# Dominant Firms in the Digital Age

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# JAN EECKHOUT THE PROFIT PARADOX

THREATEN THE

# **THE PROFIT PARADOX**


How Thriving Firms Threaten the Future of Work

**BY JAN EECKHOUT** 

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TheProfitParadox.com

#### Dow Jones



PROFIT PARADOX

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#### RISE IN ECONOMY-WIDE MARKET POWER

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Economy-wide market power...

- Stock market valuations: p.a. growth  $< 1\% \rightarrow 7\%$
- Markups:  $1.2 \rightarrow 1.6$
- Profit rates:  $1\% \rightarrow 8\%$
- $\rightarrow\,$  For a few dominant firms: distribution and reallocation


#### Aggregate Markup


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#### Markup Distribution

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
## Markup Distribution



- Decomposition: within-sector, not between sectors
- Large reallocation to productive firms: Autor-Dorn-Katz-Patterson-Van Reenen (2020)
- In all sectors, from Tech to Textiles
- But, tech plays a role, Teulings-Van 't Klooster (2021)

#### A Global Phenomenon

THE



## History



- Market Power has always been part of economics:
  - Ancient Greece: Monopoly power granted by sovereign
  - British East India Company: built on monopoly power (origin of US independence)
  - First formal models economics: Cournot oligopoly in 1838
  - Any business person knows: gain and exploit market power to make money
  - Schumpeter: (temporary) market power is necessary for growth (creative destruction)
- Has its own discipline, Industrial Organization (IO)
- Macro: Monetary policy; Input-output connections and aggregate fluctuations
- Antitrust Policy: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)

### MACROECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS


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
Economy-wide market power ... has an economy-wide impact


- Declining labor share
  - Wage stagnation (wedge productivity-wages)
  - Falling labor force participation
- Declining business dynamism
  - Labor reallocation
  - Startup rate
- Rising Wage Inequality

#### Labor Share

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




## Business Dynamism: Job Reallocation THE PROFIT PARADO Job reallocation rate US, percent 35-30-25-2000 2010 1980 1990 2020


#### Business Dynamism: Startups

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#### Wage Inequality

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## Wage Inequality




The role of Market Power

- Between-firm inequality: increases due to market power (> 50%)
- Wage stagnation: wage decline even without technological regress




#### Wage Inequality: Superstar Pay

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#### Wage Inequality: Superstar Pay

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"I don't want a business that's easy for competitors. I want a business with a moat around it. [...] Our managers of the businesses we run, I've got one message for them, which is to widen the moat." – Warren Buffett (2007)

## Economic Mechanisms



What are the economic mechanisms (including General Equilibrium effects)

 ${\rm Causes}$ 

- 1. Lax antitrust enforcement 'Bork doctrine' starts in early 1980s
- 2. Fast technological change
  - Scale economies: Fixed cost + 40%; Returns to scale: from 1 to 1.05
  - Rising dispersion in productivities:  $\sigma = .03 \rightarrow .07$

3. Globalization

## Welfare Cost



- Output (and welfare) loss: 8% of GDP De Loecker e.a. (2022), Edmonds e.a. (2022)
  - Large reallocation towards most productive firms
  - Even larger decline due to rent-extraction (deadweight loss)
- Efficiency gain + market power:
  - price  $p \searrow$
  - cost  $c \searrow \searrow$
  - markup  $\frac{p}{c}\nearrow$



- Taxation: can redistribute, but cannot get rid of inefficiency
- Only reducing economy-wide market power will reduce inefficiency



- Taxation: can redistribute, but cannot get rid of inefficiency
- Only reducing economy-wide market power will reduce inefficiency
- But, current antitrust/regulation
  - focuses on direct harm to consumers and workers
  - has limited tools to deal with (pecuniary) externalities from economy-wide market power

#### • More competition

- Split up firms? Maybe
- Regulation: interoperability separate network from operators (pro-competitive)

- Antitrust policy: merger review, Ex ante regulation, market investigations,...
- Regulate dominant firms as utilities

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- Fast technological change  $\rightarrow$  market power  $\rightarrow$  economy-wide implications
- Large welfare cost (8% of GDP); future?
- Not first time:
  - 1900, electricity, telegraph, railways  $\rightarrow$  now all are regulated utilities
  - But... it took 2 wars and the great depression to undo market power

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