# **Dominant Currency Paradigm**

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CREI Lectures, 2018

Lecture III

### Endogenous currency choice

- Engel (JIE, 2006), Gopinath, Itskhoki and Rigobon (AER, 2010)
- Prices are sticky one period ahead.
- firm chooses to price in the local (n) currency as opposed to the producer (i) currency if E<sub>t-1</sub>Π(p<sub>in,t</sub>) > E<sub>t-1</sub>(Π(p<sub>in,t</sub>).
- second order approximation to the profit function around the flexible price at date *t*,

$$\begin{split} \mathbb{E}_{t-1}\left[\Pi(\bar{p}_{in,t}^n) - \Pi(\bar{p}_{in,t}^i)\right] &\approx \mathbb{E}_{t-1}\frac{1}{2}\tilde{\Pi}_{pp}\left[(\bar{p}_{in,t}^n - \tilde{p}_{in,t}^n)^2 - (\bar{p}_{in,t}^i + e_{in,t} - \tilde{p}_{in,t}^n)^2\right]\\ \tilde{\Pi}_{pp} &< 0 \end{split}$$

$$\begin{split} \mathbb{E}_{t-1} \frac{1}{2} \tilde{\Pi}_{pp} \left[ (\bar{p}_{in,t}^{n} - \bar{p}_{in,t}^{i} - e_{in,t}) (\bar{p}_{in,t}^{n} + \bar{p}_{in,t}^{i} + e_{in,t} - 2\tilde{p}_{in,t}^{n}) \right] = \\ \mathbb{E}_{t-1} \frac{1}{2} \tilde{\Pi}_{pp} \left[ (\mathbb{E}_{t-1} e_{in,t} - e_{in,t}) (\bar{p}_{in,t}^{n} + \bar{p}_{in,t}^{i} + e_{in,t} - 2\tilde{p}_{in,t}^{n}) \right] \end{split}$$

The equality follows because  $\bar{p}_{in,t}^n = \bar{p}_{in,t}^i + \mathbb{E}_{t-1}e_{in,t}$ ,  $\mathbb{E}_{t-1}(\mathbb{E}_{t-1}e_{in,t} - e_{in,t}) = 0$ 

$$\mathbb{E}_{t-1}\left[\Pi(\bar{p}_{in,t}^n) - \Pi(\bar{p}_{in,t}^i)\right] \approx \frac{1}{2}\tilde{\Pi}_{pp}Cov_{t-1}(-e_{in,t},e_{in,t} - 2\tilde{p}_{in,t}^n)$$

The firm will therefore choose LCP if:

$$\frac{\textit{Cov}_{t-1}(\tilde{p}_{\textit{in},t}^n,e_{\textit{in},t})}{\textit{Var}_{t-1}(e_{\textit{in},t})} < \frac{1}{2},$$

- if a firm desires low ERPT, in the short run before it has a chance to adjust prices, the firm is better off choosing local currency pricing that results in 0% pass-through in the short run.
- If short-run desired pass-through is high, the firm should choose producer currency pricing that results in complete (100%) pass-through prior to price adjustment.
- Multiple equilibria.

• Dollar pricing if

$$\frac{\textit{Cov}_{t-1}(\tilde{p}_{\textit{in},t}^{\$}, e_{i\$,t})}{\textit{Var}_{t-1}(e_{i\$,t})} < \frac{1}{2},$$

- Imported inputs always pushes towards dollar pricing
- Strategic complementarities in pricing mixed



Figure 6: Currency Choice in the  $(\Gamma, \phi)$ -space

### Banking, Trade, and the Making of a Dominant Currency

Gita Gopinath Jeremy Stein Harvard Harvard

## What is a "Dominant Currency"? Trade invoicing

#### Trade invoicing

•  $\frac{\text{Dollar Invoicing in World Imports}}{\text{Imports from U.S.}} = 4.7$  $\frac{\text{Euro Invoicing in World Imports}}{\text{Imports from Euro Area}} = 1.2$ 

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- 2 International bank funding and corporate borrowing
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  - Dollar: 64%; Euro: 20%; Yen: 4%
- - Violation of UIP: Dollar risk-free assets pay lower expected returns (in a common currency)

### Literature

#### • Trade invoicing (unit of account)

• Friberg (1998), Engel (2006), Devereux et al. (2004), Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2005), Gopinath et al. (2010), Goldberg and Tille (2013), Perez and Drenik (2017), Doepke and Schneider (2017)

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- Safe assets and exorbitant privilege (store of value)
  - Hassan (2013), Gourinchas and Rey (2010); Maggiori (2017); He, Krishnamurthy, Milibradt (2016), Farhi and Maggiori (2016)

### What we do

- 1 Unified theory for dominance in trade invoicing and finance
- 2 Strategic complementarity of unit of account and store of value
- **3** Dominant currency, despite multiple candidates
- G 'Currency mismatch' and 'exorbitant privilege'

### What we do

- 1 Unified theory for dominance in trade invoicing and finance
- 2 Strategic complementarity of unit of account and store of value
- **3** Dominant currency, despite multiple candidates
- (4) 'Currency mismatch' and 'exorbitant privilege'

Eichengreen (2010): "...experience suggests that the logical sequencing of steps in internationalizing a currency is: first, encouraging its use in invoicing and settling trade; second, encouraging its use in private financial transactions; third encouraging its use by central banks and governments as a form in which to hold private reserves."

High \$ invoicing









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  - Single EM and US
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#### Full model: US, Euro Area, continuum of emerging markets

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Some cross-country evidence

- 1) Exogenous invoicing
- 2) Endogenous invoicing
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- Two countries: U.S and an EM.
- Two dates: 0 and 1
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- Importers

$$\max_{C_0,D_h,D_{\$},A_R} C_0 + \beta \mathbb{E}_0 W_1 + \theta \log(M), \tag{P1}$$

subject to:

$$egin{aligned} C_0 &\leq W_0 - Q_h D_h - \mathcal{E}_0 Q_\$ D_\$ - Q_R A_R \ W_1 &= D_h + \mathcal{E}_1 D_\$ + \xi A_R, \end{aligned}$$

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subject to:

$$C_0 \leq W_0 - Q_h D_h - \mathcal{E}_0 Q_{\$} D_{\$} - Q_R A_R$$
  
$$W_1 = D_h + \mathcal{E}_1 D_{\$} + \xi A_R,$$

• Preference for safe "money-like" assets,  $\theta > 0$ 

$$M = \left(D_h^{\alpha_h} D_{\$}^{\alpha_{\$}}\right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha_h + \alpha_{\$}}}$$

- Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012), Stein (2012), Sunderam (2014), Greenwood, Hanson and Stein (2015), Nagel (2016)
- price in invoice currency set at time 0 and sticky through time 1

$$Q_h = \beta + \theta \frac{\alpha_h}{(\alpha_h + \alpha_\$) D_h}$$

$$Q_{\$} = \beta + \theta \frac{\alpha_{\$}}{(\alpha_h + \alpha_{\$})D_{\$}}$$

$$Q_R = \beta$$

• 
$$\mathbb{E}_0(\mathcal{E}_1) = \mathcal{E}_0 = 1; \mathbb{E}_0(\xi) = 1$$

- EM Banks (agglomeration of banks and borrowing firms)
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$$\max_{B_h,B_{\$},B_R} \mathbb{E}_0 \left[ \gamma N - B_h - \mathcal{E} B_{\$} - \xi B_R \right]$$

subject to,

$$\begin{aligned} Q_h B_h + Q_{\$} B_{\$} + Q_R B_R &\geq N \\ \bar{\mathcal{E}} B_{\$} + B_h &\leq \gamma_L N \end{aligned}$$

- · Limits to safe asset creation
  - $\gamma_L$ : Worst case payout of project
  - $\bar{\mathcal{E}}$ : Worst case value of EM currency
- · Comparative disadvantage in manufacturing dollar safe claims

• 
$$\mathbb{E}_0 \gamma = 1, \mathbb{E}_0 \xi = 1$$

• UIP Violation & Exorbitant Privilege:  $Q_{\$} > Q_h > Q_R$ 

$$\frac{Q_{\$} - \beta}{Q_h - \beta} = \bar{\mathcal{E}}$$
### Model: Exogenous invoicing and banking market structure

• UIP Violation & Exorbitant Privilege:  $Q_{\$} > Q_h > Q_R$ 

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- Market clearing

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· 'Walking up a supply curve'

$$D_{h} = \frac{\alpha_{h}}{\alpha_{\$} + \alpha_{h}} \left( \gamma_{L} N + \bar{\mathcal{E}} X_{\$} \right)$$

$$D_{\$} = \frac{\alpha_{\$}}{\alpha_{\$} + \alpha_{h}} \frac{\left( \gamma_{L} N + \bar{\mathcal{E}} X_{\$} \right)}{\bar{\mathcal{E}}} > X_{\$}$$

$$Q_{h} = \beta + \frac{\theta}{\left( \gamma_{L} N + \bar{\mathcal{E}} X_{\$} \right)}$$

$$Q_{\$} = \beta + \frac{\theta \bar{\mathcal{E}}}{\left( \gamma_{L} N + \bar{\mathcal{E}} X_{\$} \right)}$$

Model: Invoicing Shares, UIP Deviations, Dollar Borrowing



$$\bar{\alpha_{\$}} = \frac{\alpha_h \mathcal{E} X_{\$}}{\gamma_L N}$$

High dollar invoicing  $\implies$  low return on safe dollar claims

Outline of Talk

- 1) Exogenous invoicing
- 2) Endogenous invoicing
- 3) Strategic complementarity, Multiple Equilibria
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### Model: Endogenous Invoicing

• Invoice fraction  $\eta$  of *N* in dollars (exports)

$$\max_{B_h,B_{\$},B_{\$},B_{\$},\eta} \mathbb{E}_0 \left[ \gamma N_0 + \gamma (1-\eta) N + \mathcal{E} \gamma \eta N - B_h - \mathcal{E} B_{\$} - \xi B_R - \frac{\phi}{2} N \eta^2 \right]$$

subject to,

$$egin{aligned} Q_h B_h + Q_\$ B_\$ + Q_R B_R \geq & N + N_0 \ ar{\mathcal{E}} B_\$ + B_h \leq & \gamma_L N_0 + (1 - \eta) \gamma_L N + ar{\mathcal{E}} \eta \gamma_L N \ & B_h \leq & \gamma_L N_0 + (1 - \eta) \gamma_L N \end{aligned}$$

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- Comparative disadvantage in manufacturing \$ safe claims
  - Currency mismatch:  $\bar{\mathcal{E}}$
  - Invoicing costs:  $\frac{\phi}{2} \frac{(\eta N)^2}{N}$ ; Proxies for risk-aversion of ultimate owners of exporting firms.

# Model: Endogenous Invoicing Shares

• Dollar premium (DP):

$$Q_{\$} - Q_h = \beta \left( \mu(\eta)(\bar{\mathcal{E}} - 1) - \kappa \right)$$

• Invoicing choice (IC):

$$\eta = rac{\gamma_L}{eta \phi} \left( Q_{\$} - Q_h 
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- · Why invoice in dollars? To access cheap dollar financing
  - Contrast with arguments based on optimal degree of cost pass-through into prices

#### Equilibrium Values As Dollar Invoice Share Varies



# Why Invoicing Relevant if Exporters Can Hedge?

- Invoicing bundles goods-pricing with risk management.
- Why not unbundle?
  - To hedge FX risk need to post collateral, reduces real investment
    - Rampini and Viswanathan (2010, 2013, 2017), Rampini, Sufi and Viswanathan (2014), Rampini, Viswanathan and Vuillemey (2017)

# Outline of Talk

- 1) Exogenous invoicing
- 2) Endogenous invoicing
- 3) Strategic complementarity, Multiple Equilibria
- 4) Emergence of single dominant currency

- Continuum of EMs and US
- · Safe asset demand only in own local currency and in dollars

$$M_i = \left(D_{hi}^{\alpha_{hi}} D_{\$i}^{\alpha_{\$i}}\right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha_{hi} + \alpha_{\$i}}}$$

Invoicing decisions in *j* effect invoicing shares in *i*

$$\alpha_{\$i} \equiv a + b \int_{j \neq i} \eta_j dj$$

- a > 0: share of U.S. goods
- b > 0: share of goods from other EMs; a + b < 1

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$$B_{hi} = D_{hi}, B_{Ri} = A_{Ri}, \int_i B_{si} di + X_s = \int_i D_{si} di$$

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High 
$$\eta_j$$

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## Simultaneous determination of invoicing and banking

- Integrated markets for dollar deposits, segmented markets for EM currencies.
- Multiple Equilibria with varying degrees of dollar invoicing

Simultaneous determination of invoicing and banking

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$$\alpha_{\$i} = a + b \int_{j \neq i} \eta_{\$j} dj \qquad \alpha_{\notin i} = a + b \int_{j \neq i} \eta_{\notin j} dj$$

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• Symmetry: 
$$\bar{\mathcal{E}}_{\in i} = \bar{\mathcal{E}}_{\$i} = \bar{\mathcal{E}}$$

· Integrated markets for dollar and euro deposits

• EM Banks

$$\max \mathbb{E}_{0}[\gamma(N_{0}+N)+\gamma N\eta_{\$i}(\mathcal{E}_{\$i,1}-1)+\gamma N\eta_{\epsilon i}(\mathcal{E}_{\epsilon i,1}-1) \\ -B_{hi}-\mathcal{E}_{\$i,1}B_{\$i}-\mathcal{E}_{\epsilon i,1}B_{\epsilon i}-\xi B_{Ri} \\ -\frac{\phi}{2}N(\eta_{\$i}^{2}+\eta_{\epsilon i}^{2}+2c\eta_{\$i}\eta_{\epsilon i})]$$

subject to,

$$\begin{aligned} Q_{h}B_{hi} + Q_{\$}B_{\$i} + Q_{\varepsilon}B_{\varepsilon i} + Q_{Ri}B_{Ri} &\geq N + N_{0} \\ \bar{\mathcal{E}}(B_{\$i} + B_{\varepsilon i}) + B_{i} &\leq \gamma_{L}(N_{0} + (1 - \eta_{\$i} - \eta_{\varepsilon i})N) + (\eta_{\$i} + \eta_{\varepsilon i})\bar{\mathcal{E}}\gamma_{L}N \\ B_{i} &\leq \gamma_{L}(N_{0} + (1 - \eta_{\$i} - \eta_{\varepsilon i})N) \end{aligned}$$

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subject to,

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•  $\bar{\mathcal{E}}_{\in} = \bar{\mathcal{E}}_{\$} = \bar{\mathcal{E}}$ 

• Integrated markets for dollar and euro deposits, segmented markets for EM currencies.

Invoicing decision

$$\eta_{\$i} = \frac{\gamma_L}{\beta\phi} (Q_{\$} - Q_{hi}) - c\eta_{\in i}$$
$$\eta_{\in i} = \frac{\gamma_L}{\beta\phi} (Q_{\in} - Q_{hi}) - c\eta_{\$i}$$

Market-clearing:

$$D_{hi} = B_{hi} \quad \forall i$$

$$A_{Ri} = B_{Ri} \quad \forall i$$

$$\int_{i} D_{\$i} = \int_{i} B_{\$i} + X$$

$$\int_{i} D_{ŧi} = \int_{i} B_{ŧi} + X$$

- Three possible equilibria
  - No global currency (symmetric)
    - $\eta_{\$} = \eta_{\in} = 0, B_{\$} = B_{\in} = 0$
  - · Single/dominant global currency (asymmetric)
    - $\eta_{\$} > 0, \eta_{\in} = 0, B_{\$} > 0, B_{\in} = 0$
  - Multiple global currencies (symmetric)
    - $\eta_{\$} > 0, \eta_{\textcircled{\in}} > 0, B_{\$} > 0, B_{\textcircled{\in}} > 0$

- Single/dominant global currency
  - sufficient safe-asset demand to sustain one global currency, but not two



Figure: Equilibria supported as a function of 'a'

### Numerical Example

Parameter	Ν	$N_0$	X	$\alpha_h$	$\phi$	$\theta$	$\beta$	$\gamma_L$	$\bar{\mathcal{E}}$	b	С
Value	7	7	3	0.2	0.1	1.4	0.8	0.7	2	0.5	0.8



## Dominance in Trade Invoicing



### Dominance in Banking


## **Currency Mismatch**



### **Exorbitant Privilege**



### Comments

- · Which currency dominates? The role of history
  - Pre-1999,  $a_{\$} >> a_{\in}$ , Dollar only dominant currency
  - · Post-1999, closer in size, but history picks the dollar
  - · Can take a long time to reverse

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  - · Can take a long time to reverse
- · Why dollarization of central bank reserves?
  - · Lender of last resort of banks
  - Central bank asset mix mirrors commercial banks liability structure
  - Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor (2010)

Data: Relation between trade invoicing and bank liabilities

$$\frac{D_{\$,i}}{D_{€,i}} = \frac{\alpha_{\$,i}}{\alpha_{€,i}} \cdot \frac{Q_{€} - \beta}{Q_{\$} - \beta}$$

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BIS Locational Banking Statistics, Local Liabilities

### Data: Relation between trade invoicing and bank liabilities



BIS Locational Banking Statistics, Local liabilities

# Data: Relation between trade invoicing and central bank reserves



IMF, Wong (2007), Gopinath & Stein (2018, AER P&P)

## Conclusion

1 Unified theory for dominance in trade invoicing and finance

- · Invoice in dollars because dollar financing cheap
- · Dollar financing cheap because of invoicing in dollars
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**1** Unified theory for dominance in trade invoicing *and* finance

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#### China's Renminbi

- Share as settlement currency: 0% in 2010, 25% in 2015
- · Second most widely used currency in global trade finance

Micro-foundation for P1 back

• Risk-Neutral Investors:

<u>-n</u>

$$\max_{\substack{C_0^n, C_1^n, D_k^n, D_s^n, A_R^n}} C_0^n + \beta \mathbb{E}_0 C_1^n,$$
(P2)  
subject to:

$$C_0^n \le W_0^n - Q_h D_h^n - \mathcal{E}_0 Q_{\$} D_{\$}^n - Q_R A_R^n, \ C_1 = D_h^n + \mathcal{E}_1 D_{\$}^n + \xi A_R^n,$$

$$\begin{aligned} Q_R &= \beta, A_R > 0\\ D_h^n &= D_\$^n &= 0 \qquad \text{if} \qquad Q_h > \beta, Q_\$ > \beta \end{aligned}$$

Micro-foundation for P1 back

Risk-Averse Importers:

$$\max_{C_1,D_h,D_{\$}} \mathbb{E}_0 U(C_1),$$
(P3)  
subject to:  
$$W \ge Q_h D_h - \mathcal{E}_0 Q_{\$} D_{\$}$$
$$P_1 C_1 \le D_h + \mathcal{E}_1 D_{\$},$$

where the consumption aggregator and price level are given by,

$$C = C_h^{1-\alpha} C_{\$}^{\alpha} \qquad P = \frac{P_h^{1-\alpha} \left(\mathcal{E}_1 P_{\$}\right)^{\alpha}}{\alpha^{\alpha} (1-\alpha)^{1-\alpha}} = \frac{\mathcal{E}_1^{\alpha}}{\alpha^{\alpha} (1-\alpha)^{1-\alpha}} = \nu \mathcal{E}_1^{\alpha}$$

and  $\alpha = \frac{\alpha_{\$}}{\alpha_h + \alpha_{\$}}$ 

## Micro-foundation for P1



Figure: Relative demand for dollar deposits (in partial equilibrium)

## Micro-foundation for P1 Dack



Figure: Full equilibrium