairs  $(\hat{a}, \Sigma, r)$  and  $\Upsilon$  is the distribution over unemployed workers  $(\hat{a}, \Sigma)$ .<sup>13</sup> On the basis of the search and separation policies above, we can characterize two Kolmogorov forward equations, one for  $\Gamma$  and one for  $\Upsilon$ , which together with the process for  $z$  fully describe the dynamics in this economy. While the construction of these equations is standard, their precise expression is slightly protracted. We therefore confine their presentation to appendix A.

## 7. Equilibrium and Block Recursivity

An equilibrium is a joint worker-firm value function satisfying equation (6), an unemployed value function satisfying equation (4), lifetime utilities  $x$  satisfying the free entry condition (2), and a distribution of worker-firm pairs and unemployed workers evolving according to equations (A.1) and (A.2) in appendix A.

As usual, directed search together with bilateral efficiency and free entry imply that the unique equilibrium is block recursive (e.g., Menzio and Shi 2010, 2011; Schaal 2017). This is because free entry of firms implies that the market tightness in each submarket is only a function of the joint surplus rather than depending on the distribution of workers across submarkets (see eqq. [8], [9]). Hence, given that job finding rates are independent of cross-sectional distributions, so are the search problems of workers and the corresponding value functions (3) and (5). Absent any other cross-sectional dependence, we conclude that the only aggregate

<sup>12</sup> Workers may separate from their jobs yet continue with their current career because the gains from increasing the job finding rate may outweigh the cost of unemployment, as observed for workers whose current job rung is far from their desired one.

<sup>13</sup> Because of the symmetry in  $k$  discussed above, there is no need to keep track of the distribution of workers across  $k$  separately.

dependence of  $\mathcal{U}$  and  $J$  is through  $z$ . On this account, we drop the time subscript  $t$  from all value functions going forward.

### III. Calibration

This section describes the parametrization of the model. Following the literature, we use a set of standard moments to identify parameters common to labor search models. To inform ourselves about parameters unique to our model, we use a combination of moments constructed using data from the US Department of Labor's O\*NET project together with a worker-level panel from the NLSY79.

#### A. *Measuring Careers and Mismatch in the Data*

In the model, careers are each associated with a unique skill type. In the sequel, we argue that when matched with an adequate empirical definition of careers, this simple notion of careers is isomorphic to a more general version of our model, in which each job utilizes a mix of different skill types. Specifically, provided that skill mixes are orthogonal to one another for a given career classification, such a general model of skill utilization can always be reduced to the simple model introduced in section II. Motivated by this observation, we measure career mobility in the data as job transitions between occupations that are characterized by sufficiently orthogonal skill mixes based on its O\*NET descriptors.

#### 1. Model-Consistent Measure of Careers

To guide our interpretation of the data, consider the following generalization of our model, in which each job utilizes a mix of different skill types. Output per worker-firm pair is given by

$$y_{i,k,r}(t) = F(z(t), \mathbf{q}_{k,r}, \mathbf{a}_i),$$

where  $\mathbf{a}_i \equiv (a_{i,1}, \dots, a_{i,J})$  defines a vector of skills for each worker  $i$  over  $J$  basic aptitudes. Similarly,  $\mathbf{q}_{k,r} \equiv r \cdot (w_{k,1}, \dots, w_{k,J})$  defines a requirement vector over the same aptitudes for a given job. As before, jobs are classified in terms of their task complexity  $r$  and a particular skill mix, indexed by  $k \in \{1, \dots, K\}$ . The difference is that each  $k$  now maps into a vector of weights  $(w_{k,1}, \dots, w_{k,J})$  over the  $J$  basic aptitudes, normalized to sum to unity, as opposed to a unique skill type.

The key observation is that—with an appropriate classification of careers—the more general model outlined here can be (approximately) collapsed into the one developed in section II. Specifically, to make our simple model consistent with the more general production technology outlined, it suffices to classify occupations into careers so that job requirements

$\{q_{k,j}\}$  are (approximately) orthogonal across  $k$ .<sup>14</sup> With this in mind, we interpret two occupations observed in the data as different careers if their requirement vectors are sufficiently orthogonal. Specifically, let  $\varphi: \mathbb{R}^J \times \mathbb{R}^J \rightarrow [0, \pi/2]$  define the angular distance between two skill vectors  $q_1$  and  $q_2$ ,

$$\varphi(q_1, q_2) = \cos^{-1} \left( \frac{q_1 \cdot q_2}{\|q_1\| \|q_2\|} \right).$$

Then any job transition from a job with  $q_1$  to a job with  $q_2$  is treated as a career switch if and only if  $\varphi(q_1, q_2) \geq \bar{\varphi}$  for some  $\bar{\varphi}$  (below,  $\bar{\varphi}$  is chosen so that the average correlation in requirements for career switches is zero).<sup>15</sup> To account for variations in economic relevance across the  $J$  skill dimensions, we weigh them using a set of market weights when computing  $\varphi(q_1, q_2)$  in our empirical implementation.<sup>16</sup>

Figure 3 illustrates our empirical approach to measuring career switches for the case where  $J = 2$ . Starting from job  $q_1$ , transitions into jobs within the cone defined by  $\bar{\varphi}$  (depicted by the shaded area) are interpreted as transitions up and down the same job ladder (i.e., changes in  $r$  with a negligible variation in the skill mix  $k$ ). Transitions to jobs outside the  $\bar{\varphi}$ -cone are interpreted as career switches (i.e., transitions with a significant change in the skill mix  $k$ ). Appendix G.1 provides examples for occupations inside and outside the  $\bar{\varphi}$ -cones of economists and dental assistants.

## 2. Residual Correlation in Skills across Careers

We have argued that an orthogonal classification of careers allows for an exact mapping of our model to the data. In appendix I, we provide evidence that given our classification, learning is indeed uncorrelated across careers. Nevertheless, one may ask about the implications if this were not the case.

In theory, if skills were correlated across careers, workers could partially predict their performance in previously untried careers (although their ability to do so is likely limited in practice).<sup>17</sup> This would allow them to direct their search toward occupations for which they believe to be most qualified.

<sup>14</sup> Here we tacitly assume that  $K$  is sufficiently large so that workers do not run out of careers during their lifetime. We also assume that  $F$  collapses to (1) when  $\{q_{k,j}\}$  are orthogonal across  $k$ . See app. B for two examples where skills are perfect complements and perfect substitutes.

<sup>15</sup> See also Gathmann and Schönberg (2011) for a similar approach used to measure occupational distance.

<sup>16</sup> Specifically, let  $v_1, \dots, v_J$  denote a set of weights (further described below). Then  $\varphi(q_1, q_2)$  is computed using the weighted dot product  $q_1 \cdot q_2 \equiv \sum_j v_j q_{1,j} q_{2,j}$ .

<sup>17</sup> In practice, predicting workers' performance across careers is likely impaired by uncertainty about the importance of skills for different careers. For instance, suppose that skills enter production through a linear index  $w_k a'_i$ . In this case, learning about the linear index  $w_k a'_i$  is a sufficient statistic for the current career, yet it cannot be easily projected across careers without additional knowledge about both  $w_k$  and  $w_k$ .




FIG. 3.—Schematic illustration of empirical measure of careers for  $J = 2$ . Job transitions from  $q_1$  to jobs within the  $\varphi$ -cone are interpreted as transitions up and down the same job ladder; transitions to jobs outside the  $\varphi$ -cone are interpreted as career switches.

Using the notation of our model, we could capture this by reinterpreting  $a_0$  as the conditional mean of the best-perceived career and  $S_0$  as the residual uncertainty. As long as skills are not perfectly correlated, the model would still give rise to an increase in uncertainty and mismatch after career switches, not changing its fundamental dynamics. The main addition compared with the uncorrelated skill case would be a likely increase in  $a_0$  (and decrease in  $S_0$ ) over the life cycle of a worker, reflecting that workers become better at predicting their strengths with additional experience.

### 3. Measuring Skill Requirements and Careers

Our empirical measure of skill requirements is based on the O\*NET project, which describes occupations using a list of 277 descriptors relating to required worker attributes and skills. We follow the literature and reduce the large set of descriptors to  $J = 4$  dimensions using principal components (Güvenen et al. 2020; Lise and Postel-Vinay 2020), which we interpret as mathematics, verbal, social, and technical skills.<sup>18</sup> To make them

<sup>18</sup> Güvenen et al. (2020) and Lise and Postel-Vinay (2020) reduce worker requirements to only three dimensions. We add the technical component, as it has been shown to be an important determinant for labor market outcomes (Prada and Urzúa 2017).



comparable, we normalize each skill dimension in terms of percentile ranks.<sup>19</sup> Appendix F describes the data in more detail.

To identify career moves, we merge our skill measures with the NLSY79. Let  $\mathbf{q}_{i,t} = (q_{i,t,1}, \dots, q_{i,t,4})$  denote the four-dimensional skill measure associated with the job held by worker  $i$  at date  $t$ .<sup>20</sup> As detailed above, we associate a job transition from  $\mathbf{q}_{i,t}$  to  $\mathbf{q}_{i,t+1}$  with a career switch if the angular distance between the two skill vectors,  $\varphi(\mathbf{q}_{i,t}, \mathbf{q}_{i,t+1})$ , exceeds  $\bar{\varphi}$ . The threshold  $\bar{\varphi}$  is chosen so that the average correlation in requirements (across skill dimensions) is zero for career moves:  $\sum_{j=1}^4 v_j \text{Corr}(q_{i,t,j}, q_{i,t+1,j}) = 0$ , where  $\{v_j\}$  is a set of market weights described below.<sup>21</sup> Using this strategy, we set  $\bar{\varphi} = 14.8^\circ$ , which implies that 42.1% of all job transitions in the NLSY79 sample are career switches. The propensity to switch careers is comparable to the numbers obtained by Carrillo-Tudela et al. (2016), Fujita and Moscarini (2017), Carrillo-Tudela and Visschers (2021), and Huckfeldt (2022).

#### 4. Measuring Worker Skills and Mismatch

Following Guvenen et al. (2020), we define mismatch on the basis of the absolute difference in skill requirements and worker skills. For this purpose, we measure worker skills on the basis of six Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) scores available from the NLSY79 sample, individual scores on the Rotter locus of control scale, and the Rosenberg self-esteem scale. We follow a similar procedure as for skill requirements to reduce those scores into a four-dimensional measure of worker abilities in math, verbal, social, and technical skills.

Let  $\mathbf{a}_i = (a_{i,1}, \dots, a_{i,4})$  denote the skill vector of worker  $i$ . The mismatch between worker  $i$  and their current occupation is then given by

$$m_{i,t} \equiv \sum_{j=1}^4 v_j |a_{i,j} - q_{i,t,j}|. \quad (10)$$

Here  $v_j$  are market weights obtained from the regression coefficients on each of the four mismatch dimensions in a Mincer regression (normalized so  $\sum_{j=1}^4 v_j = 1$ ).<sup>22</sup> The weights ensure that our mismatch measure is

<sup>19</sup> To make our measure of skill requirements comparable with our measure of worker skills (described below), we compute the percentile ranks on the basis of the distribution of requirements among jobs observed in the NLSY79 sample.

<sup>20</sup> We map 2010 Standard Occupational Classification codes used by O\*NET to classify occupations into census codes used by NLSY79 using standard crosswalk files.

<sup>21</sup> The zero correlation among career switchers contrasts strongly with an average correlation of 0.89 among job switchers who are classified as within-career transitions.

<sup>22</sup> Specifically, we regress  $\log \text{wage}_{i,t}$  on math, verbal, technical, and social mismatch, controlling for a quadratic polynomial in age and worker fixed effects. The resulting weights are 0.58, 0.14, 0.09, and 0.19 for math, verbal, technical, and social, respectively.

not driven by skills that are economically irrelevant. Similarly, we define positive mismatch (measuring overqualification) and negative mismatch (measuring underqualification) as

$$m_{i,t}^+ \equiv \sum_{j=1}^4 v_j \max\{a_{i,j} - q_{i,t,j}, 0\},$$

$$m_{i,t}^- \equiv \sum_{j=1}^4 v_j \max\{q_{i,t,j} - a_{i,j}, 0\}.$$
(11)

## B. Parametrization of the Model

### 1. Assigned Parameters

We parametrize the model at a monthly frequency. The discount rate  $\rho$  is set to  $\log(1.05)/12$ , corresponding to an annual discount rate of 5%.

The relative search intensity of employed workers,  $\kappa$ , is set to 0.5, consistent with the relative search effort documented in Holzer (1987) and Faberman et al. (2022).<sup>23</sup> We choose to set the relative search intensity  $\kappa$  on the basis of direct evidence as opposed to targeting the job-to-job rate, because job-to-job transitions are clearly caused by many factors not present in the model, including relocation shocks, rent-seeking motives, and random fluctuations in match quality. If we would force the model to match the empirical job-to-job rate, we would effectively require learning about skills to account for these other forces, overstating the importance of learning for job-to-job mobility.<sup>24</sup>

We specify the set of potential task complexities,  $\mathcal{R}$ , using a seven-point grid given by  $\{0, 0.5, \dots, 3\} \cdot S_0^{1/2}$ , denoted in standard deviations of  $a_k$ . The boundaries of the grid are chosen so that adding additional grid points has no impact on the results.<sup>25</sup> We approximate beliefs about worker skills using a 61-point grid for  $\hat{a}_k$  on  $[-3, 7] \cdot S_0^{1/2} + a_0$  and a 21-point grid for  $\Sigma_k$  on  $[0, 1] \cdot S_0$ . Finally, we normalize log productivity in recessions to zero and choose transition rates for  $z$  in order to match the monthly switching intensities between recessions and expansions in the United States, where recessions are periods with an unemployment rate above its unconditional average of about 6.5%.

<sup>23</sup> Conditional on searching for jobs, Holzer (1987) and Faberman et al. (2022) document a relative time spent on search activities among employed workers of 0.48 and 0.51, respectively.

<sup>24</sup> In our calibration, the monthly job-to-job worker flows are 0.021.

<sup>25</sup> Adding an extra grid point at  $-0.5 \cdot S_0^{1/2}$  has no effect, as no search is directed to such submarkets in our calibration. Adding an extra grid point at  $3.5 \cdot S_0^{1/2}$  does not change the results, as it attracts only a negligible mass of 0.005 workers at the ergodic distribution.

## 2. Target Moments

We calibrate the remaining parameters using the method of moments, with weights chosen to minimize the relative distance between model and empirical moments. All model moments are computed at the ergodic distribution. As usual, all parameters are identified jointly. In the following, we provide a heuristic mapping from moments to parameters to guide intuition.

Following the literature, we target worker flows in and out of unemployment, as documented by Shimer (2012), to identify the exogenous separation rate  $\delta$  and the flow cost of vacancy creation  $c$ . We identify  $b$  by targeting a replacement ratio of  $b/\mathbb{E}[y]$  equal to 0.71, as found by Hall and Milgrom (2008). Following Menzio and Shi (2010) and Schaal (2017), we choose constant elasticity of substitution contact rate functions  $p(\theta) = (1 + \theta^{-\gamma})^{-1/\gamma}$  and  $q(\theta) = (1 + \theta^\gamma)^{-1/\gamma}$ . The matching function parameter  $\gamma$  is set to match an elasticity of unemployment to employment (UE) flows with respect to the aggregate vacancy-unemployment ratio of 0.28, as estimated by Shimer (2005). Finally, we identify  $z_H$  (relative to  $z_L$ ) from an average recession-expansion difference in unemployment amounting to 2.8 percentage points in the United States.

To identify the speed of learning, parametrized by  $\sigma$ , we target an average slope of the empirical separation hazard between the third and the eighteenth month of employment,  $\log(\text{haz}_3/\text{haz}_{18})$ , of 1.37, as found in the NLSY79 sample.<sup>26</sup> Intuitively, a high speed of learning (low values of  $\sigma$ ) allows worker-firm pairs to quickly identify whether a match is profitable, implying a steep decline in the separation hazard over time. By contrast, if learning is slow, worker-firm pairs will keep revising their beliefs for a prolonged time, reflected in a flattening of the hazard curve.

Next, we use the arrival rate of exogenous career shocks,  $\epsilon$ , to ensure consistency of the model with an average propensity to switch careers of 42.1%, as documented above in the NLSY79. Relatedly, we use the technology parameter  $\eta$  to match the empirical cyclicalitly in career mobility, which we find to be 6.9 percentage points higher in recessions compared with expansions.

Finally, to identify the prior mean and variance of skills,  $a_0$  and  $S_0$ , we match the positive and negative mismatch of workers in the first job of a new career. This captures that total mismatch in the first job after a career switch is closely linked to the prior uncertainty  $S_0$ , whereas the ratio between over- and underqualification pins down  $a_0$  relative to the entry job rung  $r^*(a_0, S_0, z)$ . We note that according to the data, workers starting a new career are on average overqualified.

<sup>26</sup> We measure the slope starting after the third month of employment, as the first 3 months are often subject to explicit or implicit probationary agreements, which the model abstracts from.

### 3. Estimation Results

Table 1 reports the data targets alongside the corresponding moments in the calibrated model. The model fits the data almost perfectly.

The calibrated parameters are listed in table 2. Figure 4 shows the implied ergodic distribution of individual state variables: mean beliefs about the currently employed skill (along with their true realization  $a$ ), uncertainty, and task complexities. The distribution of mean beliefs is censored slightly below  $a_0$ , reflecting the option to switch careers whenever workers become pessimistic about their skills. Moreover, comparing the distribution of  $\hat{a}_k$  with the true distribution of currently pursued skills  $a_k$ , the latter is more dispersed, especially around  $\hat{a}_k = a_0$ . This is because uncertainty is highest at the beginning of a career and is negatively correlated with  $|\hat{a}_k - a_0|$ , as large belief revisions are more likely the more information is observed.

The distribution of uncertainty is visibly right skewed, with a median uncertainty of  $0.25 \cdot S_0$  and a mean of  $0.35 \cdot S_0$ . Not surprisingly, however, despite the overall right skew, the distribution of  $\Sigma_k$  also has a concentration of mass at  $\Sigma_k = S_0$ , reflecting the reset in learning after workers switch careers.

Finally, the distribution of job rungs is hump shaped, with a median job rung of  $1.0 \cdot S_0^{1/2}$  and a mean of  $1.2 \cdot S_0^{1/2}$ .

## IV. Dynamics at the Worker Level

We are now ready to study the equilibrium allocation of workers to jobs and how it evolves over time. In this section, we do so, focusing on the

TABLE 1  
TARGETED MOMENTS

| Fitted Moments                                    | Model | Data | Source                     |
|---|-------|------|----------------------------|
| $\mathbb{E}_L[U] - \mathbb{E}_H[U]$               | .028  | .028 | Bureau of Labor Statistics |
| $\mathbb{E}[\text{UE rate}]$                      | .425  | .425 | Shimer 2012                |
| $\mathbb{E}[\text{EU rate}]$                      | .035  | .035 | Shimer 2012                |
| $b/\mathbb{E}[y]$                                 | .706  | .710 | Hall and Milgrom 2008      |
| $\epsilon_{UE/\theta}$                            | .280  | .280 | Shimer 2005                |
| $\mathbb{E}[\log(\text{haz}_0/\text{haz}_{18})]$  | 1.37  | 1.37 | NLSY79                     |
| $\mathbb{E}[\chi = 1]$                            | .421  | .422 | NLSY79, O*NET              |
| $\mathbb{E}_L[\chi = 1] - \mathbb{E}_H[\chi = 1]$ | .069  | .069 | NLSY79, O*NET              |
| $\mathbb{E}_{NC}[m^-]$                            | .096  | .096 | NLSY79, O*NET              |
| $\mathbb{E}_{NC}[m^+]$                            | .201  | .201 | NLSY79, O*NET              |

NOTE.—The notation  $\mathbb{E}[\cdot]$  denotes unconditional expectations, computed at the ergodic distribution of the model.  $\mathbb{E}_L[\cdot]$ ,  $\mathbb{E}_H[\cdot]$ , and  $\mathbb{E}_{NC}[\cdot]$  denote expectations conditional on the aggregate state being in a recession and expansion and conditional on the first job in a new career.  $U$  denotes the aggregate unemployment rate, EU and UE are monthly transition rates,  $y$  is output per worker-firm pair,  $\epsilon_{UE/\theta}$  is the elasticity of the UE rate with respect to the aggregate vacancy-unemployment ratio,  $\text{haz}_x$  is the separation hazard after  $x$  months of employment,  $\chi$  is an indicator evaluating to unity if workers switch careers during a job transition (this includes both EE' and EUE' transitions), and  $m^-$  and  $m^+$  denote negative and positive mismatch.

TABLE 2  
SUMMARY OF PARAMETERS

| Parameter                      | Description                              | Value           |
|--------------------------------|--|-----------------|
| Assigned:                      |  |                 |
| $\rho$                         | Monthly discount rate                    | $\log(1.05)/12$ |
| $\kappa$                       | Relative search intensity of employed    | .5              |
| $z_L$                          | Aggregate log productivity in recessions | 0               |
| $\lambda_{z_u}, \lambda_{z_o}$ | Poisson rates of productivity shock      | .0172, .0128    |
| Estimated:                     |  |                 |
| $z_H$                          | Aggregate log productivity in expansions | .301            |
| $b$                            | Home production utility                  | .985            |
| $c$                            | Flow cost of vacancies                   | .007            |
| $\gamma$                       | Matching function parameter              | .514            |
| $\eta$                         | Return on task complexity                | .494            |
| $a_0$                          | Unconditional mean of skills             | .105            |
| $S_0^{1/2}$                    | Standard deviation of skills             | .357            |
| $\sigma$                       | Standard deviation of signal noise       | 2.463           |
| $\delta$                       | Exogenous separation rate                | .012            |
| $\epsilon$                     | Exogenous career switching rate          | .003            |

microlevel dynamics of workers. We begin with a random simulation that illustrates the labor market dynamics of a single worker. Next, we highlight how workers’ career choice and their progression through the job ladder are both shaped by inertia. Finally, we show how this inertia carries over to earnings and generates a significant unemployment scar after job displacement.

A. *Sample Path for a Single Worker*

In the model, the allocation of workers to jobs is governed by an interaction of learning, career choice, and workers’ progression through job rungs. Figure 5 illustrates this interaction by simulating a 10-year sample




FIG. 4.—Ergodic distribution of individual state variables. Values for  $a_k, \hat{a}_k, \Sigma_k^{1/2}$ , and  $r$  are denominated in units of  $S_0^{1/2}$ .




FIG. 5.—Sample path for single worker. The figure shows a random career path for a single worker, initialized without a job and with  $(\hat{a}_k, \Sigma_k) = (a_0, S_0)$ . Throughout, the aggregate state is fixed at  $z = z_L$ . Vertical gray bands depict unemployment spells. Vertical dotted lines depict career switches.

path for a single worker while keeping the aggregate state fixed at  $z = z_L$ . There are no exogenous separation or displacement shocks realized throughout the path. At  $t = 0$ , the worker is unemployed and initial beliefs are  $(\hat{a}_k, \Sigma_k) = (a_0, S_0)$ .

Given the initial belief, the worker directs their search at  $t = 0$  toward the bottom job rung ( $r = 0$ ). Once matched, they start revising their belief, resulting in declining uncertainty (fourth panel), revisions to their mean estimate (solid black line in first panel), and revisions to expected mismatch (second panel). Over time, these revisions lead to a reallocation in jobs via on-the-job search, job separations, and career changes.

Specifically, the worker engages in on-the-job search whenever their desired job rung  $r^*$  differs from the current job rung  $r$  (gray dashed line

in first panel). Graphically, on-the-job search episodes occur whenever the mean belief falls outside the lightly shaded bands in panel 1 (which indicate that  $r = r^*(\hat{a}_k, \Sigma_k, z)$ ). For instance, starting at about 5 years, the upward-revision in  $\hat{a}_k$  leads the worker to attempt to climb up the job ladder, which they succeed at about 5.5 years. Further successful job-to-job transition can be seen in years 6–9, during which the worker experiences five additional job-to-job transitions (inducing changes in the job rung, as seen in the first panel).

Endogenous job separations occur whenever mismatch falls outside the gray dashed lines in the second panel, as observed after about 0.9, 1.4, and 2.4 years.<sup>27</sup> Once the worker is unemployed, they direct their search toward a new career whenever  $\hat{a}_k$  falls below the thin dotted threshold in the first panel, as observed for the first two of the three unemployment spells (indicated by the vertical dotted lines at the beginning of the corresponding unemployment spell). In these cases, the belief resets to  $(\hat{a}_k, \Sigma_k) = (a_0, S_0)$ , and the worker directs their search to the bottom job rung of the new career. By contrast, the third separation after 2.4 years occurs because the gains from climbing the job ladder are sufficiently large so that increasing the job finding rate (by moving to unemployment) outweighs the cost of being temporarily unemployed. During this final unemployment spell, the worker hence directs their search to a higher job rung within the same career.

### B. Inertia in Job Rungs, Mismatch, and Earnings

The sample path in figure 5 demonstrates that the allocation of workers to jobs is subject to inertia both within and across careers. The inertia reflects, on the one hand, the time needed to learn about any subsisting mismatch and, on the other hand, its slow dissolution due to search frictions. We next explore the consequences of this inertia for workers' progression through job rungs, mismatch, and earnings.

#### 1. Inertia in Job Rungs and Mismatch

We begin by highlighting inertia in workers' progression through job rungs. Figure 6A plots the average job rung as a function of workers' tenure in a given career. The average job rung increases in tenure for two reasons: (1) the climbing of the job ladder of high-ability workers and (2) the selection out of a career by low-ability workers. Both forces are subject to inertia. Absent frictions, workers would always pursue a career with  $a_k \geq r^{\max}$  and would always be employed at the top job rung  $r^{\max} = 3 \cdot S_0^{1/2}$ , yielding a flat

<sup>27</sup> The separation thresholds can be equivalently expressed in terms of  $\hat{a}$  as we have done in fig. 2.




FIG. 6.—Relationship between tenure, job rungs, mismatch, and earnings. Tenure is defined as the time since the last career change. The no-mismatch counterfactuals show fictitious profiles for average job rungs and earnings, where the distribution of abilities evolves as in equilibrium but where  $r = r^*(a, 0, z)$  at all times. All conditional expectations are computed at the ergodic distribution.

relationship between job rungs and tenure.<sup>28</sup> This starkly contrasts with the slow climb through the job rungs seen in figure 6A.

To assess the relative importance of the two sources of inertia, we contrast the model's evolution of job rungs with a counterfactual where there is no mismatch conditional on skills; that is,  $r = r^*(a, 0, z)$ . To make the counterfactual comparable, we evaluate it using exactly the same distribution of skills (conditional on tenure) as emerges in equilibrium. By construction, the counterfactual reflects only the selection effect, which in our calibration explains about 50% of the increase in job rungs with tenure.

The slow reallocation of job rungs causes mismatch to be persistent as well. Moreover, as shown in figure 6B, this naturally translates into a negative correlation between mismatch and job rungs.<sup>29</sup> Interestingly, despite the overall decline in mismatch across job rungs, there is a relative increase in the contribution of underqualification among higher job rungs, which is driven by the diminishing option value of being overqualified, as discussed in the context of figure 1.

## 2. Inertia in Earnings

Having documented inertia in job rungs and mismatch, we next look at its impact on earnings. Because wages are not uniquely determined by the bilaterally efficient labor contracts explored so far, we first have to

<sup>28</sup> Career mobility is subject to inertia, since evaluating the prospects of a career takes time because of the information friction and reduces the returns to trying out new careers, given the anticipation of mismatch. In app. C, we assess the cost of this implicit friction, finding that on average it amounts to 4.7 months of average output per worker.

<sup>29</sup> There is a slight increase in mismatch at the highest job rung due to an increase in overqualification among workers whose skills exceed the top job rung  $r^{\max}$ .



take a stand on the wage arrangement that firms use to deliver a worker's promised lifetime utility  $x$ . We do so by following Schaal (2017) and choosing the unique wage scheme under which employed workers find it sequentially optimal to pursue the contracted continuation and search policies, even in the absence of any contractual commitment. The unique wage arrangement with these properties effectively pays workers their expected marginal product, adjusted for the cost of recruitment, which is loaded onto workers at the instant of hiring (for details, see app. C).

Earnings are inversely related to mismatch through its adverse impact on labor productivity. For underqualified workers, this is due to the direct penalty on production. For overqualified workers, this is due to the opportunity cost of operating a task complexity that is too low. In either case, earnings are again subject to strong inertia in both the reallocation of job rungs within career and an inefficiently low propensity to switch careers. Figure 6C plots the resulting earnings profile in tenure along with the no-mismatch counterfactual.<sup>30</sup> The slow climb through the job ladder gives rise to a steep wage ladder that spans many years. Over the course of the first 10 years, earnings increase by a factor of 2.4, most of which is explained by the eventual outflow of low-ability workers.

### C. Scarring Effect of Unemployment

Previous literature has documented a large and persistent impact of involuntary job loss on future wages and earnings (e.g., Davis and von Wachter 2011; Jarosch 2021), especially when the job loss is accompanied by occupational displacement (Huckfeldt 2022). In this section, we offer a narrative for the scarring effect of unemployment based on the inertia in mismatch and earnings. In line with the evidence in Huckfeldt (2022), earnings losses are in large part realized through wage losses and are concentrated among workers who are separated from their job and are displaced from their career.

*Career displacement versus job loss.*—Figure 7A shows the earnings and wage path of a worker with at least 3 years prior job tenure that is displaced from their current career at  $t = 0$ , conditional on the business cycle state at  $t = 0$ .<sup>31</sup> Relative to the counterfactual of no job loss, earnings are reduced by roughly 47% 1 year after the displacement and continue to be depressed by about 19% 5 years later and by about 10% 10 years later.

<sup>30</sup> To increase comparability, we keep both the distribution of abilities and recruiting costs fixed at their equilibrium level. That is, counterfactual earnings are reduced by the same recruiting cost as in the model, so that the difference in earnings solely reflects the increase in labor productivity due to a lack of mismatch.

<sup>31</sup> The restriction to workers with 3 years of prior job tenure parallels the selection made by Davis and von Wachter (2011) and Jarosch (2021) in their empirical studies. Without the tenure requirement, the earnings loss from displacement amounts to 45%, 16%, and 8% after 1, 5, and 10 years, respectively.




FIG. 7.—Response to displacement shock. *A*, Earnings and wage losses by workers displaced from their career at  $t = 0$ , conditional on business cycle state at  $t = 0$ . All responses are as a percentage relative to the counterfactual of no job loss. *B*, Corresponding average job rungs (in units of  $S_0^{1/2}$ ) for workers displaced from their career, workers separated from their job without career displacement, and workers without job loss.

While initially a significant share of the earnings loss is explained by a slow rate of reemployment (after 1 year, 36% of the workers displaced during recessions and 28% of the ones displaced during expansions are unemployed), most of the long-run scar is due to a persistent decline in wages.

The logic behind this long-run scar on wages is that displaced workers—who previously occupied jobs at all rungs of the job ladder—must rebuild their careers in new sectors, which is subject to inertia, as described above. Figure 7*B* illustrates this by plotting the average job rung of displaced workers in the sequel of their job loss. While workers who are separated from their job without career displacement are able to immediately reenter the labor market at their previous job rungs (with little consequences for earnings),<sup>32</sup> workers who are displaced from their career enter the labor market at the bottom rung and take years to advance to their previous rungs. The prolonged impact of this long climb through the job rungs on earnings is able to account for the evidence in the literature, which 5–10 years after displacement documents earnings losses relative to the control group ranging from 5%–10% (Davis and von Wachter 2011; Huckfeldt 2022) to 15%–20% (Jarosch 2021).

## V. Aggregate Fluctuations in Mismatch

In this section, we study the macrodynamics of mismatch and its implications for aggregate productivity. We also present reduced-form evidence on the cyclicity of mismatch in the data.

### A. Mismatch Cycles in the Model

#### 1. Cleansing and Sullyng

We begin by computing the cyclical difference in mismatch, defined by the difference in conditional means between recessions and expansions,  $\mathbb{E}_L[\cdot] - \mathbb{E}_H[\cdot]$ . Table 3 reports the results. The model predicts procyclical fluctuations in underqualification (with negative mismatch being 2.7% smaller in recessions than in expansions) and countercyclical fluctuations in overqualification (with positive mismatch being 1.6% larger in recessions than in expansions). Combined, total mismatch is mildly procyclical, being on average 0.5% smaller in recessions than in expansions.

The overall cyclicity in mismatch is the result of opposing effects operating at different tenure levels. This is illustrated in figure 8, which breaks down the cyclicity by the time a worker has been continuously employed since their last unemployment spell (employment tenure). Among new hires (workers with zero employment tenure), both over- and

<sup>32</sup> There is a small and temporary earnings loss for workers who are separated without career displacement due to the job loss itself and the recruiting cost that is loaded onto starting wages.

TABLE 3  
CYCLICALITY OF MISMATCH IN MODEL

| Mismatch Measure        | $m_{i,t}$ | $m_{i,t}^-$ | $m_{i,t}^+$ |
|-------------------------|-----------|-------------|-------------|
| Cyclical difference (%) | -.48      | -2.70       | 1.61        |

NOTE.—The table reports the difference in conditional means between recessions and expansions, computed at the ergodic distribution and denominated in percent of the ergodic mean.

underqualification are significantly heightened in recessions. Combined, total mismatch among new hires increases by about 4% in recessions, exposing a recessionary sully effect among newly employed.

The increase in mismatch among newly employed workers contrasts starkly with the cyclicality in mismatch among workers with an employment tenure of more than 9 months, for whom mismatch is reduced in recessions, evocative of a recessionary cleansing effect. For instance, among workers who have been continuously employed for 2 years, both over- and under-qualification are about 4% smaller in recessions compared with expansions.

## 2. Understanding the Mechanism

Through the lens of the model, sully and cleansing are two sides of a single mechanism. To illustrate, figure 9 compares the separation/continuation policy of worker-firms across business cycle states. In the one extreme,




FIG. 8.—Mismatch cyclical by employment tenure. The figure plots the cyclical of  $m$ ,  $m^-$ , and  $m^+$  conditional on being continuously employed for  $\tau$  years; that is,  $\Delta E[\cdot|\tau] = E[\cdot|z_L, \tau] - E[\cdot|z_H, \tau]$ . All cyclical differences are denominated in percentage deviations from their ergodic mean  $E[\cdot]$ .




FIG. 9.—Separation policies: expansions versus recessions. The figure shows how the continuation region contracts during recessions. The career-switching threshold is plotted for  $z = z_L$ . Values for  $\hat{a}_k$ ,  $\Sigma_k^{1/2}$ , and  $r$  are denominated in units of  $\Delta_0^{1/2}$ .

if a worker is well matched to their current job, the match is continued in both business cycle states (white regions in the graph). In the other extreme, if a worker is excessively mismatched, the match is always terminated (dark gray regions). Finally, most relevant for us, when (expected) mismatch is between these two extremes, the match is continued in expansions but terminated in recessions (light gray regions). This is the natural consequence of matches being more productive in expansions, prompting worker-firms to tolerate a higher level of mismatch in expansions and triggering the cleansing of workers with above-average levels of mismatch during recessions.

Interestingly, it is precisely the cleansing of mismatched workers that induces the sulling among new hires. This is because workers who lose their jobs during recessions tend to switch careers, which in turn comes with higher skill uncertainty and higher levels of mismatch.

To appreciate this link from cleansing to sulling, consider the career-switching threshold depicted by the solid black line in figure 9.<sup>33</sup> Unemployed workers with a skill estimate  $\hat{a}_k$  below this threshold switch careers. Importantly, however, even if a worker anticipates to switch careers once they lose their job, they may still prefer to remain employed in the former career pro tempore to avoid the cost of finding a new job. Graphically, such workers with a loose career attachment exist whenever the career-switching threshold (solid black line) lies above the separation threshold for  $z = z_L$ .

<sup>33</sup> The threshold is depicted for  $z = z_L$ , which is the relevant one here. The threshold for  $z = z_H$  is virtually identical (differing in a single grid point).

(dotted gray line), as it does for the bottom three job rungs. Workers in this region of the graph are precisely the ones switching careers after being cleansed out in recessions and are responsible for the sully effect.

For sully to be quantitatively important, workers with a loose career attachment must make up a significant fraction of the cleansing region. Figure 10A shows the composition of workers inside the cleansing region, confirming that indeed the majority of cleansed workers switch careers upon separation (86% at the ergodic distribution).<sup>34</sup> The figure further reveals that virtually all of the cleansing is concentrated at the bottom job rungs, consistent with mismatch being more prevalent at the bottom job rungs.

Figure 10B sheds additional light on the mechanism. First, it compares cleansed jobs with surviving ones in terms of their mismatch. Both over- and underqualification are more pronounced in cleansed jobs. Hence, cleansing indeed has a procyclical impact on mismatch. Second, when cleansed workers reapply to jobs within their current career, they are naturally less mismatched in their new job. When switching careers, however, mismatch in the new career may initially exceed the one in the cleansed job. This is the case for overqualification, echoing that our calibration matches the empirically strong prevalence of overqualification among career switchers. In particular, the initial increase in overqualification is sufficiently large for positive mismatch to be overall countercyclical (table 3). By contrast, underqualification among career switchers is lower than in cleansed jobs so that underqualification is overall procyclical.

In sum, both the cleansing and the sully during recessions are driven by transitions in and out of bottom job rungs. The combination of these two effects explains the tenure profile of the mismatch cyclicity documented in figure 8: at low tenure levels, a match is likely to be created within the current aggregate state so that sully becomes the dominant factor. At high tenure levels, a match is likely to predate the current aggregate state so that cleansing becomes the dominant factor. Finally, at very high levels of tenure, few workers are mismatched to begin with, resulting in a negligible cyclical impact on mismatch.

### 3. Consequences for Aggregate Productivity

We next assess how the cyclical sorting patterns discussed so far affect output. To do so, we examine the endogenous component of labor productivity determined by the selection of workers into job rungs and careers,

$$e_{i,k,r}(t) \equiv \frac{y_{i,k,r}(t)}{\exp(z(t))},$$

<sup>34</sup> This is because workers generally attempt to resolve expected mismatch via on-the-job search so that in equilibrium, little mass is actually distributed across the cleansing region. The one exception to this is precisely the workers with a loose career attachment for whom applying to other jobs within the same career has no value.




FIG. 10.—Composition and mismatch of cleansed workers. *A*, Distribution of cleansed workers over job rungs and career mobility. *B*, Mean mismatch for cleansed matches compared with surviving matches as well as mismatch in next job conditional on career mobility.

which we call labor efficiency. Using this measure, we find that the sorting of workers into jobs and careers translates to an increase in labor efficiency of about 0.4% in recessions compared with expansions. The black line with crosses in figure 11 excinds the overall cyclicity of labor efficiency into its




FIG. 11.—Cyclicity of labor efficiency by employment tenure. The figure plots the cyclicity of  $\log e$  and its constituents conditional on being continuously employed for  $\tau$  years; that is,  $\Delta E[\cdot][\tau] = E[\cdot][z_L, \tau] - E[\cdot][z_H, \tau]$ .

cyclicality at different employment tenures. Echoing the sully among new hires, average labor efficiency among new hires is about 1% smaller in recessions than in expansions. By contrast, average labor efficiency among workers who have been continuously employed for 2 years is about 1.5% larger in recessions.

It is instructive to decompose (log) labor efficiency using (1) and (11) as follows:

$$\log e_{i,k,r}(t) = \eta a_{i,k} - \eta m_{i,k,r}^+ - (1 - \eta) m_{i,k,r}^-.$$

The decomposition identifies three endogenous components that determine labor efficiency. Conditional on skills  $a_{i,k}$ , labor efficiency decreases in both over- and underqualification, reflecting the direct impact of mismatch on output (if underqualified) and the opportunity cost of switching to a higher task complexity (if overqualified). Additionally, labor efficiency further varies with the career choice, which determines the skills employed for production (gray line with circles in fig. 11). Interestingly, the skill cyclicality is determined by the same two forces determining the mismatch cyclicality: among new hires, the rise in career mobility naturally translates into lower average skills. In our calibration, this explains about two-thirds of the overall drop in labor efficiency among new hires. By contrast, the cleansing of highly mismatched workers during recessions shifts the composition of the workforce toward more skilled workers. The reason is again that mismatch is more pronounced among workers with low career tenures, which is correlated with lower than average skills. In our calibration, this explains about three-quarters of the overall rise in labor efficiency among workers who have been continuously employed for 2 years.

We note that the countercyclicality in labor efficiency does not immediately translate into predictions regarding aggregate labor productivity. To draw inference about aggregate labor productivity, we first need to take a stand on the nature of the aggregate productivity shock  $z$ . One possibility is the literal interpretation as a shock to productive efficiency. In this case, overall labor productivity is given by  $\exp(z)\mathbb{E}[e_{i,k,r}]$ , which is procyclical in our calibration. However, owing to the partial equilibrium nature of the model, we can alternatively interpret  $z$  as a demand shock to the real price of labor output.<sup>35</sup> In this case, aggregate labor productivity is entirely determined by the endogenous labor efficiency  $\mathbb{E}[e_{i,k,r}]$  and is hence countercyclical.

<sup>35</sup> Here we tacitly assume that the real price of labor output fluctuates relative to home production  $b$  and the vacancy cost  $c$  either because  $b$  and  $c$  are defined in real terms, as in Walsh (2005) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Trabandt (2015, 2016), or because of sectoral heterogeneity.



This flexibility in interpreting  $z$  suggests a new narrative for the labor productivity puzzle—namely, the fact that labor productivity has become less procyclical in the United States and actually rose in 2008–9 during the Great Recession (e.g., Mulligan 2011; McGrattan and Prescott 2012; Galí and van Rens 2021). Through the lens of the model, we would precisely expect such development when productivity shocks are diminishing and business cycles have become increasingly demand driven, consistent with findings in Hazell et al. (2022) as well as with the household balance sheet narrative of the Great Recession (Mian, Rao, and Sufi 2013).

#### 4. Sectoral Displacement Shocks

So far, shocks to the aggregate labor product affected all workers equally. We now use our model to explore the case where shocks are directed to certain careers. While stylized, one can view this exercise as an approximation to structural change or to recessions that disproportionately affect certain sectors, such as leisure and hospitality during the 2020–21 pandemic.

Specifically, we consider a sectoral shock that displaces 1% of the labor force from their career. For simplicity, we assume that all workers in the affected careers are displaced, regardless of their employment status. In this pure form, the shock acts as a prototypical sullyng shock, forcing all affected workers to switch careers while shutting down any compositional cleansing effects. Accordingly, it induces a *countercyclical* mismatch response.

In light of recent empirical literature, it is interesting to highlight two features of the simulated response (shown in fig. 12). First, aggregate productivity (or, equivalently, labor efficiency, given that the displacement shock is uncorrelated with  $z$ ) is persistently reduced, outlasting the immediate impact on unemployment. Second, these productivity losses are realized in sectors not originally affected by the shock. This is because displaced workers must rebuild their careers in new sectors, which persistently reduces labor productivity below its long-run potential, even after reemployment. Both features are in line with evidence on the aggregate consequences of job displacement following a trade shock that led to mass layoffs in manufacturing due to increased competition from Chinese imports. In particular, the literature has documented large and persistent effects of this displacement on wages and productivity (e.g., Autor, Dorn, and Hanson 2013, 2016), whereas its impact on unemployment has been transient (Bloom et al. 2019). As predicted by the model, Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) document that the wage reductions following an aggregate displacement shock to manufacturing were not realized in manufacturing but indeed are concentrated outside that sector.




FIG. 12.—Aggregate impact of sectoral displacement shock. The figure shows the responses in aggregate productivity (in percent) and unemployment (in percentage points) to a shock that displaces 1% of the labor force from their career. The responses are averages over the ergodic process for aggregate productivity  $z$ .

## 5. On the Relative Importance of Cleansing versus Sullyng

Given its calibration, the model predicts that cleansing dominates sullyng for the average recession. Before examining mismatch in the data, we briefly comment on the relative contribution of cleansing and sullyng for other recessions. The model suggests that the relative importance of the two forces hinges on both the scale and the scope of recessions.

Regarding the scale, appendix E compares impulse responses of mismatch and labor efficiency across aggregate shocks of different sizes. The analysis suggests that the relative importance of sullyng is declining in the scale of a recession. The reason is that once the shock is of a certain scale, further scaling it up will only amplify cleansing but will not induce any additional sullyng. For instance, for small shocks with an initial unemployment response of 1 percentage points, sullyng roughly cancels the cleansing effect on mismatch after 12 months into the recession. By contrast, for large shocks with an initial unemployment response of 5 percentage points, cleansing strongly dominates, reducing mismatch by about 8.6% after 12 months.

At the same time, as evident from our extension on sectoral shocks, the relative importance of the two forces hinges critically on the scope of a recession. In the case of sectoral shocks, recessions are of small scope

(they affect only a few careers) but of large magnitude (in our stylized implementation, they fully shut down all affected careers). In this prototypical form, sectoral shocks do not induce any cleansing and instead lead to recessions marked by especially pronounced sulling.

### B. Mismatch Cycles in the Data

We next explore the relation between mismatch and the US business cycle in the data, using the empirical mismatch measure introduced in section III.A. We do so by estimating the following empirical specification:

$$m_{i,t} = \beta_0 + (\beta_1 + \beta_2 JS_{i,t} + \beta_3 UE_{i,t}) \times recession_t + \gamma \times (JS_{i,t}, UE_{i,t}, x_{i,t}) + \delta_i + \delta_m + \delta_y + \epsilon_{i,t}. \quad (12)$$

Here  $m_{i,t}$  is the mismatch of worker  $i$  at time  $t$ ;  $JS_{i,t}$  and  $UE_{i,t}$  are dummies indicating job stayers and new hires from unemployment;<sup>36</sup>  $recession_t$  is an indicator that evaluates to unity if the aggregate unemployment rate is above its unconditional average of about 6.5%;  $x_{i,t}$  is a set of individual controls, including a quadratic polynomial in age, the region of residence, and a full set of one-digit occupation and industry dummies; and  $\delta_i$ ,  $\delta_m$ , and  $\delta_y$  are individual, month, and 5-year fixed effects, respectively. Here, job-to-job transitions are the omitted category and are absorbed by  $\beta_1$ .<sup>37</sup> We note that the inclusion of individual fixed effects controls for compositional changes in the workforce over the business cycles (e.g., Solon, Barsky, and Parker 1994).

Table 4 reports the estimated business cyclicity. Looking at job stayers, mismatch declines in recessions by an average of 0.29 percentage points, which corresponds to 1.01% of the unconditional average in mismatch. Decomposing the decline into positive and negative mismatch (cols. 2, 3), we find that the decline is entirely driven by layoffs of underqualified workers, whereas mismatch due to overqualification is acyclical.

The procyclicality of mismatch among job stayers stands in contrast to the cyclicity among newly employed workers, which is countercyclical (0.65 percentage points, or 2.31% of the average mismatch among new hires). Decomposing the mismatch, we find that the overall cyclicity is largely driven by unemployed workers finding a job in recessions being on average more overqualified compared with workers finding a job in expansions.

<sup>36</sup> Job stayers are defined as all workers who have the same employer at date  $t$  as in the previous month. New hires from unemployment are defined as all newly hired workers who reported to be not working, unemployed, or out of the labor force in the previous month.

<sup>37</sup> As our model does not imply any robust prediction for the cyclicity in mismatch among job-to-job movers, we do not focus on job-to-job transitions here. See table H.3 in app. H.4 for details on the implied mismatch cyclicity among job-to-job transitions.

TABLE 4  
CYCLICALITY OF MISMATCH IN DATA

|                                     | DEPENDENT VARIABLE ( $\times 100$ ) |                    |                    |
|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
|                                     | $m_{i,t}$<br>(1)                    | $m_{i,t}^+$<br>(2) | $m_{i,t}^-$<br>(3) |
| Job stayers ( $\beta_1 + \beta_2$ ) | -.0292**<br>(.127)                  | .017<br>(.091)     | -.309***<br>(.085) |
| New hires ( $\beta_1 + \beta_3$ )   | .648**<br>(.291)                    | .502**<br>(.209)   | .146<br>(.185)     |
| Total cyclical                      | -.249**<br>(.126)                   | .043<br>(.091)     | -.292***<br>(.084) |

NOTE.—Standard errors clustered at the worker level are in parentheses. Dependent variables are multiplied by 100 (so mismatch ranges from 0 to 100).

\*\* Coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 5% level.

\*\*\* Coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 1% level.

Looking at the total cyclical (third row), we find that overall mismatch is procyclical. Intuitively, even though new hires are significantly more mismatched during recessions, they constitute only a small fraction of the workforce. Aggregate mismatch is therefore primarily determined by the cleansing effect of recessions, comprising roughly acyclical dynamics of overqualification and procyclical dynamics of underqualification.

*Comparison to the model.*—The strong presence of a cleansing effect in the data lends support to the baseline version of our model, in which business cycles are driven by aggregate productivity shocks. Using the baseline model to compute the analog to the empirical moments in table 4, we obtain

$$\Delta \mathbb{E}_{JS}[m^+] = 0.094, \Delta \mathbb{E}_{JS}[m^-] = -0.210,$$

$$\Delta \mathbb{E}_{UE}[m^+] = 0.416, \Delta \mathbb{E}_{UE}[m^-] = 0.148,$$

where  $\Delta$  denotes the difference in conditional means,  $\mathbb{E}_L[\cdot] - \mathbb{E}_H[\cdot]$ , computed at the ergodic distribution.<sup>38</sup> Overall, the model does a fairly good job at replicating the estimated coefficients, the exception being the cyclical of  $m^+$  among job stayers, for which the model predicts a small countercyclical response as opposed to the acyclical one in the data. Otherwise, the model captures well the strong cleansing effect on underqualified workers as well as the sully effect among new hires, which has a more pronounced effect on overqualification.

## VI. Suggestive Evidence

We conclude the paper by providing direct evidence toward the learning friction at the core of this paper and toward its implications for career

<sup>38</sup> Analogous to table 4, the cyclical differences are multiplied by 100.

mobility and mismatch. Appendix I contains additional supportive evidence toward the assumptions and mechanism of the model.

A. *Learning about Skills*

We begin by providing direct evidence for workers having imperfect information about their skills, as modeled here. We do so using a NLSY79 survey question that asks workers about their expected occupation in 60 months. On the basis of the reported forecasts, we construct forecast errors between a worker’s realized occupation in 60 months and their prediction:

$$fe_{i,t,j} \equiv q_{i,t+60,j} - \hat{q}_{i,t+60,j},$$

where  $\hat{q}_{i,t+60,j}$  is the requirement in skill  $j$  associated with the predicted occupation. Suppose that an econometrician observes a noisy measure of a worker’s skills  $\mathbf{a}$ . Hypothesizing that skills are indeed predictive of future occupations,  $\mathbb{E}[\mathbf{q}_{i,t+60} | \mathbf{a}_i] = \mathbf{a}_i$ , one would then predict the forecast error regarding the utilization of skill  $j$  to be given by

$$pe_{i,t,j} \equiv a_{ij} - \hat{q}_{i,t+60,j}.$$

Importantly,  $pe_{i,t,j}$  is fully realized at the time the forecasts are surveyed. The main premise of our test is that under the null hypothesis that workers know their skills, the forecast error should therefore be orthogonal to the predicted error  $pe_{i,t,j}$ . Note that the orthogonality test follows immediately from the null of workers knowing their own skills and holds regardless of whether the econometric conjecture  $\mathbb{E}[\mathbf{q}_{i,t+60} | \mathbf{a}_i] = \mathbf{a}_i$  is correct. Moreover, while the goodness of our measure for worker skills affects the power of the test, it is inconsequential for its validity.<sup>39</sup>

We assess the hypothesis of full information by estimating the following specification:

$$\sum_{j=1}^4 fe_{i,t,j} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \sum_{j=1}^4 pe_{i,t,j} + \epsilon_{i,t}. \tag{13}$$

Our estimate for  $\beta_1$  is given by 0.56, with a standard error of 0.02. Table 5 further reports variations of our test, where we separately estimate (13) for each skill dimension,

$$fe_{i,t,j} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 pe_{i,t,j} + \epsilon_{i,t,j}.$$

In all cases, we reject the null hypothesis that workers have full information about their skills. The findings are consistent with anecdotal evidence

<sup>39</sup> This is because any variable that is realized at date  $t$  should be orthogonal to workers’ expectation error under full information. This holds true independent of the remainder of workers’ information structure and regardless of whether  $\mathbf{a}_i$  is a noisy measure itself. See Chahrour and Ulbricht (2021) for a formal proof.

TABLE 5  
DIRECT EVIDENCE FOR LEARNING

|               | DEPENDENT VARIABLE   |                   |                   |                   |                   |
|---------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
|               | $\sum_j fe_j$<br>(1) | $fe_j$            |                   |                   |                   |
|               |                      | Math<br>(2)       | Verbal<br>(3)     | Technical<br>(4)  | Social<br>(5)     |
| $\sum_j pe_j$ | .562***<br>(.020)    |                   |                   |                   |                   |
| $pe_j$        |                      | .556***<br>(.019) | .471***<br>(.020) | .331***<br>(.020) | .482***<br>(.020) |
| $R^2$         | .321                 | .331              | .257              | .155              | .251              |
| Observations  | 1,575                | 1,575             | 1,575             | 1,575             | 1,575             |

NOTE.—Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

\*\*\* Coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 1% level.

given in Guvenen et al. (2020), which suggests that workers are unaware of their own ASVAB test scores, and with recent work by Conlon et al. (2018), who document substantial forecast errors regarding labor market outcomes using the Survey of Consumer Expectations of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

We also note that  $\beta_1 > 0$  in all specifications, indicating that learning has the expected effect: suppose, for instance, that a worker underestimates their future use of math skills. Then our estimate indicates that over time, as the worker learns about their skills, they indeed end up in a career that is more math intense than initially predicted.

To sum up, our estimates (1) reject the null that workers perfectly know their skills and (2) support the prediction that as workers learn about their skills, their occupation choices are skill driven.

## B. Career Mobility and Mismatch

### 1. Skills Predict Career Mobility

Our model predicts that workers seek to switch careers when their belief estimate about current skills,  $\hat{a}_k$ , falls below a certain threshold. Lacking data on  $\hat{a}_k$ , we cannot directly explore this prediction in the data. Still, because  $\hat{a}_k$  is centered around the true skill  $a_k$ , we can use our skill measure to proxy for  $\hat{a}_k$ . To do so, define  $a_i(k) \equiv (w_{k,1}, \dots, w_{k,j}) \times \mathbf{a}'_i$  as the suitability of worker  $i$ 's skills for their current career  $k$ , determined by their skills weighted by the normalized skill requirements,  $\{w_{k,j}\}$ , introduced in section III.A. We then estimate the following specification in the sample of all job transitions in the NLSY79:

$$\text{career switch}_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 a_i(k_{i,t-1}) + \gamma x_{i,t} + \delta_m + \delta_y + \epsilon_{i,t}, \quad (14)$$

where career switch<sub>*i,t*</sub> is a dummy that equals 1 if the transition entails a career switch; *x*<sub>*i,t*</sub> is a set of worker controls, including a quadratic polynomial in age, the region of residence, and race, gender, and education dummies; and δ<sub>*m*</sub> and δ<sub>*y*</sub> are month and 5-year fixed effects. We estimate β̂<sub>1</sub> = -0.071 (cf. table 6), implying that a lower skill index for the job prior to the transition indeed raises the propensity of career switching, consistent with the predictions of the model.

2. Career Mobility Predicts Mismatch

Our model further predicts that workers who switch careers are on average more mismatched in their new job compared with nonswitchers. Moreover, because mismatch is caused by uncertainty, we not only expect it to be higher on average among switchers but also further expect it to have a higher variance.

We explore these predictions by comparing switchers with nonswitchers, using again the same sample of all job transitions in the NLSY79. Specifically, we estimate the impact on average mismatch using the following specification:

$$m_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{career switch}_{i,t} + \gamma x_{i,t} + \delta_m + \delta_y + \epsilon_{i,t}, \quad (15)$$

using the same set of controls as in (14). We find β̂<sub>1</sub> = 0.957, implying that average mismatch among career switchers is indeed significantly higher than among nonswitchers. To explore the impact on the variance of mismatch, we use a conditional heteroskedasticity model using the residuals from (15) to compute the standard deviation of mismatch, SD (m<sub>*i,t*</sub>) = |ε<sub>*i,t*</sub>|. The second stage is specified as follows:

TABLE 6  
CAREER MOBILITY AND MISMATCH

|   | DEPENDENT VARIABLE                         |                                       |  |
|---|--|---------------------------------------|--|
|   | career switch <sub><i>i,t</i></sub><br>(1) | <i>m</i> <sub><i>i,t</i></sub><br>(2) | SD ( <i>m</i> <sub><i>i,t</i></sub> )<br>(3) |
| <i>a</i> <sub><i>i</i></sub> ( <i>k</i> <sub><i>i,t-1</i></sub> ) | -.071***<br>(.023)                         |                                       |  |
| career switch <sub><i>i,t</i></sub>                               |  | .957***<br>(.308)                     | .605***<br>(.178)                            |

NOTE.—Standard errors clustered at the worker level are in parentheses. Mismatch in cols. 2 and 3 is multiplied by 100 (so it ranges from 0 to 100). Column 3 reports the second stage of a conditional heteroskedasticity model, using the residuals ε<sub>*i,t*</sub> from col. 2 to compute SD (m<sub>*i,t*</sub>) = |ε<sub>*i,t*</sub>|. See the main text for a description of the controls.

\*\*\* Coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 1% level.

$$\text{s.d.}(m_{i,t}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{career switch}_{i,t} + \gamma x_{i,t} + \delta_m + \delta_y + \zeta_{i,t},$$

using again the same set of controls as in (14) and (15). As predicted by the model, we find a positive and statistically significant effect that increases the standard deviation of mismatch by 0.605 for career-switchers compared to non-switchers.

## VII. Conclusion

This paper studies the business cyclicity of worker-occupation mismatch in a quantitative business cycle model with labor market and information frictions. We estimate the model using US data. We find that aggregate mismatch is procyclical among job stayers and countercyclical among new hires, with the former force being overall dominating. These patterns are consistent with direct evidence on the cyclicity of mismatch. We have also shown that the model predicts a scarring effect of job displacement that is sufficiently large to account for empirical evidence on the unemployment scar.

Our framework is among the first that incorporates multidimensional sorting into an equilibrium model with labor market frictions (see also Lindenlaub and Postel-Vinay 2020; Lise and Postel-Vinay 2020). It is distinguished from the existing literature by its analytical tractability, which opens the door to the analysis of aggregate shocks. Our framework delivers rich predictions regarding job and career mobility.

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