

"How Costly Are Markups?"

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The Questions

- three important questions
 - ① how large are the losses from markups?
 - ② what are the distorted margins?
 - ③ what are the best corrective policies?
- why do we care?
 - ▶ in recent past, US industries have become more concentrated and profit margins have increased
 - ★ 1982-2010: sales share of top 4 firms increased by 40% (Autor et al., 2013)
 - ▶ large literature emphasizes importance of micro-level distortions for aggregate outcomes
 - ★ market power is an obvious source of misallocation
 - ▶ identifying inefficiencies needed to find remedies

This Paper: Model

- main challenges:
 - ▶ markups hard to measure
 - ▶ no universally accepted model of imperfect competition
- quantitative model of firm dynamics with endogenous markups
- monopolistic competition with free entry
 - ▶ upon entry: productivity drawn from Pareto distribution, shape parameter ξ
 - ▶ after entry: one-time irreversible investment
 - ▶ two factors: labor and intermediates
 - ▶ infinitesimal firms, but non-CES demand system

Kinked Demand

- Kimball-Klenow-Willis (KKW) production function

- ▶ elasticity varies with relative quantity, $q = y/Y$

markup:
$$\mu(q) = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - q^{\epsilon/\sigma}}$$

- ★ $\sigma > 1$ determines average elasticity of substitution
- ★ $\epsilon \geq 0$ determines how elasticity varies with relative quantity (superelasticity)
- ★ $\epsilon = 0 \rightarrow$ CES

- compared to CES, $\epsilon > 0$:

- ▶ as a firm's price rises above average, its demand is choked off more quickly than with CES
- ▶ as its price declines below average, its demand rises less rapidly than it does under CES
- ▶ hence, stronger incentive to keep prices close to average \rightarrow "kinked demand"

Results

- calibration:

- ▶ $\sigma = 10 \rightarrow \mu(1) = \mu(q)|_{\epsilon=0} = 1.11$
- ▶ $\epsilon = 1.64$ and $\zeta = 4.79$ calibrated to match the US distribution of sales and payroll in 6-digit NAICS industries

- costs of markups: 26.1% (without intermediates: 3.4%)

- 1 underinvestment, labor supply too low (*aggregate markup*) $\approx 3/4$
- 2 misallocation across firms (*markup dispersion*) $\approx 1/4$
- 3 inefficient entry ≈ 0

- policy analysis:

- 1 entry subsidy not very effective: entry not very distorted, effect on competition weak
- 2 limiting industry concentration may backfire: large firms are already *too small*
- 3 uniform output subsidy eliminates 3/4 of distortion

General Comments

- important question
- largely plausible results
 - ▶ top firms account for a huge fraction of sales
 - ▶ if markups vary little across top firms → relatively low misallocation
 - ▶ crucial effect of intermediates (Jones, 2011, Baqaee & Farhi, 2018)
- questions:
 - ▶ kinked demand
 - ▶ calibration - robustness
 - ▶ the rise of concentration

Kinked Demand: Some Issues


- kinked demand
 - ▶ no strategic interaction
- key feature:
 - ▶ stronger DRS than CES
- comparison to CES
 - ▶ CES with exogenous markups (same as KKW) → "overstate" misallocation
 - ★ but calibration of σ not easily comparable
 - ★ (Hsieh & Klenow, 2009)
 - ▶ CES with endogenous markups (discrete number of firms) → similar misallocation
 - ★ but then CES/KKW not crucial, provided the right "curvature" is used
 - ★ (Atkeson & Burstein, 2008, Edmond, Midrigan & Xu, 2015)

KKW versus CES

- demand elasticity, e :

$$KKW : e(q) = \sigma q^{-\epsilon/\sigma}; \quad CES : e(s) = \left(\frac{s}{\theta} + \frac{1-s}{\gamma} \right)^{-1}$$

- ▶ elasticity of profit share to q (KKW, red) or s (CES, black):



- firm size less effective at reducing markups with KKW than CES

Calibration: Some Issues

- is this a model of superstar firms?
 - ▶ Census data aggregated in size classes
 - ★ superstar firms are *within* the top bin
 - ▶ continuum of firms versus granularity
- why $\sigma = 10$?
 - ▶ seems high compared to estimates of demand elasticities
 - ★ trade literature often uses $\sigma \leq 5$ (Broda & Weinstein, 2006, Redding & Weinstein, 2018)
- ratio ϵ/σ critical in shaping the markup distribution
 - ▶ no direct evidence, indirect for Taiwan
 - ▶ are Taiwanese manufacturing firms comparable to US?

Calibration: Some Suggestions

- use firm-level data in Compustat
 - ▶ estimate simultaneously σ , ϵ , and ξ
 - ▶ show how the model fits the markup distribution
 - ★ markup variation seems higher in Compustat
- add multiple industries
- cross-industry heterogeneity in markups may be higher
 - ▶ high cross-industry variation in $\sigma \rightarrow \uparrow$ misallocation
 - ▶ lower elasticity of substitution between industries $\rightarrow \downarrow$ misallocation
 - ▶ (Epifani & Gancia, 2011)
- net effect unclear, would be nice to find out!

Why Did Concentration Increase?

- the increase in concentration is astonishing
 - ▶ worth a paper on its own!
- is it good or bad news?
 - ▶ not obvious
- reason for the increase in concentration matters
 - ▶ markups more compressed → lower misallocation
 - ▶ productivity more dispersed → higher misallocation?
- empirical challenge:
 - ▶ disentangle markups and technology

Why Did Concentration Increase? Some Hints

- Bonfiglioli, Crino' & Gancia (2018a)
 - ▶ transaction-level data on US import, 2002-2012
 - ▶ study firm-level determinants of economic performance in US market
 - ★ intensive/extensive, average/top firms, granularity
 - ★ granularity less important than heterogeneity for explaining sales
- here: use our data to document the increase in concentration
 - ▶ many countries of origin, many sectors → country or sector specific?
 - ▶ all firms are small in the US market → markup variation unlikely
 - ▶ can control for prices
- 2002-2012 change in the share of top4 firms
 - ▶ by country: +20%
 - ▶ by sector: +20%
 - ▶ not explained by changes in prices
- global in scope, technological in nature
 - ▶ concentration correlates with: market size, export, entry, innovation (Bonfiglioli, Crino' & Gancia, 2018a,b,c)

Conclusion

- great paper!
 - ▶ important question
 - ▶ very nice model
 - ▶ plausible results
- some more effort on the calibration may help
 - ▶ is KKW the "right" demand system?
- leaves the desire to see more
- especially on the time dimension
 - ▶ how did distortion change with the rise of concentration?

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